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Abstract 
Under an over-arching feminist framework, this thesis utilises disaster sociology 
and domestic violence theory to examine the complex and multi-faceted 
relationship between domestic violence and disasters.  The applicability of 
previously published theories was tested through a postal survey of 
communities affected by 17 Civil Defence emergencies in New Zealand and in 5 
detailed case studies (taken from the 17 surveyed communities) relating to the 
impact of Civil Defence emergencies on domestic violence and disaster 
response agencies in New Zealand.  The case studies involved the collection of 
reporting statistics from Women’s Refuge, interviews with representatives of 
agencies working in domestic violence response and disaster management, and 
analyses of case file summaries from the Women’s Refuge national database 
across the five affected geographic areas.  These methods provided both 
quantitative and qualitative data on domestic violence reporting during 
disasters in New Zealand.   
 
In almost all of the communities studied there was an increase in reporting of 
domestic violence following the Civil Defence emergencies.  Pre-existing theory 
and interviews within the case studies were used to examine significant factors 
and demographics that were common across the women seeking assistance 
during the disasters in order to provide coherent generalisations that may be 
applied in other contexts.  The research concluded that domestic violence 
reporting did increase during disasters.  Whilst it was not possible to determine 
whether it was only domestic violence reporting or domestic violence itself that 
had increased, interviews with key agency representatives revealed some of the 
possible causes of their increased workload.  Confirming the findings of 
international studies, agency representatives stated that prior abuse and 
financial strain were some of the main factors behind the reported increases in 
domestic violence. 
 
Agency representatives reported a range of issues concerning the official 
responses to increased domestic violence reporting during disasters, many of 
which were structural issues regarding procedures set out in current Civil 
Defence policies.  These procedural problems are examined in line with the 
feminist goals guiding this work and a case is made for policy changes that 
should lead to improved handling of increased domestic violence reporting 
during disasters and lead to the development of a more co-ordinated approach 
to the social impacts of disasters.  In order to address the needs of domestic 
violence victims, the degree of gender mainstreaming within Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management policy and practice should also be reviewed.  
 
New Zealand is subject to both national and international obligations to address 
the impact that gender norms have on the outcomes of those experiencing 
disasters.  It is currently not meeting these obligations.  These lacunae in policy 
and planning are placing already vulnerable women and children at heightened 
risk during disasters.  As a country that prides itself on progressive social 
policy, New Zealand can do better. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
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To be a survivor – first you must bleed.  You bleed all that 
was inside of you: the pain, the memories, the fear, the 
wounds fusing together, the ties to what was, in all its 
forms.  You bleed not once but several times.  And when 
you are empty, you either fade into a shadow or find the 
strength, and courage to live.  When you stand up again, 
you are for a time, hollow–empty, like a bottle of beer 
lying on the street, cracked and reeking of its bitter 
contents.  Then you fill yourself up with the new, you 
recreate yourself – you reform.  You don’t have the same 
heart or mind.  The way you see the world is forever 
changed. 
(Lynn Mari, 2009) 
 
 
Domestic violence is an issue that confronts one in three New Zealand women 
in their lifetime (Fanslow & Robinson, 2004).  It is thus likely that all New 
Zealanders know or will know someone who has experienced domestic violence.  
As a child of the 1980’s, I had always, somewhat naively, believed that it was 
not my generation perpetrating this abuse.  I held the belief that domestic 
violence was somehow removed from my life and only relevant through 
research and work.  However, one day while catching up with an old friend, I 
learnt that she had recently escaped an abusive relationship.  I knew the man 
she had been in a relationship with.  The relationship had existed for many 
years.  It had escalated to the point where he controlled her diet, her clothes 
and aspects of her physical appearance, such as her hair, before she left.  She 
did not report this to any agency and had no intention of doing so.  As I 
listened, I was shocked and it struck me that I had accepted inadvertently the 
societal stereotyping of domestic violence victims.  I had been exposed as 
believing that victims and perpetrators of domestic violence were poor, less 
educated and at least ten years older than we were.  At that time, in my early-
20’s, middle class, and with a post-graduate educated lifestyle, I had assumed it 
would never happen in my world.  We have undoubtedly all been guilty at some 
point of thinking domestic violence is someone else’s problem; that the women 
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who suffer abuse belong to a different world than ours.  However, domestic 
violence is not just a problem of the poor or the uneducated.  With such an 
incidence in New Zealander society, it is everyone’s problem.  This thesis 
considers one aspect of domestic violence – the impact of disasters on the 
incidence and reporting of domestic violence.  In this regard, I believe it is 
critical to understand the complex relationships between domestic violence and 
disasters so that these women, women we all know, are assured of the help 
they need and deserve during disasters. 
 
The conclusions made in this thesis are derived from five case studies and a 
postal survey of agencies that work in the domestic violence field in New 
Zealand.  Where increases in reporting were observed, I examined the policy 
and planning in place to meet the needs of those reporting domestic violence to 
determine whether this policy and planning is, and has been, effective.  Where 
shortfalls in policy and planning were established, recommendations have been 
made to address these. 
 
Throughout the course of this research, many of the individuals involved 
commented to me that it seemed “commonsense” or “logical” that domestic 
violence would increase during a natural disaster.  These comments were often 
supported by analogies to events such as factory closures or the loss of 
significant sports games.  These seemingly analogous events may produce 
similar results – such as a rise in domestic violence reporting, however, they do 
not possess the same complexity that a natural disaster presents.  Natural 
disasters can result in loss of key lifelines (roads, electrical power, telephones), 
isolation, and immediate destruction of both homes and possessions.  These 
complications are not present, on this scale, in the aftermath of factory closures 
or losses at sporting events.  The added layer of complexity makes natural 
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disasters a particularly important context in which to examine domestic 
violence reporting.  The findings of this research can be transposed loosely to 
events not categorised as natural disasters, which also result in significant 
stress or life-shocks to a population.  However, the dynamics at play will differ, 
thus research specific to these life-shocks will undoubtedly yield more relevant 
results. 
 
The next three chapters of this thesis focus on the context of the data by 
discussing the theoretical and methodological frameworks used in the research, 
and describing the events, areas, and agencies involved in the studies.  In these 
chapters, previous studies in this area are introduced and the parallels with this 
research explained.   
 
This thesis sits juxtaposed between a number of broad research fields dealing 
with theoretical and methodological issues.  In order to study the interaction 
between domestic violence reporting and disasters, a clear understanding of 
the sociology of disasters, gender and disasters, domestic violence, and the 
theories and literature relevant to gendered policy, is required.   
 
Chapter Two outlines theories and models used in this research to explain why 
domestic violence might increase during a disaster, specifically disaster 
sociology and the Pressure and Release model.  It also places the research in 
the current body of knowledge, discussing the existing empirical literature 
linking domestic violence and disasters and demonstrating how this study 
corroborates and builds on this pre-existing body of work.   
 
The third chapter examines feminist methodology and explains how this 
research embodies the theoretical base underpinning feminist studies.  Key 
 Chapter 1 
 
 4  
elements of feminist research are it is reflexive, focuses on gender inequality, 
gives voice to women and marginalised groups, rejects traditional power 
dynamics between researcher and subjects and has a goal of bringing about 
social change (Renzetti, 1997: 133; Skinner, Hester & Malos, 2005: 10; 
Landman, 2006: 431).  Chapter 3 also presents the methods utilised in data 
collection and the analysis phase of this research, before concluding with a 
review of the limitations of the work and how future research would build on 
this thesis.  The methodologies used were selected based on previous empirical 
studies and comprised a mixed-method approach to gain a broad perspective 
on the relationship between domestic violence reporting incidence and 
disasters.  There were two phases to this research: a survey of 17 Civil Defence 
emergencies in New Zealand between 1996 and 2006 and, five in-depth case 
studies selected from the 17 emergencies surveyed.  The case studies involved 
a collection of statistics from a non-government domestic violence agency, 
aggregation of case file summaries from the previously mentioned domestic 
violence organisation and, interviews with agency representatives from 
domestic violence response and disaster management organisations. 
 
The fourth chapter is contextual and provides the reader with information about 
the events included in this research and the communities that took part in the 
case studies.  It also provides a description of the agencies that took part in the 
case studies, for readers not familiar with the domestic violence and Civil 
Defence fields in New Zealand.  In discussing the demographic characteristics 
of the communities, the chapter includes a generalised perspective, to render 
the findings and recommendations of this study applicable to other 
communities, both within New Zealand and internationally. 
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The second set of three chapters presents the data collected in this study and 
examines the increases observed across the five case studies and the postal 
survey. It considers the factors reported as relevant by the agencies and any 
demographic groupings that are over-represented in the data and may explain 
any shifts in domestic violence reporting independent of the disaster.  These 
chapters conclude with a consideration of the planning and response issues 
stemming from an increase in domestic violence reporting, that arose during 
the disasters.  These data are compared with previous studies and put into 
context with theories that may explain issues not cognisable by reference to the 
data in isolation. 
 
Chapter Five is the first chapter to present the findings of the research.  It 
documents the increases reported by participants in the survey phase and the 
case studies phase.  These increases are considered community-by-community 
to provide the reader with a comprehensive image of each community including 
which agencies, if any, reported an increase.  The final section of the chapter 
reviews the increases by agency, with the aim of providing an organisation-wide 
perspective on any potential increases.  Increases were found to have varied in 
scale and scope across the agencies that participated in the interviews, with 
non-government agencies reporting larger and more sustained increases than 
government agencies.  These differential impacts are examined to decipher the 
grounds for such variation.  This establishes the basis for the policy 
recommendations presented in Chapter Eight. 
 
Chapter Six focuses on the factors that agency representatives, past empirical 
studies and theory suggest are related to or causative of the increases in 
domestic violence reporting presented in Chapter Five.  The Pressure and 
Release model introduced in Chapter Two, is evaluated to assess its ability to 
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explain potential increases in the nature and incidence of domestic violence in 
the aftermath of disasters.  This chapter presents and analyses the extensive 
body of literature relevant to a woman’s decision to stay in or leave an abusive 
relationship and how this decision may be impacted upon by disasters. 
 
Chapter Seven introduces the issues that agencies reported in dealing with 
increased domestic violence reporting during their respective disasters.  The 
chapter highlights the variations and also the commonalities observed between 
agencies.  The chapter is structured by agency to reflect the reality that future 
policy suggestions are necessarily agency-specific, rather than community-
specific.  Many of the issues stem from a lack of planning.  The implications of 
this for policy are discussed further in Chapter Eight. 
 
Chapter Eight examines the policy implications of this research and presents 
suggestions for policy change.  The chapter commences with a picture of 
current local and international policies that are relevant to this research.  The 
issue of gender-mainstreaming in policy is then discussed, coupled with an 
exposition of why the incorporation of gender analysis in policy formulation is 
essential in fulfilling policy requirements for all policies in New Zealand, 
including those of Civil Defence and Emergency Management.  The second half 
of the chapter focuses on policy suggestions for the individual agencies 
involved in Civil Defence and Emergency Management response and recovery 
and domestic violence agencies who will need to continue providing services 
during a disaster. 
 
The final chapter presents the conclusions from my research and the pre-
existing body of work.  Suggestions are also made for future research, which 
 Chapter 1 
 
 7  
may play a critical role in ensuring that victims of domestic violence in New 
Zealand are not left at greater risk than others during disasters in the future. 
 
This research is the first of its kind in New Zealand.  It aims to provide a 
benchmark for future evaluation of how agencies respond to increased 
domestic violence reporting during natural hazard events.  The final policy 
chapter offers New-Zealand-specific recommendations for policy change 
directed at the central organisations involved in the research.  However, the 
lessons learned by agencies in New Zealand should be capable of transposition 
to organisations in other countries.  Finally, this work substantiates lessons 
elucidated by earlier researchers, such as Wilson, Phillips & Neal (1998), 
Enarson (1999), Fothergill (1999) and Jenkins & Phillips (2008), and confirms a 
need for policy change that these researchers have advocated for over the last 
decade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two:  Literature Review 
Disasters & Domestic Violence 
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The study of domestic violence and disasters is a small field, yet it bridges a 
number of broad bodies of literature dealing with theoretical and 
methodological issues.  To study domestic violence rates after disasters, a clear 
understanding of the sociology of disasters, gender and disasters, domestic 
violence, and the theories and literature relevant to gendered policy is needed.  
This chapter will focus on the sociology of disasters and the literature related to 
domestic violence, and will show how they are theoretically and empirically 
linked.  A discussion of gender and disasters, and gendered policy will begin 
the chapter on policy implications. 
 
The first half of this chapter is dedicated to discussing the terminology and 
philosophy of research into natural hazards and disasters, and describing the 
current approach, which emphasises disasters as social phenomena (see Mileti, 
1999; Pelling, 2001; Posner, 2004; Tierney, 2006).  It will cover the debate 
concerning the definition and conceptualisation of the term ‘disaster’, before 
reviewing the different models used in Emergency Management.  The first 
section will finish with a review of the Pressure and Release model from disaster 
sociology literature, which underpins this research.  The Pressure and Release 
model suggests that domestic violence places its victims at greater risk than 
other women in the community during disasters.   
  
The second half of the chapter begins by examining the limited existing 
literature on domestic violence and disasters, which indicates a reciprocal 
relationship between domestic violence and disasters, that domestic violence 
places its victims at greater risk during disasters, and that disasters increase 
the level of domestic violence recorded in a community.  The definition of, and 
conceptual issues surrounding, domestic violence are discussed, including an 
analysis of the three dominant underlying theoretical perspectives for 
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examining domestic violence – feminist, individual-based, and societal.  This 
thesis applies a feminist approach to domestic violence and, this section 
concludes with a discussion of the gendered nature of domestic violence and 
the rationale for looking solely at female victims of domestic violence. 
 
Disasters 
Today, it is widely accepted that disasters are fundamentally social events; a 
natural hazard event without any interaction with a human is rarely called a 
disaster (Alexander, 1997: 289; Mileti, 1999; Quarantelli, 2001; Stallings, 2005; 
Rodriquez & Russell, 2006: 193; Perry, 2007).  To disaster researchers, physical 
events are simply triggers of disasters, the underlying root causes are social, 
political and economic factors (Blaikie et al., 1994).  Recent events like the 
Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 (Amarasiri de Silva, 2008) and Hurricane Katrina 
in 2005 (Daniels et al., 2006) show the magnitude and course of disasters are 
shaped by inequalities in society, and the capability of local and national 
institutions to respond to the hazard event.  Tierney (2006) singles out gender 
as a key dimension of inequality, linked to power, privilege, and social 
expectations.  Below I present the case for treating disasters as social 
phenomena that have led to increased support for people-focused approaches 
to hazard mitigation and the recognition of a need for social policy responses 
(Pelling, 2001). 
 
Natural hazards are generally defined as processes in the physical environment 
harmful to human life or property, caused by forces extraneous to society (e.g. 
Pelling, 2001; Keller and Blodgett, 2008; Hyndman and Hyndman, 2009).  
Disaster is a term used for both (1) any event that causes significant damage 
and loss of life and (2) the emergency situation that is the consequence of such 
an event.  For a disaster to be entered into the International Emergency 
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Disasters Database maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology 
of Disasters (CRED)  at the Université Catholique de Louvain, the source of the 
comparative data used below, it must fulfil at least one of the following criteria:  
 Ten (10) or more people reported killed. 
 Hundred (100) people reported affected. 
 Declaration of a state of emergency. 
 Call for international assistance. 
 
(http://www.emdat.be/ExplanatoryNotes/explanotes.html) 
 
Natural disasters? 
The case that disasters cannot be viewed solely from the narrow perspective of 
the triggering physical events lies in statistical databases for disaster impacts 
(For example, Rodriquez et al., 2009).  These show that there has been a steady 
increase in the number of declared disasters since 1900, (Figure 1), coupled 
with a significant increase in their cost (see Figure 2, a 15-fold increase for 
1990-1999 with respect to 1950-1959) despite no significant change in the 
frequency of large hazard events. 
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Figure 1: Total Number of Reported Disasters Globally (1900 to 2008)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
History of disaster research 
 
 
 
 
  
Source:  http://www.emdat.be/Database/Trends/trends.html 
 
The increased number of disasters reflects dominantly societal factors, such as 
population growth, particularly in vulnerable coast and flat-lying regions, and 
also more accurate tracking and reporting of disasters (World Bank, 2006: 3-4). 
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Figure 2:  Estimated Decadal Cost of Reported Disasters 1950-1959 to 
1990-1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  http://www.emdat.be/Database/Trends/trends.html 
 
The increased dollar cost also reflects human factors like population growth but 
also a heightened vulnerability of infrastructure in increasingly complex 
societies (Mileti, 1999: 67). 
 
The recognition of disasters as intrinsically social phenomena has led to 
suggestions that hazard mitigation must move beyond technological solutions 
that address accurate and rapid identification of hazard but do not address 
society’s reaction to hazards, warning messages, or the differential impacts that 
pre-existing social structures create for different groups within the society 
affected (White and Hass, 1975; Mileti 1999; Wisner et al., 2004).  
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Disciplines and approaches in disaster research 
The field of disaster research began along a path parallel to other physical 
sciences (Alexander, 1991: 293; Tierney 2006).  In these initial stages, the 
primary focus of researchers was the quantification and interpretation of the 
physical processes occurring (Alexander, 1997: 293; Quarantelli, 1978; Perry, 
2007: 4).  This involved modelling a disaster as a cycle of events that moved 
from dormancy to a warning stage to crisis, moving eventually, via recovery, 
back to dormancy (Alexander, 1997: 289; Perry, 2007: 4).   
 
There are now a number of disciplines that study disasters.  Each discipline has 
a different approach to the research and understanding of disasters.  In order to 
isolate those theories which provide the greatest utility for understanding the 
issue of increased domestic violence reporting during disasters, each discipline, 
its seminal researchers and key theories were examined.  Alexander (1991) lists 
these as:  
 Technical (see Press, 1975; Alexander, 1991; Coburn and Spence, 1992; 
Wright and Pearson, 1992; Bernard, 2005; Roberts et al., 2006) 
 
 Geographical (see Barrows, 1923; White, 1945; White & Hass, 1975; 
Hewitt, 1994) 
 
 Anthropology (see Torry, 1979; Clay, 1988; Cernea, 1990; Oliver-Smith, 
1999; Hofmann & Oliver-Smith, 2002) 
 
 Development studies (see Davis 1978; Cuny, 1983 & 1994; Rivers, 1982; 
McAllister, 1993; Berke et al., 1993) 
 
 Medical (see Beinin, 1985; Manni & Magalini, 1985; Briggs & Brinsfield, 
2003; Ciottone, 2006; Hogan & Burstein, 2007) 
 
 Sociology and Psychology (see Marks & Fritz, 1954; Quarantelli, 1954; 
Spiegel, 1957; Weisman, 1958; Enarson, 1998; Johnston et al., 2005; 
Paton, 2008) 
 
 
Within his list of disciplines that are used to understand the effects of natural 
hazards, Alexander has grouped sociology and psychology together.  However, 
I submit that these fields are logically distinct and that psychology should be 
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viewed as a separate school of thought.  Psychology and sociology may be more 
closely allied than, for example, sociology and the technical approaches, in that 
they shift the focus away from purely the recovery phase of disasters.  However, 
the schools of thought differ in both methodological approach and focus.  Many 
of the current psychology-based studies focus on the planning and mitigation 
techniques of individuals or individual households, and how to communicate 
risk to groups of individuals living in certain areas (Johnston, et al., 2005; 
Paton, 2008).  Sociological studies focus on how the structures within a society 
contribute to unsafe conditions, building on the geographical approach of White 
and Hass (1975).  Although authors may use individual case studies to illustrate 
how the structures interact with a hazard event to create inequality, the focus is 
very much on the structures and the need for change at the societal level, rather 
than on the individual (Enarson, 1999; Wisner et al., 2004). 
 
The geographical, development studies, anthropological, technical, 
psychological and medical approaches, though valid for other studies, are not 
the most useful in this research as domestic violence is a primarily social issue.  
These approaches fail to answer the question of whether domestic violence 
increases during disasters and, if yes, why.  This field of research belongs 
within the school of sociology and disaster, and, within this, the specific area of 
gender and disasters.   
 
Evolution of sociological study of disasters 
Although sociology and disaster work began in the 1920’s (Prince, 1920), the 
next surge in the growth and formalisation of the field did not occur until the 
1950’s (Marks & Fritz, 1954; Quarantelli, 1954; Spiegel, 1957; Weisman, 1958) 
with much significant work taking place between the late 1960’s and early 
1970’s (Barton, 1969; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977; Picou, Marshall & Gill, 2004: 
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1495).  The early focus was on disaster-related behaviours, such as helping 
actions, social cohesion, and the setting-aside of community conflict.  Later 
emphasis switched to diversity and stratification in society, and the influence of 
wealth, ethnicity, gender, age (Tierney, 2006).  During this period, sociologists 
were able to shift the focus of disaster researchers from understanding the 
physical processes of disasters to the consequent social disruption and change 
brought about by those processes (Quarantelli, 1978; 1998; Mileti, 1991; 
Rosenthal, 1998). 
 
The move to include social impacts did not lead to a consensus concerning the 
broader definition of a disaster, rather it served as the catalyst for heightened 
debate and disagreement, both conceptually and quantitatively (Dombrowsky, 
1995: 241; Hewitt, 1995; Quarantelli, 1995: 221).  However, during the 1970’s 
and 1980’s, there was a degree of agreement regarding how to define the 
spatial and temporal boundaries of disasters (Dombrowsky, 1995: 245; 
Alexander, 1997).  The social impacts were considered to be relatively simple 
and equal in their effects across the physically affected population.  For 
example, in the case of a flooding event, all those who were affected by 
floodwaters entering their house were considered to have the same needs in 
terms of the response action (Rosenthal, 1998: 150).  The social impacts were 
also limited to those which occurred in the immediate response phase of the 
event and little attention was given to long-term impacts.  There were a smaller 
number of researchers, such as Barton (1970), Merton (1970) and Quarantelli 
(1977), who made reference to differential vulnerability and, examined the 
disproportionate impact that disasters had on groups in society made more 
vulnerable by the social structures in place, such as the aged, poor, and ethnic 
minorities.  However, these perspectives were not readily included in policy or 
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procedural documents and mainstream disaster research (Bolin et al., 1998: 
27). 
 
It was during the 1970s that researchers began to focus on quantifying the 
social impacts of disasters (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977: 26).  Aid agencies, 
insurance companies and government agencies sought to calculate the financial 
costs of a disaster, incorporating the direct and some indirect costs of the 
natural hazard event.  Examples of the costs included were the more obvious 
physical damage to housing, roads and other infrastructure, the cost of 
emergency supplies such as food, blankets, water, and emergency housing, and 
the cost to insurance companies of compensating victims.  This might be 
extended to include less direct costs such as loss of earnings, or the sum total 
of insurance excesses and items not covered by insurance that individuals had 
to bear (Foster, 1976; Burton, et al., 1978; Quarantelli, 2001).   
 
A second figure often used to measure the scale of the event was the mortality 
rate, augmented, in certain instances, by the injury rate.  However, issues arose 
as the counting procedures varied from event to event and even across agencies 
in the same event (Quarantelli, 2001).  Quarantelli highlighted a particular issue 
in developed countries with large ethnic minority populations.  It was found in 
the 1901 San Francisco earthquake and the 1953 typhoon in Australia that both 
countries had large minority populations of Chinese, and Aboriginal Australians 
(respectively) that were not included in the mortality rates (2001: 326).  The 
result of this was underestimates in the overall death rates for the events and a 
total lack of analysis of the impact the event had on these minority groups.  
Researchers argued that quantitative measures were not sufficient to provide an 
accurate picture of the social impacts of disasters, and began to develop 
alternative qualitative measures utilizing surveys with open-ended questions 
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and interviews (Drabek, 1989; Blaikie et al., 1994; Alexander, 1997; Quarantelli, 
2001). 
 
As the measurement scales for disasters changed, so too did the understanding 
of what constituted a disaster.  Current sociological research has evolved into 
theories of complex social structures that have more gradational boundaries in 
terms of when the disaster starts (Morrow & Enarson, 1996; Stehlik et al., 2000; 
Enarson, 2001; Fothergill, 2003; Bradshaw, 2004).  Included in this increased 
complexity, are layers linked to vulnerability or disadvantage that pre-dated the 
natural hazard event and the term disaster was then separated from the hazard 
event and defined in terms of the social impacts of the event (Dynes, 1970; 
Ploughman, 1997: 120; Morrow, 1999; Hutton & Haque, 2004; Rodriguez & 
Russell, 2006: 196).  Disasters were then considered in a framework of the 
interactions of the destructive physical events, with people and vulnerable 
environments (Mileti, 2001; Tierney, 2006), that is the juxtaposition of physical, 
social and infrastructural systems in the nomenclature of White and Hass 
(1975).  Quarantelli (1998), Enarson (1999) and Wisner et al. (2004) highlight 
the intricate social, political, legal and economic structures that all intersect 
with the natural hazard event and lead to a disaster.  These structures produce 
different outcomes based on an individual’s position within the structures; as a 
result, not all individuals within the disaster zone experience disasters equally.  
This acknowledgement of social phenomena has impacted on definitions of the 
term disaster. 
 
Defining disaster 
Consensus on a definition of disaster has yet to be reached; different agencies 
continue to use different definitions depending on the context (Dombrowsky, 
1995: 241; Hewitt, 1995: Quarantelli, 1995: 221).  Quarantelli (1977 (with 
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Dynes); 1978; 1994; 1998; 2001) suggests that there is no need for a common 
definition of disaster across practitioners, researchers, policy makers, and aid 
agencies as each has a different use for the term.  For example, aid agencies, 
policy makers and practitioners require a term with spatial and temporal 
limitations, as they are concerned with resourcing the response, which involves 
defining how much response and for how long.  Researchers do not require 
such a focused definition as, more often than not, their work is simply limited 
by such a definition, not improved (Quarantelli, 2001).   
 
The definition of disaster used here is in line with those put forward by Wisner 
et al. (2004), and Quarantelli (2001):  
A disaster occurs when a significant number of vulnerable people 
experience a hazard and suffer severe damage and/or disruption 
of their livelihood system in such a way that recovery is unlikely 
without external aid 
(Wisner et al., 2004: 50).   
 
and 
…those crisis occasions generated by the threat of or the actual 
impact of relatively sudden natural and technological agents (such 
as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, tornadoes, 
and tsunamis as well as toxic chemical spills, radiation fallouts, 
large-scale explosions and fires, structural failures, massive 
transportation wrecks and crashes, etc.) that have significant 
negative social consequences.  Basically we include only those 
instances where everyday community life is disrupted and where 
local resources cannot handle the demands of the situation. 
(Quarantelli, 2001: 332-333) 
 
The above definitions match formal definitions used in the context of declared 
Civil Defence emergencies in New Zealand.  Once a Civil Defence emergency is 
declared formally in a region, external support becomes available from outside 
the region (i.e., Central Government).  The Ministry of Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management’s definition of an emergency, taken from the CDEM Act 
2002 is: 
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 “emergency” means a situation that - 
 
“(a) is the result of any happening, whether natural or otherwise, 
including, without limitation, any explosion, earthquake, eruption, 
tsunami, land movement, flood, storm, tornado, cyclone, serious fire, 
leakage or spillage of any dangerous gas or substance, technological 
failure, infestation, plague, epidemic, failure of or disruption to an 
emergency service or a lifeline utility, or actual or imminent attack or 
warlike act; and 
 
(b) causes or may cause loss of life or injury or illness or distress or in 
any way endangers the safety of the public or property in New Zealand or 
any part of New Zealand; and 
 
(c) cannot be dealt with by emergency services, or otherwise requires a 
significant and co-ordinated response under this Act” 
(CDEM Act, 2002) 
 
Events studied were selected on the criteria of (a) a declaration of a Civil 
Defence Emergency; and (b) a significant impact on the community (for 
example, there must be more than localised surface flooding in the case of 
floods or limited closure of roads).  The events selected produced impacts 
which disrupted everyday life to an extent that provided an insight into 
community life not available prior to the event. 
 
The five case studies in this research are all rapid-onset or ‘catastrophic’ 
disasters.  One of the key distinctions drawn by Wisner et al. (2004) is between 
rapid-onset disasters and slow-onset (chronic) disasters.  Rapid-onset disasters 
involve natural hazard events that have a sharp initiation (and ending).  These 
are events such as floods, earthquakes, tsunamis or hurricanes (Wisner et al., 
2004: 10).  These can be distinguished from events, such as droughts and 
environmental degradation, which move very slowly but can have longer and 
more devastating effects on the affected population than rapid-onset disasters.   
 
More research has been conducted in the context of rapid-onset disasters.  A 
plausible explanation for this is that the clear boundaries of the actual event 
create a well-delineated structure for the research.  Wisner et al. (2004) are in 
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favour of including prolonged events, such as droughts and epidemics, in their 
interpretation of disaster.  However, Quarantelli states that these should be 
treated separately as “social problems involving chronic stress” rather than 
crisis situations (2001: 333).  This emphasises Quarantelli’s perception of the 
need for the hazard event causing the disaster to have distinct limits.  Wisner et 
al. do not recognise the necessity for these criteria.  Despite their divergence of 
opinion as to what constitutes a disaster, Quantarelli and Wisner agree that 
disasters are entirely social phenomena.   
 
Models of Disasters 
In this research, I use the Pressure and Release model (Blaikie et al., 1994; 
Wisner et al., 2004) as a tool for considering how domestic violence and 
disasters interact.  This model focuses on vulnerability, highlighting the 
multiple layers and structures in place in society prior to the disaster, as well as 
the nature of the hazard event itself, in placing different individuals at varying 
levels of risk.   
 
Background 
The model used in the context of disasters during the late 1970’s was the 
Comprehensive Emergency Management model (McEntire et al., 2002: 268).  
The Comprehensive Emergency Management model focussed primarily on the 
hazard phenomena and not the social, political and economic variables that 
create a disaster.  It has been criticised as overly simplistic (Neal, 1997; 
McEntire, 2002: 268).  Notwithstanding, this model laid much of the 
groundwork for subsequent models.  A lack of focus on social, poltical, cultural 
and economic variables indicates that this model would not be the most 
appropriate for an examination of domestic violence reporting rates during 
disasters. 
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The Disaster Resistant Community model is another alternative.  Geis describes 
the model as:  
…a means to assist the communities in minimising their 
vulnerability to natural hazards by maximising the application of 
the principles and techniques of mitigation to their development 
and/or redevelopment decision-making process 
(2000: 152) 
 
The model ignores the social, political and economic structures existing in 
society that lead to increased or reduced vulnerability, which makes it 
unsuitable for this study which looks at the intersection of social and natural 
disasters.  Another shortcoming is its focus on mitigation and not post-disaster 
issues.  This limits the utility of the model to planners and engineers, and not 
those participants in the disaster process dealing with the social impacts, such 
as counsellors (McEntire, 2002: 269).   
 
The Disaster-Resilient Community model is a third means of conceptualising 
disasters.  However, the inclusion of the term ‘resilience’ has meant that this 
model lends itself to wide variations in interpretation (Mileti, 1999: 33; Buckle, 
Mars & Smale, 2000: 8-9).  Little consensus has been reached as to what creates 
resiliency.  However, the model does focus more on the social side of disasters 
and is thus more applicable across disciplines in the field. It is perhaps this far-
reaching applicability that has resulted in such a wide interpretation of its 
meaning.  The model does identify that disaster mitigation practises alone will 
not be 100 percent effective and a focus solely on post-disaster efforts will 
leave societies at risk.  This model may prove more applicable to a study 
looking at ways to mitigate increases in domestic violence during disasters, 
however, it does not provide the appropriate tools necessary for establishing if 
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increased domestic violence reporting is an issue that needs addressing and so 
is not the best model for this research. 
 
Sustainability models have also been used to examine disasters.  Mileti has 
been a major proponent of sustainable hazards mitigation, defining 
sustainability as existing if “a locality can tolerate – and overcome – damage, 
diminished productivity, and reduced quality of life from an extreme event 
without significant outside assistance” (1999: 4).  Again, this model focuses on 
mitigation rather than examining social issues that arise during disasters.  As 
such, it is not the most suitable model for an examination of domestic violence 
reporting and disasters. 
 
Finally, vulnerability models focus on the ways in which pre-existing social 
structures put populations at risk during disasters.  These models examine the 
juxtaposition of natural hazard events with multi-layered social inequalities to 
create concepts of being “at risk” to disasters.  More recently, two models in 
particular have gained recognition in the field of social impacts of disasters.  
The term vulnerability is used in a specific manner in this research.  The 
definition of vulnerability in this thesis is: 
…the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that 
influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover 
from the impact of a natural hazard… 
(Wisner et. al., 2004: 11).  
 
This definition focuses on the pre-existing social, cultural, political, economic 
and legal structures that designate differing levels of vulnerability and 
consequently risk to groups in a society during a disaster.  It purports that 
groups who are adversely affected by pre-existing structures, such as patriarchy 
or capitalism, are more vulnerable during disasters and will face a greater risk 
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to their livelihood, leading to a slower and harder recovery (Wisner et al., 2004: 
11).  This will be discussed more specifically in the models discussed below. 
 
Differential vulnerability is recognised in the Access model.  The Access model 
is a more complex model that focuses on the micro-scale, in contrast with the 
Pressure and Release model in which the focus is the macro-level.  The Access 
model is restricted to the level of individual households or individuals, and, 
therefore, cannot represent society-wide problems such as domestic violence.  
As a consequence of this individualised focus, it offers less utility here for an 
examination of domestic violence rates after a disaster.  The model of disasters 
used in this research is the Pressure and Release model which offers a 
framework to analyse the intersection of disasters and domestic violence. 
 
The Pressure and Release model 
Without the context of vulnerability issues, the perception of natural hazard 
events is that all people in an affected community will be impacted in the same 
ways and to the same extent (particularly, those living in the same residence).  
However, disasters intersect with the pre-existing structures and inequalities in 
society – political, cultural, legal and social (Morrow, 2004; Fothergill & Peek, 
2004: 89; Rodriguez & Russell, 2006: 193).  These structures stratify society 
and limit the access of some groups to the resources required to protect 
themselves from the physical impacts and to facilitate their recovery from 
disasters.   
 
Wisner et al. (2004) developed the Pressure and Release model, based on the 
interaction of the natural hazard event and the societal structures that put 
members of the affected society “at risk” and renders them consequently 
vulnerable to a significant negative impact from the event.  This model falls 
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within the vulnerability approach to disaster research.  The Pressure and 
Release model states that prior to the event, individuals already experience 
pressure to varying degrees from structures in society, such as capitalism or 
patriarchy.  When the hazard event occurs this pressure is released and the 
impact this release has on individuals is related to the degree of pressure they 
were under prior to the event (Wisner et al., 2004: 51).  As a simple illustration, 
a low-waged individual who has little or no savings or insurance is more 
adversely affected by a tsunami than a person with savings and insurance.  Low-
wage jobs stem from a capitalist structure; the vulnerability stems not from the 
event itself, but from the structures pre-dating the event.  Vulnerability is 
dependent on the structure of society and is not purely a function of the natural 
hazard.  The Pressure and Release model discusses three ‘layers” of 
vulnerability (Wisner, 2004: 49): 
(a) Root causes, such as political or legal systems;  
(b) Dynamic pressures, such as lack of appropriate skills and 
macro-forces, such as rapid population growth; and  
(c) Unsafe conditions, including lack of local institutions and 
low-income levels.  
 
Root causes in the Pressure and Release model are those furthest removed from 
the risk.  Root causes include political structures, and other social, cultural and 
legal factors, which structure a society (Wisner, 2004: 53).  Root causes are 
often ignored in disaster analysis and presumed to be an entrenched, 
immovable part of society’s structure.  These forces impact on society by 
myriad means, through the way the law is enforced and upon whom; via military 
force and power; by marginalising those without power or interest to those with 
power; through the relationship between the State and the public; and the 
relative sense of empowerment of members within society.  Root causes are the 
most difficult issues to address and yet yield the most effective results if 
challenged and amended. 
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Dynamic pressures are “processes and activities that translate the effects of 
root causes both temporally and spatially into unsafe conditions” (Wisner et al., 
2004: 53).  Dynamic pressures are more readily visible than root causes but not 
as palpable as unsafe conditions.  Moreover, dynamic pressures operate on 
large spatial scales.  Wisner et al. cite the examples of foreign debt, rapid 
urbanisation of a population, and war (2004: 54).  Ending a war or repaying 
foreign debt are processes that can endure for decades.  These pressures create 
and sustain unsafe conditions that stratify different groups and expose these 
groups to different levels of risk.  The pressures can overlap further increasing 
the risk applicable to certain groups.  Gender and disaster literature often 
highlights the higher levels of risk faced by women than their male 
counterparts, due to gender inequalities (Scanlon, 1996; Kottegoda, 1997; 
Enarson, 1998a; Major, 1999; Enarson & Morrow, 1999; Fothergill, 1996; 
Enarson, 2001a; Enarson, 2001b; Cannon, 2002; Fothergill, 2003; Enarson et 
al., 2003; Ahmed, 2004; Abeysekera, 2006; Burnad & SRED team, 2006; 
Prasertcharoensuk & Sirisook, 2006; Sayeed, 2006).  For example, Ariyabandu 
discusses the situation in Bangladesh in which widowed women can have their 
land and home taken from them by evocation of Shariah law (2000: 4).  In this 
example, a social and religious norm has placed this group of women at greater 
risk than widower men, or non-widowed women in the wake of a disaster.  While 
the hazard event itself has not targeted women, it has a higher cost for women 
who lose their husbands than men who lose their wives and may have the 
permanent effect of moving widowed women from a life of comparative 
stability, in terms of a steady income and housing, to a life of poverty and 
homelessness.   
 
The final layer, unsafe conditions, are routinely witnessed everyday by 
community agencies working with marginalised groups and common examples 
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include unstable incomes, heavy reliance on the State for provision of basic 
necessities (if available), unsafe buildings and at-risk neighbourhoods (e.g. the 
hillside shanty towns in Brazil (Wisner et al., 2004: 55)); and specifically related 
to disasters, translates to a lack of preparedness for a hazard event.  These 
factors are the most frequently targeted by policy as they are the most apparent 
and, in some cases, urgent symptoms of vulnerability.  However, without 
addressing the root causes of these symptoms, this is analogous to putting a 
bandage over an infected wound.   
 
Gender and the Pressure Release model 
Applying the Pressure and Release model to this research: domestic violence is 
one of the many dynamic pressures that can create unsafe conditions for 
groups of women.  The root cause is a society stratified by gender and, 
specifically, one that has underlying patriarchy.  Patriarchy has two key 
elements.  The first is a structure in which “men have more power and privilege 
than women” (Smith, 1990: 257).  The second is an ideology which legitimises 
this structure (Smith, 1990: 258).  Patriarchy is largely invisible in everyday life 
and yet it is one of the most pervasive structures in societies (MacKinnon, 1983: 
638).  This invisibility often makes it hard to pinpoint the structure and how it 
manifests itself in the society.  Nevertheless, the downstream effects of a 
patriarchal society are apparent in every census or time-use survey, and are 
detected by domestic violence research.  The effects include wage-gaps, women 
being more likely to take parental-leave, women being more likely to be in a 
caring role for parents or children (Statistics New Zealand, 2001; Statistics New 
Zealand, 2006a), and women forming the overwhelming majority of those 
seeking protection orders against partners (Bartlett, 2006: 36) or help from 
domestic violence agencies (National Collective of Independent Women’s 
Refuges, 2005). 
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Gender stratification is one of the social structures that are brought to light 
following disasters (Fordham & Ketteridge, 1998; Fothergill, 1998; Wilson, 
Phillips & Neal, 1998; Enarson, 1999).  Gender stratification is a root cause in 
the Pressure and Release model.  It creates different impacts in different 
societies and can vary in its rigidity.  In societies where gender roles and norms 
are strongly ascribed to, and where stratification is commonplace, disasters can 
have significant and often fatal consequences for women.  An example can be 
found in the Boxing Day 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka during which 91 percent of 
adults killed were women (Abeysekera, 2006: 5).  This was created through 
social norms that put the onus on women to save any children in the family 
(sometimes at the cost of their own lives) (Abeysekera, 2006: 5).  Women were 
also less likely to leave the house without their husbands who may not have 
returned to the home during the tsunami as this is a cultural norm in Sri Lanka 
(Abeysekera, 2006: 5).   
 
Furthermore, ethnic, age and class stratifications intersect with gender and can 
compound inequalities (Fordham, 1999; Fothergill, 2003; Bolin, 2007).  
Stratification is evident in the degree of access to resources, such as education, 
health, food, and shelter.  Lack of access to resources is further compounded 
during an event and consequently groups that are disadvantaged in everyday 
life are relatively more vulnerable after a disaster (Fordham, 1998).   
 
Summary 
Disasters expose latent social situations and problems that can be obscured 
during times of environmental normalcy (Merton, 1970; Fothergill, 1998: 11).  
Vulnerability, social stratification and the consequent inequalities are elements 
of this.  It is too simplistic to conclude that all women are more vulnerable than 
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all men are.  This would be to ignore other existing stratifications in class, 
ethnicity, religion, ability and age, inter alia, which intersect with gender 
stratification and create multiple vulnerabilities with individualised levels of 
risk. (Ariyabandu, 2000; Enarson et al., 2003; Fothergill, 2003; Phillips & 
Morrow, 2008).  As a feminist researcher, I am concerned predominantly with 
the issues arising from gender stratification.  In societies, or in subsections of 
societies, where the impact of gender stratification is not obvious, the 
difference in impacts may not be marked.  However, this does not negate the 
fact that specific groups of women within these societies will be more adversely 
affected than their male counterparts.  Domestic violence victims are such a 
group; this group is comprised of individuals from a range of backgrounds in 
terms of class, ethnicity, ability and age.   
 
Domestic violence and disasters 
The everyday situation of domestic violence victims is typically one that is 
characterised by a lack of social networks; isolation that creates a lack of access 
to social services, money and other resources, and decision-making power 
within the domestic relationship; low self-esteem; and frequently a high 
incidence of fatalism (Stets, 1991; Hague & Wilson, 2000; Jewkes, 2002; Logan 
et al., 2003; Levendosky et al., 2004; Michalski, 2004; Bogat, Levendosky, & 
von Eye¸2005).  These characteristics are exploited as tools by the perpetrators 
of domestic violence to attain and maintain control over the women.  The 
characteristics can also augment complications in situations of disaster 
response and recovery.  For example, if a woman is unable to make the decision 
to evacuate for fear of reprisal, this exacerbates the high level of risk inherent 
to the hazard event itself and may result in the loss of life or the need for 
external agencies to step in and enforce evacuation (Enarson, 1998b: 1-2).  The 
emergency management literature assumes that a woman has access to 
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mandatory evacuation orders.  However, if a woman is entirely isolated from the 
outside world, such an order can go unnoticed creating the same result as if the 
order was wilfully ignored.  These are two more examples, of which there are 
many more that demonstrate the need to be aware of domestic violence within 
disaster response, and recovery plans and policies.  Moreover, the relationship 
between the incidence of domestic violence and disaster impacts appears to be 
reciprocal, with studies overseas showing that disasters affect domestic 
violence reporting. 
 
A limited amount of overseas research over the last 18 years has shown that an 
increase in the rate of reported and non-reported domestic violence in affected 
areas is one social consequence of disasters (both natural and non-) (Palinkas et 
al., 1993; Dobson, 1994; Honeycombe, 1994; Enarson & Morrow, 1996; Wilson, 
Phillips & Neal, 1998; Davis & Ender, 1999; Enarson, 1999; Fothergill, 1999; 
Rashid, 2000; Fisher, 2005; Jenkins & Phillips, 2008).  Only four of these 
studies have focused specifically on domestic violence and the observed 
changes in reporting levels during disasters: Enarson (1999); Fothergill (1999); 
Jenkins and Phillips (2008); and Wilson, Phillips and Neal (1998). 
 
Elaine Enarson investigated the impact that natural hazard events had on 
domestic violence shelters in Canada and the United States.  Enarson’s work is 
the most comparable to the current study as Enarson focuses on the agency 
level of domestic violence reporting during disasters, rather than the individual.  
Initially a postal survey was sent out to domestic violence agencies across the 
United States and Canada.  The returned surveys provided the organisations 
that would participate in the second phase of the research, which consisted of 
telephone and face-to-face interviews.  The second phase involved interviewing 
representatives from 77 different shelters across the two countries.  Enarson 
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observed that in those areas affected by a severe natural hazard event, the 
caseloads of surveyed shelters had increased between 15 and 59 percent (1999: 
756-757).  Enarson also showed that little or no planning was in place within 
shelters for disaster events due to a lack of time and money within the shelters.  
As a result the shelters’ limited resources were placed under extreme pressure 
with less staff available to cope with the increased workloads (Enarson, 1999: 
757). 
 
In fact, shelter workload did not simply increase, the work itself had become 
more complex due to the necessity for new interactions with other agencies 
that were similarly unprepared for the needs of the shelters.  Enarson cites an 
example observed on Kauai, Hawaii during Hurricane Iniki during which the 
Police failed to enforce pre-existing protection orders during the disaster 
(Enarson, 1999: 758).  This situation was attributed to the over-stretching of 
police resources, and a lack of power, phones and water.  A consequence was 
an increase in the workload and complexity of cases that the women’s shelters 
were dealing with (Enarson, 1999: 758).  Heightened need for interactions with 
State agencies further increased the work of the women’s shelters.  Moreover, 
there was a fundamental lack of recognition on the part of officials of the 
special needs of an evacuated women’s shelter (Enarson, 1999: 760).  Shelters 
reported that officials did not understand that the general evacuation site was 
not appropriate for the women’s shelter (Enarson, 1999: 760).  Finally, a range 
of financial burdens were placed on the agencies responding to increased 
domestic violence reporting.  Women’s shelter representatives perceived that 
the “sympathy” of the community lasted for approximately six months following 
the commencement of a disaster and then financial donations became scarce.  
Often pre-existing fundraising events were delayed due to the disasters and, 
finally, federal and State funders’ resources were diverted to general disaster 
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programmes leaving women’s shelters with less resources to meet a much 
higher demand (Enarson, 1999: 760). 
 
Enarson’s work laid the foundation for research into increased domestic 
violence reporting during disasters.  Enarson’s methods and considerations 
were replicated and expanded on in the current study.  This will be discussed 
further in the methodology chapter. 
 
Wilson et al. (1998) examined domestic violence following three events in the 
United States, from the perspective of agency-level impacts.  The three case 
studies were Santa Cruz County, California following the 1989 Loma Prieta 
earthquake; Lancaster, Texas following the 1994 tornado; and Dade County, 
Florida following Hurricane Andrew in 1992.  Data were collected through semi-
structured interviews with agency representatives, statistics and information 
materials from agencies, and analysis of contemporaneous documents and 
media items.   
 
The aim was to establish whether existing agencies coped with the levels of 
reported domestic violence in the aftermath of these disasters, and if not, 
whether there was a gap necessitating the formation of new agencies designed 
to meet the shorter-term needs of the community.  The most significant finding 
was that pre-disaster attitudes towards domestic violence “strongly influence 
the perception and handling of domestic violence after a disaster” (Wilson, 
Phillips & Neal, 1998: 120).  The authors submit that if agencies were aware of 
a domestic violence problem in their community, then they were able to handle 
any increases in domestic violence reporting and, therefore, no significant gaps 
exist (Wilson, Phillips & Neal, 1998).  Conversely, if agencies in a community 
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refused to acknowledge that there was a problem prior to the event, agencies 
consequently did not recognise an increase had occurred after an event.   
 
This finding highlights the significant impact that agency representatives’ 
awareness and opinions have on research examining domestic violence 
reporting during disasters.  The reliance on secondary source opinion and 
information is a potentially significant limitation on this research.  Information 
provided by agencies that work in the field, rather than women experiencing 
domestic violence, is necessarily filtered (even if unintentional) which can result 
in distortion, this issue is discussed in detail in the methodology chapter.  
However, there are countervailing benefits to interviews with agency 
representatives that outweigh any potential distortion.  These will also be 
discussed in the methodology chapter. 
 
Fothergill (1999) investigated increases in the incidence of domestic violence 
following the Red River flooding in 1997 in North Dakota and Minnesota in the 
United States.  Fothergill recorded shelter work volumes following the flood and 
compared them to the statistics for the year prior to the event.  Fothergill 
(1999) noted significant increases in the number of cases presenting, coupled 
with decreases in the number of staff available to work in the shelter.  Whilst 
agency impacts were included, Fothergill’s focus was at the individual level.  
Fothergill’s work centred around two cases of women she spoke to who 
reported incidents of domestic violence during the flood itself.  These case 
studies illustrate both the situation for the two women following the flooding 
and their understanding of the dynamics involved.  
 
The first case study concerned a relationship that had involved domestic 
violence prior to the flood.  A physical assault had taken place 20 years prior to 
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the flood, followed by a period without physical assault up until the flooding 
occurred.  However, the relationship was characterised by controlling behaviour 
exerted over the woman by her partner over the 20-year duration of the 
relationship (Fothergill, 1999: 88).  Post-flooding, the violence returned 
(Fothergill, 1999: 87).  The victim of the violence left the relationship in the 
period following the flood and remained separated from the abuser.  The 
woman in this case was a middle-class, employed, able-bodied, white woman, 
who was able to draw on her extended family resources as well as the 
knowledge that she had a secure income stream to leave the relationship 
(Fothergill, 1999).  This case was contrasted with the second case. 
 
The second case involved a woman from a working-class background, who had 
been disabled in a car accident leaving her unable to walk on her own.  She had 
grown up in an abusive family and had been in abusive relationships since her 
teenage years (Fothergill, 1999: 90).  Prior to the flooding, the relationship was 
violent.  The woman had become dependent on her perpetrator for physical and 
financial assistance (Fothergill, 1999: 90).  However, during the flooding event, 
the perpetrator was absent from their home in an alcohol and drug treatment 
centre.  The woman had faced the flood and its destruction on her own 
(Fothergill, 1999: 91-92).  In doing this, the woman’s level of self-efficacy 
improved, and consequently, she felt that if she could survive the flood, she 
could survive on her own.  The second woman also left the abusive relationship.  
The woman’s disability had compounded her increasing isolation and, 
therefore, the support she received from a domestic violence agency in the 
months following the flooding were recognised as invaluable for her continued 
independence and sense of empowerment (Fothergill, 1999). 
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Fothergill’s work has given insight into the impact experiencing and surviving a 
disaster has on a woman’s decision to stay or leave an abusive relationship.  In 
both of the case studies, the women themselves said that the flooding had 
acted as a catalyst for them to seek help from domestic violence agencies.  It 
was the first study that realistically voiced individual women’s perspectives of 
the dynamics involved in domestic violence reporting during disasters.  The 
first case study noted that the abuse in the relationship had intensified in the 
aftermath of the flooding.  This increase in abuse coupled with the other effects 
of the flooding compelled the woman to leave the relationship and seek help 
from domestic violence agencies.  The second case study highlighted the 
positive effect that the victim’s own ability to cope with the event had on the 
victim’s self-esteem and self-efficacy.  This in turn led to her accessing help 
from domestic violence agencies.  The coalescence of the two stories suggests 
that a disaster can affect both the perpetrator and the victim.  Moreover, it is 
apparent that both domestic violence and domestic violence reporting may 
increase during disasters.  However, this work was based on two stories only 
and a study that includes a greater number of women will greatly improve the 
understanding in this area. 
 
These two cases studied by Fothergill also highlight the different effects of one 
disaster on different women.  The impact of the flood on both of the women 
was shown to be influenced by the intersection with pre-existing social strata 
(particularly  economic  strata) and their specific needs pursuant to leaving the 
abusive relationship.  One of the women had greater financial resources to draw 
from post-flooding and did not require as much agency intervention as the 
women with lesser financial resources.  The work demonstrates that there is no 
single, universal domestic violence victim.  This is significant in policy 
formulation (which will become relevant at the end of this thesis) and needs to 
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be understood by those working with abused women during disasters and, also, 
more generally in times of non-disaster. 
 
During the final months of this thesis, Jenkins and Phillips (2008) published a 
study of the impact of Hurricane Katrina on both domestic violence victims and 
domestic violence shelters.  Data was collected through four methods: focus 
groups with survivors of domestic violence, interviews with domestic violence 
advocates, statistics of domestic violence incidence and observations at 
community meetings (Jenkins & Phillips, 2008: 55).  There were five focus 
groups with women survivors that focused on the impact Hurricane Katrina had 
on their decision to leave abusive relationships.  Interviews with domestic 
violence advocates focused on the impact the storm had on their services and 
the difference in service provision after the hurricane.  The community 
meetings were specifically related to domestic violence.  These were held 
between legal and social service providers in New Orleans and occurred 
monthly between November 2005 and November 2007 (Jenkins & Phillips, 
2008: 55). 
 
The research found two significant issues for domestic violence victims.  The 
first was child custody (Jenkins & Phillips, 2008: 56).  An example given was 
that of a woman whose husband was late returning her daughter from his visit 
with her prior to the storm.  Worried about the impending storm and needing to 
evacuate, the woman faced a barrage of threats and abuse in trying to regain 
custody of her daughter to evacuate (Jenkins & Phillips, 2008: 56).  Eventually, 
she had to remove her daughter from the house by covert means in order to 
evacuate in time.  Issues were also raised in the context of women whose 
children were evacuated with the non-custodial parent.  Custodial parents were 
not necessarily evacuated to the same location as their children.  Examples 
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were given of legal battles of more than two years duration to regain custody of 
their children (Jenkins & Phillips, 2008: 57). 
 
The second issue was housing.  A lack of alternative housing was a significant 
barrier for domestic violence victims wanting to leave their abusive partners 
after Hurricane Katrina.  In some cases, a flawed housing policy resulted in 
abusers sharing residence with their victims in FEMA-supplied housing (Jenkins 
& Phillips, 2008: 57).  In those examples, the fact that the victim was still 
married to the abuser (although legally separated) coupled with a one trailer per 
family policy, meant that the abuser was able to claim he was entitled to stay in 
the FEMA housing (Jenkins & Phillips, 2008: 56).  However, the cost and 
availability of housing, more generally, produced a significant barrier to women 
who wanted to leave abusive relationships (Jenkins & Phillips, 2008: 59).  With 
less housing available, the standards of available housing declined while prices 
escalated.  These two housing policy issues emphasise the complexity of 
domestic violence victims’ needs during disasters (Jenkins & Phillips, 2008). 
 
Jenkins & Phillips found that Hurricane Katrina had a dual role as a 
marginalising event and an impetus for change.  In some cases, policy 
shortcomings during the disaster proved a barrier for domestic violence victims 
to leave abusive relationships, particularly those that ignored women’s financial 
situations, and this is a potential pitfall that will need to be avoided in future 
policy formulation.  However, for some women the event itself proved a 
motivator for change (Jenkins & Phillips, 2008: 61).  For some women, the 
incidence and severity of the domestic violence had increased, which motivated 
them to leave the relationship or the event had catalysed a rise in their self-
esteem and self-efficacy, which then encouraged change (Jenkins & Phillips, 
2008: 61).  These conclusions echo those of Enarson (1999) and Fothergill 
 Chapter 2 
 40  
(1999).  This suggests that while both the scale and nature of domestic violence 
may change during a disaster, the level of reporting may also increase.  Either 
of these effects produces an increased workload for domestic violence agencies 
during disasters.  The Jenkins & Phillips study concluded that the disaster had 
an effect on the behaviour of both the victim and perpetrator (refer also to 
Fothergill (1999) who reached a similar conclusion). 
 
The review of research on gender and disasters shows all studies unequivocally 
found that domestic violence reporting had increased in the months following a 
significant natural hazard event.  These studies, combined with the existing 
theory on disaster vulnerability, provide the foundation for an investigation into 
whether domestic violence reporting increases during disasters in New Zealand. 
 
The subsidiary question of whether it is reporting alone or the level of domestic 
violence that increases has yet to be answered, although two of the previous 
studies suggest both occur.  To examine this, a clear understanding is needed 
of what domestic violence is and what factors are involved.  A discussion of the 
definition of domestic violence used in this research and the three central 
approaches to conceptualising domestic violence follow.   
 
Domestic Violence 
Definitions and the terminology of domestic violence, like disasters, have been 
the subjects of extensive debate (Gelles, 1985: 352; Hegarty, Sheehan, & 
Schonfeld, 1999; Brownridge, & Halli, 1999; Rhatigan et al., 2005; Hegarty & 
Roberts, 2008).  Domestic violence researchers have not yet settled on a 
universal definition.  However, New Zealand’s most widely used definition of 
domestic violence comes from the Te Rito strategy, which is cited by both 
researchers and practitioners.  This definition has been adopted in this 
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research.  In Te Rito, domestic violence is defined as “a broad range of 
controlling behaviours, commonly of a physical, sexual, and/or psychological 
nature which typically involve fear, intimidation and emotional deprivation” 
(Ministry of Social Development, 2002: 8).   
 
The Te Rito definition highlights that domestic violence is not simply physical 
violence but rather it is fundamentally about the control of another individual.  
In fact, research indicates that physical violence is not necessarily the most 
common type of domestic violence experienced (Hornung, McCullough, & 
Sugimoto, 1981: 690).  Domestic violence can also take the form of verbal 
cruelty, emotional abuse, or sexual abuse (Ritchie & Ritchie, 1993).  The 
incidence of abuse spans the entirety of the demographic spectrum; crossing 
boundaries of age, ethnicity, gender, income and geography.  A 2001 study 
observed no correlation between any demographic data set and the rate of 
abuse in New Zealand (Semple, 2001).   
 
There are three main approaches to examining the causes of domestic violence 
– individual-based, societal, and critical/feminist (Jasinski, 2001; Buzawa & 
Buzawa, 1996).  Each offers factors that are present in the lives of those that 
perpetrate violence against their spouses.   
 
Individual-Based Perspectives 
Individual-based factors are the personality and psychological characteristics of 
the perpetrators and any external forces acting on those individuals.  Inherent 
characteristics include low self-esteem, traditional and stereotypical beliefs, low 
self-efficacy, fatalism, denial, stress and stress-related disorders (sometimes 
linked to more serious psychological conditions such as schizophrenia and 
depression) (Hotaling & Sugarman, 1986; Margolin, 1993; Holtzworth-Monroe 
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et al., 1997; Emery & Laumann-Billings, 1998; Halpern et al., 2001; Vest et al., 
2002).  These factors found to be present in the perpetrators of domestic 
violence also impact on their response to, and recovery from, disasters.  If this 
person is also in control of a household, as abusers are, this will create 
problems for Civil Defence staff trying to evacuate the entire household, which 
is subject to the sole will of one individual.  Though not currently acknowledged 
by Civil Defence in New Zealand, this is a very real issue that could present to 
first responders in an emergency, making it a Civil Defence issue. 
 
External factors such as a violent family background, substance abuse, lack of 
employment, and isolation also increase the likelihood of domestic violence 
(Margolin, 1993; Buzawa & Buzawa, 1996: 14-16; Holtzworth-Monroe et al., 
1997; Emery & Laumann-Billings, 1998; Jackson & Oates, 1998: 126-128; 
Kantor & Jansinski, 1998: 13; Campbell et al., 2003; Ehrensaft, 2003; Bogat, 
Levendosky, & von Eye, 2005).  Isolation, either geographical or enforced, 
presents problems for Civil Defence in communicating information to isolated 
parties.  Without access to radios, televisions or computers, some domestic 
violence victims will be unaware of the seriousness of the situation until it is too 
late for them to act (and anyone else in their house).   
 
Domestic violence can affect the way in which both perpetrators and victims 
respond to disasters, however, the relationship between disasters and domestic 
violence is reciprocal.  A disaster can impact on domestic violence and domestic 
violence reporting and has been seen to do this in previous studies on domestic 
violence and disasters (Enarson, 1999; Fothergill, 1999; Jenkins & Phillips, 
2008).  Disasters can create a feeling of a lack of control in individuals 
experiencing them.  As mentioned earlier, control is crucial in understanding 
domestic violence (Goode, 1971: 624; Williams, 1992; Margolin, 1993; Felson & 
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Messner, 2000: 86).  Umberson et al. discuss the role of personal control (also 
called self-efficacy or mastery) in the lives of both perpetrators and victims of 
domestic violence.  The authors argue that for victims of domestic violence, 
their perceived level of personal control is eroded over time by their abuser, to 
a level where they feel they have little or no control over their own lives or their 
environment.  The opposite is true for the perpetrator; the perpetrator is able to 
control more and more of the home environment, which may compensate for a 
lack of control in other aspects of the perpetrator’s life, such as their working 
environment or place in wider society (1998: 442-444).   
 
Further to this, Umberson et al. discuss the impact that the loss of control can 
have on the intensity of domestic violence (1998: 444).  The authors argue that 
when abusers feel loss of control over their wider environment, they will tighten 
the level of control at home (Umberson et al., 1998: 444).  The examples cited 
by Umberson et al. include the loss of a job or the end of the relationship.  
However, this analysis can be readily transposed to the circumstances following 
a disaster.  Disasters can destroy homes or render them uninhabitable, can 
impact on the work of both abuser and victim through business and road 
closures, and can throw the whole daily routine of a family into upheaval.  
During disasters, families often become heavily reliant on external support 
agencies for even the most basic resources, which can foster a sense of 
hopelessness and embarrassment.  If a person who seeks a high level of 
personal control, such as an abuser, is put into this dependent situation it 
follows, from the argument that Umberson et al. have presented, that domestic 
violence will intensify as abusers seek to regain the feeling of control they had 
prior to the disaster.  This could mean domestic violence transmutes from 
psychological and economic abuse to physical assaults or that the violence 
becomes more frequent.  This change in the pattern of violence was 
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demonstrated by Fothergill in her first case study, where the violence changed 
from being controlling emotionally to physical violence (1999).   
 
These individual-based theories have gained widespread public acceptance as 
they offer a so-called ‘commonsense’ explanation.  Society is more comfortable 
with the idea that an individual is able to control his/her behaviour, and thus 
perceives abusers as deviant and not part of normal society (Buzawa & Buzawa, 
1996: 14).  Conversely, these approaches have been criticised, as they have 
been unable to produce a typology that covers all men who abuse their partners 
and, therefore, cannot in isolation, give an effective understanding of domestic 
violence (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1996: 14). 
 
Societal Perspectives 
The second set of non-feminist perspectives are societal perspectives that fill in 
some gaps that exist in the individual-based perspectives.  Societal perspectives 
look at the correlation between social phenomena and structures, such as 
race/ethnicity, class, religion, access to education, employment status and age, 
and domestic violence incidence (Straus, Gelles, & Steinmetz, 1980: 132-150).  
Straus et al. (1980) found a correlation between age, income employment and, 
to a lesser extent, religion and the presence of domestic violence in a 
relationship (1980: 151). 
 
Societal perspectives have argued that a man’s class can impact on his capacity 
to release tension in a socially acceptable form, such as sport, therefore, the 
home becomes an outlet (Margolin, 1993: 675).  Another pressure point may be 
an inability to vent their frustration or air grievances in the workplace; the 
problems become internalised, and can escalate until the perpetrator gets home 
to a place where he can exert power (Margolin, 1993).  However, this argument 
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contradicts the well-established fact that domestic violence occurs across the 
demographic spectrum, in both very poor families and very wealthy families 
(Semple, 2001).  Moreover, it ignores the control aspect of domestic violence as 
it limits domestic violence to physical assaults and not the psychological, 
emotional, sexual and financial abuse that can also be a part of domestic 
violence and thus has limited application in explaining domestic violence.  
 
Feminist Perspectives 
At their core, feminist perspectives seek to highlight the role of gender. 
However, the way this manifests and is addressed varies greatly across the 
feminist school of thought (hooks 1984). 
 
The origins of domestic violence show how fundamentally gendered it is.  In the 
Middle Ages, women were burned alive for a wide variety of behaviour from 
talking back to a husband, scolding and nagging, and miscarriage of an unborn 
child (Davis, 1971).  In 1768, the “rule of thumb” was codified into law in 
London, which allowed a husband to discipline an ill-tempered or poorly-
behaved wife as long as the stick used was no thicker than his thumb (Moore, 
1979; Bograd, 1988; Straus & Gelles, 1986: 466; Jukes 1999).  In this structured 
society, husband or society had the right to discipline a woman through the use 
of violence if she did not conform with their requirements.   
 
Since this time, much legal headway has been made internationally and in New 
Zealand with the eventual passing of the Domestic Violence Act in 1995.  
However, incidents of domestic violence persist in the present day, for at least 
one in three women in New Zealand (Fanslow & Robinson, 2004: 1).  Socially 
and legally, domestic violence was historically a private matter, and not a 
matter for public intervention.  However, thinking in this area has shifted (Mears 
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& Visher, 2005: 205), assisted in large part by feminist researchers and activists 
(Schecter, 1982; Morrow, 1994). 
 
Feminist perspectives argue that society is gendered (Yllo, 1983).  Gender roles 
and norms are ascribed to individuals and we are socialised into, and constantly 
striving to achieve these through our interactions with others (Butler, 1997).  
Many feminists consider gender to be the central organising principle in social 
relations and that gender roles and norms are influenced by an underlying 
patriarchy within the society (Cranny-Francis et al., 2003).  As stated previously, 
patriarchy has two key elements.  The first is a structure in which “men have 
more power and privilege than women” (Smith, 1990: 257).  The second is an 
ideology, which legitimises this structure (Smith, 1990: 258).   
 
Patriarchy creates an inequality of power between men and women and this 
creates further inequalities, such as work and wage differences, and fosters 
domestic violence.  There is typically inequality between spouses and the 
spouse with the greater power or control over resources and decision-making 
(typically the male) will dominate the other (Bograd, 1988; Margolin, 1993). In 
this context, the need for control and dominance are again viewed as the 
central motivations of domestic violence perpetrators.  Violence is one of the 
means of achieving control and dominance (Yllo, 1983: 279; Margolin, 1993; 
Fothergill, 1996; Enarson, 1999; Michalski, 2004).  Moreover, masculinity is 
inherently associated with dominance and the use of violence to show 
dominance.  Against this background, domestic violence can be viewed as the 
mechanism through which some men attempt to demonstrate their masculinity 
(Moore, 1979: 11; Margolin, 1993; Dobash & Dobash, 1998: 164).  In a disaster 
situation, if abusive men start to lose control of their assets and resources and 
consequently feel that their masculinity is being diminished, an assertion of 
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dominance over the only people with less power than them (i.e., their wives and 
children) may be used to bolster or re-establish the perpetrator’s masculine 
identity (Anderson, 1997: 658). 
 
Other feminist perspectives focus on the ways in which a patriarchal society 
contributes to high levels of acceptance of domestic violence as an outlet for 
men’s anger (Yllo, 1983: 279; Anderson, 1997; Hanmer, 2000).  Giles, Curreen 
& Adamson show that when a society’s formal sanctions against domestic 
violence are not consistently enforced, this can result in an informal 
endorsement of domestic violence, sending a message to perpetrators that 
assault against an intimate partner is not as serious as assault against a 
stranger (2005).  The sanctioning of such conduct indicates that there is a 
subculture of violence in the relevant society which accepts men’s violence 
against women (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1996: 20; Anderson, 1997; Giles, Curreen & 
Adamson, 2005).  An example of this is inconsistent enforcement of protection 
orders by Police officers or failure to prosecute domestic perpetrators to the 
fullest extent of the law (Giles, Curreen & Adamson, 2005: 107), which 
reinforces the belief that domestic violence does not have the same gravitas as 
assault on a stranger.   
 
To render policy effective, researchers need to understand why some men 
become perpetrators and others do not.  It is almost certainly an intersection of 
the factors identified in each of the three perspectives that leads to a 
relationship becoming abusive (Mears & Visher, 2005: 209).   
 
The current perspective 
Literature suggests that different social structures, such as ethnicity/race, class, 
gender and sexual orientation, cannot be considered in isolation and 
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researchers need to include considerations of all of the factors (Sokoloff & 
Dupont, 2005).  In this research, all of these factors will be considered.  
However, this study is rooted in a feminist perspective and stresses patriarchy 
as the most significant social structure and indicator of the prevalence of 
domestic violence, as it is patent that domestic violence is a gendered issue. 
 
One study recently released in New Zealand on the role gender plays in 
domestic violence has suggested that it is not significant and that both men 
and women are equally violent in relationships (Fergusson, Horwood, & Ridder, 
2005: 1113).  The authors utilised the Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS) to measure 
the number of violent outbursts by each individual in an intimate relationship.  
The use of the CTS has been strongly criticised for its simplicity and lack of 
contextualisation – by merely counting the number of violent acts committed 
during a conflict situation, it does not establish the presence of control, nor the 
reasoning or impact of said violent acts (Dobash & Dobash, 1988: 59; Saunders, 
1988: 91; Yllo, 1988: 41; Vivian & Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 1996: 25).  Similar 
early works by Straus (1980) and Gelles (1974) have merited the same 
conclusions.  By contrast, there are many New Zealand statistics that reinforce 
the gendered nature of domestic violence:   
 Of applications made for protection orders in New Zealand in 2004, 
91 percent were female applicants (Bartlett, 2006: 36).   
 Domestic violence has been found to affect 1 in 3 New Zealand women 
in their lifetime (Fanslow & Robinson, 2004: 28).   
 Fifty percent of female murders were related to family violence (Ministry 
of Justice, 2005).   
 Women’s Refuge constantly reports increasing numbers of women 
coming to them for help, and in the 2005/06 financial year reported 
over 20,000 new cases across their 50 refuges (National Collective of 
Independent Women’s Refuges, 2006).   
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Johnson suggests that domestic violence researchers should consider the 
proposition that there are two types of violence against women: one that is 
referred to as “patriarchal terrorism” and the other as “common couple violence” 
(1995: 283).  Johnson submits that “patriarchal terrorism” is the domestic 
violence that feminist researchers, Women’s Refuges, and others working in the 
field encounter (1995: 284).  Patriarchal terrorism involves violence used 
systematically to gain control over a woman in an intimate relationship.   
 
Johnson submits that the second type of violence, “common couple violence” is 
not gendered and is not used as a means of control but rather as an outlet for 
frustration.  This is the type of violence that is reported to researchers using the 
CTS scale (Johnson, 1995: 285).  Thus, the two sides of the debate are looking 
at different problems, one of common couple violence and one of domestic 
violence, and thus see very different results.  This theory has received some 
recognition (Rhatigan, Moore & Street, 2005: 84) and explains the vast 
differences in figures cited by the two sides of the debate.  In effect, it 
invalidates the CTS as a measurement of domestic violence and supports the 
use of information derived from shelters and practitioners in the field.   
 
Domestic violence is not only an issue in heterosexual relationships, and 
research has been conducted that shows non-heterosexual relationships can 
also be abusive (Brand & Kidd, 1986; Gardner, 1989; Island & Letellier, 1991; 
Lockhart et al., 2004).  Domestic violence in non-heterosexual relationships is 
not examined in this thesis, however, this issue would be a worthwhile topic for 
future research. 
 
As stated above, all the data received from those working in the field of 
response to domestic violence and service provision in New Zealand illustrate 
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that domestic violence is highly gendered.  For this reason and because of the 
feminist approach taken in this research, the focus of this work is on domestic 
violence against women during disasters in New Zealand and not violence 
against men.  However, the study remained open to the factors listed in both 
the individual-based and societal-based perspectives as clear lacunae exist in all 
three perspectives, all of which fail to explain domestic violence in its entirety.   
 
Positive impacts of natural disasters 
As well as using a feminist perspective to look at how patriarchal divisions have 
an impact on domestic violence, previous studies have acknowledged one 
possible positive outcome that can come from experiencing a disaster.  
Overseas research has observed that domestic violence victims can feel 
empowered by the circumstance of being able to recover from a disaster and, 
consequently take steps to leave an abusive relationship (Enarson, 1999; 
Fothergill, 1999).  This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven in 
which I will analyse New Zealand evidence.  This coincides with Umberson et 
al.’s perspective on personal control and domestic violence, in which, the 
disaster may empower the victim and this new found sense of control over their 
future may persuade the victim that they are no longer willing to accept 
violence (1998).  Disasters thus present opportunities for domestic violence 
agencies to intervene, where asked, and it is crucial that they are both 
functional during disasters and operating at a high level of efficiency and 
effectiveness.  Victims of domestic violence must feel able to leave and remain 
out of abusive relationships whilst also recovering from the direct effects of the 
disaster.  Thus, promotion of domestic violence services during disasters so 
women who choose to leave the relationship or seek help for continuing the 
relationship safely are aware of how to access these is an important change to 
current practice if lessons from overseas are to be learnt in New Zealand. 
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Conclusions 
Both domestic violence and disasters are social issues.  The impact of the two 
social phenomena intersecting allows for an examination of each and their 
relationship.  Domestic violence and disasters have a complex and multi-layered 
relationship.  Domestic violence can and does affect the way in which both 
victims and perpetrators of abuse respond to and recover from domestic 
violence.  Many factors linked to domestic violence increase a person’s 
vulnerability to a natural disaster by creating unsafe conditions (isolation, lack 
of economic resources, lack of social resources) because the victim of domestic 
violence has, in all likelihood, already been stripped of access to basic social 
networks.  Heightened levels of vulnerability are a major issue and victims of 
domestic violence are seriously at risk during a disaster.  For emergency 
management policy to be relevant to domestic violence victims, emergency 
management planners and emergency responders need to be aware of what 
domestic violence is, the impact it has on a victim’s ability to respond to 
disasters, and any complicating issues that arise from the needs of a woman in 
a disaster who has left an abusive relationship.   
 
The Pressure and Release model demonstrates the way in which an underlying 
patriarchy can lead to unsafe conditions that put women at greater risk than 
men during disasters.  In particular, this study focuses on the way in which 
domestic violence acts as a “dynamic force” within the model to put domestic 
violence victims at a high level of risk during disasters.  It is not an 
exaggeration to say that this risk can mean the difference between life and 
death.  The root causes of domestic violence are social stratification, 
predominantly gender, but juxtaposed with other structures in the society, 
including political, economic, legal and other social structures.  These strata are 
implicit in wage-gap figures (Statistics New Zealand, 2006), and, related to this 
 Chapter 2 
 52  
research, domestic violence figures (National Collective of Independent Refuges, 
2006).  Patriarchy permits men to use domestic violence (whether physical, 
psychological or economic) to dominate their female partner.  In turn, domestic 
violence creates unsafe conditions, such as isolation (Stets, 1991: 670) and a 
lack of access to resources and decision-making (Hague & Wilson, 2000: 164) 
that mean victims of domestic violence are at a higher risk than some other 
groups within society when disaster strikes.   
 
Domestic violence has been shown to impact clearly on disasters.  However, 
domestic violence is also affected by disasters.  The loss of control felt by 
abusers during a disaster, or perhaps the removal of existing outlets for their 
frustration and anger, may cause an increase in domestic violence (not merely 
reporting) during a disaster.  Fothergill’s work (1999) with women who 
experienced a coincidence of a disaster and domestic violence highlighted the 
change in the nature and intensity of abuse in the relationships during the 
observed disasters.  The disaster may also empower women and influence 
decisions to stay or leave the abusive relationships (Fothergill, 1999).   
 
The relationship between domestic violence and disasters is clearly 
multifaceted.  Policy needs to acknowledge this complexity in order to address 
the differences in risk level created by the intersection of these two social 
issues, and to be effective and relevant to all those it covers.  Emergency 
Management policy seeks to enable a community to recover from an event and, 
therefore, should be inclusive of all members of that community.  Therefore, if 
domestic violence does increase following a disaster, policy must adapt to 
reflect this and respond to the special needs that women in or leaving abusive 
relationships may require.  Against the background of the theoretical and 
empirical basis described above, this research will examine whether domestic 
 Chapter 2 
 53  
violence reporting in New Zealand increases during disasters.  Prior to 
discussing the results of the research in the following chapters, Chapter Three 
will focus on the appropriate methodology and methods to undertake such 
research. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Three:  Methodology 
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A theoretical and empirical case has been presented in the previous chapter 
that reported levels of domestic violence may increase in the aftermath of 
disasters.  In the next phase of this research, I identified the appropriate 
methodology and methods to test out the impact of Civil Defence emergencies 
on domestic violence in New Zealand.  This chapter will outline the 
methodology and methods used in the following research.  The approach of this 
research is feminist and, therefore, the chapter begins with a discussion of the 
basic principles of a feminist methodology and how they were applied to this 
study.  Next, the chapter covers the three previous studies (which linked the 
incidence of domestic violence and natural hazards in Canada and the United 
States) that provide the foundation for developing methods for this research.  
The last section of the chapter addresses the research design, including the 
methods used in this work, the ethical obligations of researching domestic 
violence, and a description of the acknowledged limitations of the research. 
 
In establishing which methods to adopt and in what fashion, the aims of the 
research must be well-understood or results could be flawed by the omission of 
critical questions germane to the study.  This line of research should begin by 
establishing whether the incidence and nature of domestic violence increases 
after disasters in New Zealand.  If an increase is observed, the research can 
then move to understand the determinant factors that are at play, and if there 
are structural and policy factors that can either reduce the incidence of 
domestic violence or ensure that frontline agencies are better equipped to deal 
with this consequence of natural disasters.   
 
Methodology 
The term methodology has been used interchangeably to describe different 
aspects of research, from the finite elements of research design to the broad 
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approach taken to the research as a whole (Landman, 2006: 429-430).  In this 
thesis, the term methodology is used to describe the approach to the research 
and the way in which the methods used in the research relate to the 
underpinning theoretical framework.  The theoretical and methodological 
orientation of this research is feminist, and specifically sits in the field of 
gender and disaster.  Gender and Disasters is a field that aims to underscore 
the role that gender plays in all aspects of natural disasters: planning, response 
and recovery (Honeycombe, 1994; Fordham, 1998; Wilson, Phillips & Neal, 
1998; Enarson, 1999; Enarson & Scanlon, 1999; Fothergill, 2004).  Whilst this 
research focuses on gendered vulnerability, gender and disaster researchers 
also target gendered strengths.  Through examination of a specific 
vulnerability, domestic violence, some of the gender-based strengths also 
became apparent (Enarson, 1999). 
 
Feminist methodology 
This research is feminist research in the same vein as Enarson (1999), Fothergill 
(1999) and Fisher (2005).  As previously noted in Chapter One, I am primarily 
concerned with domestic violence against women, and whether this will bias the 
impact of a disaster to disproportionately and adversely affect women.   
 
Feminist methodology is a broad term, and, over time, the definition of what is 
or is not feminist methodology has changed considerably (e.g., Millman & 
Kanter, 1975; Smith, 1979; Cook & Fonow, 1986; Cancian, 1992; Griffiths & 
Hanmer, 2005; Skinner, Hester & Malos, 2005).  The literature indicates a 
general consensus that there is no single, unified feminist methodology, which 
is coupled with the absence of a single, unified feminist theory (hooks, 1984; 
Ramazanoglu, 1992; DeVault, 1996; Eichler, 1997; Renzetti, 1997; Fonow & 
Cook, 2005).  However, five key characteristics of feminist methodology have 
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been commonly agreed upon (Renzetti, 1997: 133; Skinner, Hester & Malos, 
2005: 10; Landman, 2006: 431).  I will discuss each of these and highlight how 
they are reflected in the methods of this research. 
 
The first principle is that feminist research is concerned with gender and 
gender inequality (Ramazanoglu, 1992; DeVault, 1996; Eichler, 1997; Renzetti, 
1997: 133; Fonow & Cook, 2005; Skinner, Hester & Malos, 2005: 10; Landman, 
2006: 431).  It is important to recognise the distinction between a person’s sex 
and his or her gender.  A person’s sex refers to the biological dichotomy used 
to describe their genitalia – either man or woman (West & Zimmerman, 1987: 
127; Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, 1999: 192).  A person’s gender refers to the 
socially ascribed and created category people are placed into – masculine or 
feminine (Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, 1999: 192; Ridgeway & Correll, 2004: 510).  
This definition of gender focuses on a performative state that individuals are 
socialised into believing can be achieved by following roles and norms in 
interactions with other people (West & Zimmerman, 1987: 126; Stets & Burke, 
1996; Litton Fox & McBride Murry, 2000: 1163; Risman, 2004: 430).  
Individuals typically strive to gain approval by acting in gender-appropriate 
ways (West & Zimmerman, 1987: 139; Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, 1999: 192; 
Messerschmidt, 2009: 86).   
 
Gender inequality refers to the unequal outcomes that stem from these gender 
roles and norms (Wood & Eagly, 2002).  Most commonly, gender inequality 
refers to a situation where masculinity is privileged and, as a consequence, 
most women experience lesser opportunities and, in some instances 
discrimination (Stets & Burke, 1996; Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, 1999; Wood & 
Eagly, 2002).  Gender stratification is another term used to describe a situation 
in which the structure of gender in society creates inequalities.  This is typically 
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reflected in income disparities, childcare arrangements, violence, and the 
division of labour (Collins et al., 1993; Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, 1999). 
 
Domestic violence is an area where gender inequality is clearly evident.  As 
previously noted, women accounted for 91% of the applicants for protection 
orders in New Zealand in 2004 (Bartlett, 2006: 36) and every year Women’s 
Refuge reports working with tens of thousands of women (National Collective of 
Independent Women’s Refuges, 2008).  One of the key goals of this research is 
to examine this gendered inequality in the context of the additional stress 
posed by natural disasters and the role that an underlying gender stratification 
within New Zealand plays in the aftermath of natural hazard events.   
 
The second principle is that feminist research has the goal of giving voice to the 
experiences of women and other marginalised groups (Eichler, 1997; Renzetti, 
1997: 133; Fonow & Cook, 2005; Skinner, Hester & Malos, 2005: 12; Landman, 
2006: 431).  Domestic violence victims are a group of marginalised women.  
Whilst in an abusive relationship, women are often isolated from society, friends 
and family, and denied access to other resources such as family finances and 
assets.  This limits or entirely negates the power these women possess both 
within the home and in wider society.  This research strives to vocalise the 
experiences of these women that are currently not included in any meaningful 
way in New Zealand Civil Defence practice and policy.  However, the stories of 
women’s experiences are conveyed through agency representatives in this 
research and thus, are subject to interpretation, which must be acknowledged. 
 
This research presents the experiences of both domestic violence victims, and 
the women (and men) working to help them, through the narratives of domestic 
violence agencies.  Insofar as it has been possible, I have quoted sources 
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directly, rather than paraphrasing into my interpretation of what the sources 
can impart.  Initially I had hoped to speak to the victims of domestic violence 
directly.  However, this was not possible, and therefore, the stories have been 
told through the agency workers and, in particular, through Women’s Refuge 
workers (a voice that can be marginalised) who had the most insight into the 
women’s needs and experiences.  Currently, the experience of New Zealand 
women subjected to domestic violence during disasters is not known.  This 
thesis aims to shed some light on this.  Future research may be able to obtain 
these stories directly from the women and build on what is presented in this 
research. 
 
The third principle of feminist research is a commitment to using the research 
to bring about social change and the understanding that as a consequence 
there is, a priori, an aspect of political activism to the work (Ramazanoglu, 
1992; Thompson, 1992; Eichler, 1997; Renzetti, 1997: 133; Fonow & Cook, 
2005; Skinner, Hester & Malos, 2005: 14; Landman, 2006: 431).  As 
Ramazanoglu (1992) states, domestic violence research can never be apolitical, 
domestic violence is a highly politicised issue and one in which gender 
inequalities are highly evident.  Moreover, any research that evaluates policy 
and highlights shortfalls in current practice will involve a degree of political 
activism.  This research primarily evaluates Emergency Management policy to 
establish whether the policy makers and planners have contingency structures 
in place to ensure that local agencies have the resources to cope with potential 
influxes in domestic violence cases.  It also looks at agency protocols to 
examine whether agencies themselves are adequately prepared for a disaster.  
However, I hope that this research will not conclude with making 
recommendations.  In accord with the third principle, once the study is 
completed, if increases are observed that are not adequately dealt with, I will 
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work to ensure the results reach those in a position to action the necessary 
changes.   
 
In this regard, during the interviewing process there was a significant raising of 
awareness for both myself and for the interviewees.  In discussing the impacts 
that could have occurred following the recent Civil Defence emergencies and 
the gaps in current planning, many interviewees clearly began to see a need for 
planning in the future.  For policy and planning changes to be effective they 
must be accepted at all levels from the national level to the operational, local 
level.  This cannot be achieved by simply sending a new policy document out to 
local agencies.  To attain a level of investment from local agencies, I have asked 
for and integrated their views as to what is feasible and necessary in a revised 
policy or plan.  This will be discussed further in Chapter Eight. 
 
The fourth principle central to feminist work is that the research has reflexivity 
(Eichler, 1997; Renzetti, 1997: 133; Litton Fox & McBride Murry, 2000; Fonow & 
Cook, 2005; Skinner, Hester & Malos, 2005: 15; Landman, 2006: 431).  
Reflexivity requires that the researcher stand back from and examine the 
impact that the actions of the researcher have on the research.  Feminists 
believe that research cannot be completely objective, and that a researcher’s 
values, judgements and beliefs influence the final product of the research.  In 
recognising and acknowledging my own background and potential biases from 
the beginning of the research, I am acknowledging that this research is not 
completely value-free and, as with all research, is not entirely objective but 
rather it is subject to my and others’ values and assumptions.  However, this 
subjectivity does not reduce the validity of the research.  In fact in 
acknowledging this level of subjectivity, which is present in all research 
(Landman, 2006: 431), I am increasing the robustness of the study. 
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As a feminist researcher with a background in Sociology and Economics, my 
focus in this research has been on domestic violence committed by men against 
women in heterosexual relationships.  One of my first jobs as a teenager was 
working for my father, a physical volcanologist, conducting experiments to 
gauge the density of rocks.  It was repetitious work that involved 100 rocks per 
sample and was solely quantitative.  However, as I progressed through my 
studies at University, I came to appreciate the value that qualitative data 
brought a richer picture of what an event was like to experience or the 
relationships involved in a situation, among other things.  This background has 
meant I value both quantitative and qualitative methods in research.  Whilst 
feminist research has historically rejected quantitative research, more recently 
feminists have argued that the use of quantitative methods with qualitative 
methods is still in line with feminist methodology (Smith, 1990; Mattingly & 
Falconer-al-Hindi, 1995; McLafferty, 1995; Oakley, 1998).  My interpretation of 
the data examined in this thesis is also affected by this background, and as 
such the results of the research are also affected. 
 
Finally, feminist research rejects the traditional dynamics of balance of power 
between researcher and the subjects of the research, and instead chooses an 
approach that empowers the subjects by giving them a greater degree of 
influence in research design and reporting (Thompson, 1992; Eichler, 1997; 
Renzetti, 1997: 133; Litton Fox & McBride Murry, 2000; Fonow & Cook, 2005; 
Skinner, Hester & Malos, 2005: 11).  This can be contentious if the researcher 
and the subject disagree over interpretations and can create a conflict of 
interest for the researcher who desires preserving rapport and goodwill with 
their research subject but also wishes to express their opinion (Skinner, Hester 
& Malos, 2005: 11).  Reinharz (1992) argues that the use of open-ended 
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questions is a way to mitigate some of the power-differential in an interviewing 
relationship as it allows for the interviewees to direct the discussion, rather 
than the interviewer doing this.  This method was incorporated into this 
research; all interviews involve open-ended questions as a way of challenging 
the traditional power dynamics between myself and the interviewees.   
 
The process of incorporating the needs, knowledge and interests of the 
agencies involved in my study began during the first stages of the research.  I 
approached the national bodies of all participating agencies and asked them 
what they would want from this research.  This information was collated and 
incorporated into the research design.  As well as incorporating the 
perspectives of participants in the design phase of the research, the instrument 
used was semi-structured interviews that allowed participants some flexibility to 
discuss the key issues they observed, whilst ensuring I covered the basic topic 
areas that came out of the design phase.  Semi-structured interviews are 
particularly valuable when research is aimed at developing an issue rather than 
attaining a yes/no answer (May, 1998).  Throughout the interviews, I was 
careful to maintain the position of an interested student (which I am), rather 
than an “expert”, a measure that reduced the potential power differential 
between interviewer and interviewee.   
 
A tension that has existed throughout this research is how to incorporate the 
feminist methodology that I employ effectively whilst still maintaining research 
that is accessible to policy makers and analysts.  This tension is not rare, 
feminist scholars have noted the competing needs that occur between feminist 
research and other methodologies (McRobbie, 1982, 46; Maynard, 1994: 24; 
Devault, 1996).  This factor has influenced both the research design and the 
way in which the results are presented.  However, in making this thesis 
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accessible to policy makers and analysts, I am meeting the third principle of 
feminist methodology discussed above, that the research has the goal of 
bringing about social change.  The next section will discuss the methods used 
to meet these competing needs. 
 
Research Methods/Design 
This research is designed to establish whether the current emergency 
management policy and planning is appropriate for the actual impact of natural 
hazard events on incidences of domestic violence.  Very little research has been 
conducted on what is potentially a very serious consequence of natural hazards 
for many women in New Zealand.  In undertaking this research, it was hoped 
that if increases are identified, suggestions for amendments to emergency 
management policy and planning can be formulated, making both more 
realistic and relevant for New Zealand society.  If the recommendations are 
accepted, this should create a more well-rounded approach to emergency 
management policy and planning.  The aim is to foster and encourage policy 
and planning that will allow government and non-government agencies access 
to the resources to better prepare for and to mitigate the effects of such an 
event.  There are two main objectives: 
 
 To determine whether there is evidence of an increase in the incidence 
of domestic violence following natural hazards in New Zealand, through 
a national postal survey and statistics collation, case studies of five 
affected communities, and interviews with representatives of response 
agencies within those communities.   
 
 To ascertain whether there is adequate provision in New Zealand 
emergency management policy and planning to assess and respond to 
potential increases in the incidence of domestic violence and, if not, to 
formulate suggestions for amendments to emergency management 
policy and planning. 
 
In deciding on the methods used to investigate increased domestic violence 
reporting after disaster in New Zealand, previous studies undertaken on the 
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topic were examined for insight into which methods were successful.  As noted 
in Chapter Two, there had been four studies conducted prior to this research 
specifically on domestic violence and disasters (Wilson, Phillips & Neal, 1998; 
Enarson, 1999; Fothergill, 1999; Jenkins & Phillips, 2008).  This thesis uses 
methods from all four studies to gain a comprehensive picture of the situation 
in New Zealand with regard to domestic violence reporting in disasters.  It does 
this in two phases.  The first is a survey of social service agencies in areas 
affected by Civil Defence emergencies in New Zealand in the last ten years.  
This method was utilised by Enarson in her study of domestic violence reporting 
in the United States and Canada (1999).  The survey was completed first and 
provided input for the selection of the case studies, a method also employed by 
Enarson (1999).  The second is five detailed case studies of communities 
affected by a Civil Defence emergency in the last five years.  This involves 
interviews with agency representatives from both domestic violence agencies 
and Civil Defence welfare organisations, and the collection of statistics from 
domestic violence agencies in the areas under consideration.  Agency interviews 
were undertaken in Enarson’s work (1999), Wilson, Phillips & Neal’s study 
(1998) of agency response to domestic violence in three communities in the 
United States, and in Jenkins & Phillips’ study (2008) of domestic violence after 
Hurricane Katrina.  The collection of agency statistics was included in all four 
previous studies (Wilson, Phillips & Neal, 1998; Enarson, 1999; Fothergill, 1999; 
Jenkins & Phillips, 2008).   
 
Overall, the thesis involves a mixed-method approach.  Part of this research 
involves analysis of quantitative data – the use of descriptive statistics from the 
Women’s Refuge database to evaluate the scale of any increases found in 
caseloads after data analysis, and a postal survey with both open and closed 
ended questions.  Quantitative data has been viewed by some feminist 
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researchers as positivistic and full of false claims of objectivity, having little to 
offer the field of social science (Smith, 1990; Mattingly & Falconer-al-Hindi, 
1995; McLafferty, 1995; Oakley, 1998).  This is due, in large part, to its ties to 
early social science research that did not include women or capture their 
experiences of social phenomena (Oakley, 1998).  However, feminist research 
has evolved from involving only qualitative data, through the utilisation of 
descriptive statistics, to finally incorporating quantitative data (Smith, 1990; 
DeVault, 1996: 35; Griffiths & Hanmer, 2005: Sharp, 2005: 305).  This inclusion 
has not been welcomed by all feminist researchers (Thompson, 1992; Mattingly 
& Falconer-al-Hindi, 1995; McLafferty, 1995; Oakley, 1998).  However, 
quantitative data has been used in domestic violence and policy research, both 
relevant areas to this thesis (Straus et al., 1980; Straus & Gelles, 1986; Smith, 
1990).  Quantitative data is critical in the area of policy evaluation and research, 
especially in a time where evidence-based reporting is increasingly popular 
(Packwood, 2002; Taylor, 2005).  Reported changes (in this case in reported 
levels of domestic violence) must include a level of quantification if analysts and 
government agencies are to seriously consider the issue (Packwood, 2002; 
Taylor, 2005).   
 
C. Wright Mills argues that whilst quantitative data can be numerically and 
statistically accurate, it may not reflect the reality of a situation (1959).  As a 
result, the policy derived from this information alone will prove ineffective.  
Qualitative research may offer a more complete and salient perspective for a 
particular situation, especially in domestic violence where the quality and scope 
of record-keeping are varied (Bouma, 1996; Oakley, 1999).  In this research, 
qualitative methods were used to record the experiences of agencies and 
individuals post-event and their impressions of what they believe could enable 
them to cope better with future events.  Qualitative research was particularly 
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suited to this phase of the research as there had been no prior work undertaken 
on this subject in New Zealand.  Statistics in isolation give limited insight into 
the lived experience of a Civil Defence emergency.  
 
Phase 1: Survey 
The first approach was a postal survey of agencies that provide social services 
in all areas that have been affected by a Civil Defence emergency in the last ten 
years.  In communities that have been affected by multiple events, only the 
most recent event was chosen.  This left 17 events, which are listed below: 
 
Table 1:  Natural Hazard Events in the last ten years where Civil Defence 
Emergencies were declared 
Ruapehu Eruption June 1996 
Northland & Pukekohe Floods  22 January 1999 
Dargaville Floods  18 April 1999 
Clutha District Flooding  17 November 1999 
Central Otago Flooding 17 November 1999 
Queenstown Lakes District Floods  1 December 1999 
Thames/South Waikato Weatherbomb 21 June 2002 
South Taranaki Storm 17 February 2004 
Marlborough Storm 17 February 2004 
Hawke's Bay Flooding 18 October 2004 
Lower North Island Storm 15 & 16 February 2004 
Eastern Bay of Plenty Floods 17 & 19 July 2004 
Dunedin Rain Storm 7 February 2005 
Greymouth Tornado 10 March 2005 
BOP Tauranga / Matata Flooding 18 May 2005 
Gisborne/East Cape Flooding 23 October 2005 
Oamaru/Timaru Snowstorm 12 June 2006 
 
The surveys served two purposes; first, they captured more communities than 
interviewing would allow and secondly they acted as a filter for the selection of 
communities for the case studies.  The surveys also satisfied a need in that 
decision-makers want research representative of a range of people and 
communities to ensure that policy will apply to a majority of the people affected 
by it (Baehler, 2003).   
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Agency selection for the survey phase was done by focussing on the epicentre 
of the emergency, then widening the area to gauge whether impacts were 
localised or if there was “ripple” effect extending into other communities.  Many 
sources were used to identify those agencies in each area that dealt with the 
victims and perpetrators of domestic violence following the respective events.  
A number of online directories were searched in the selected communities 
(Families & Communities, 2006; NZ Yellow Pages, 2006).  A check made of the 
websites of government agencies such as Work and Income NZ, Child, Youth 
and Family, and the New Zealand Police, as well as non-government agencies 
such as Women’s Refuge, Relationship Services, the Open Home Foundation, 
Plunket, and National Network of Stopping Violence Services, ensured that no 
agencies were overlooked.  Across the 17 communities affected by Civil 
Defence emergencies, 601 government and non-government agencies were 
identified as relevant to the research. 
 
Postal surveys consistently have a low rate of return.  In this research, this was 
dealt with by despatching a second repeat survey to those that did not respond 
by the deadline, together with a second reminder letter. This is in keeping with 
Fowler’s suggestions of approaches to increase the response rate (2002).  This 
was successful in creating a second wave of surveys after the reminder letter 
was received.  The second wave was smaller than the first (for the total 
response rate, see page 62).  However, it was clear the letter had made a 
difference in at least a proportion of the second wave as some survey 
respondents noted the letter or returned it with the survey. 
 
A further strategy to improve response rates was to gain national-level support 
in agencies such as Work and Income New Zealand, New Zealand Police, and 
Women’s Refuge. Covering letters of support from Chief Executives were 
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attached to letters to members of the National Network of Stopping Violence 
Services and the National Collective of Independent Women’s Refuges.  These 
were sought on the assumption that if a national office gave backing to the 
research, local agencies might be more willing to participate than if they were 
simply contacted by an unknown researcher from outside the community.  
Contact with the New Zealand Police and Work and Income were made through 
a representative at each national office who assisted in sourcing the appropriate 
interviewee and initiated contact. 
 
The time window of selecting areas affected by disasters during the previous 
ten years was selected as the surveys depend on current members of staff 
being present during the emergency, and also on the accuracy of their 
memories of events.  It was assumed that events that occurred over ten years 
ago would be too far back to be remembered without any sort of 
documentation and it was already known that record-keeping in domestic 
violence agencies was not formalised until after this time.  This was established 
in previous discussions with national-level representatives of the agencies in the 
initial stages of the research formulation (as mentioned on page 64). 
 
The survey involved 30 questions and combined the use of quantitative 
questions and qualitative questions as to the impact any change had on the 
agency.  The questions included both closed- and open-ended examples; the 
latter allowed respondents to give wider perspectives on issues such as 
preparedness and the size and duration of any changes, as well as articulate 
their understanding of these changes (see Appendix A). 
 
Another section of questions asked about the preparedness of agencies for the 
primary impacts of the hazard events and their preparedness for an increase in 
 Chapter 3 
 
 69   
domestic violence following a disaster.  Finally, the survey asked participants to 
list other agencies they had worked with in this field.  This gave a picture of the 
extent of networks at the local level and highlighted any lacunae that need to 
be filled to ensure the agency response is broad enough to catch as many 
women as possible at any stage (i.e., before, during, and after violence occurs). 
 
In total, there were 601 surveys sent and 122 replies, a response rate of 20%.  
This was a good result given that the questionnaires were relatively detailed 
and that many NGO agencies are under-resourced.  Survey responses were 
coded into SPSS for analysis.  The SPSS analysis was confined to frequency 
calculation and simple comparisons, as this research is predominantly 
qualitative and the primary purposes of the survey were to provide an overview 
of as many events as possible in New Zealand and aid in the selection of case 
study sites. 
 
Table 2: Numbers of Returned Surveys for Each Event (during 2006) 
Event Non-
government 
agency 
Government 
agency 
TOTAL
Ruapehu Eruption 4 1 5
Northland & Pukekohe Floods  4 0 4
Dargaville Floods  3 0 3
Clutha District Flooding  1 1 2
Central Otago Flooding 3 1 4
Queenstown Lakes District Floods  1 0 1
Thames/South Waikato Weatherbomb 13 2 15
South Taranaki Storm 7 1 8
Marlborough Storm 13 2 15
Hawke's Bay Flooding 2 2 4
Lower North Island Storm* 32 5 37
Eastern Bay of Plenty Floods* 4 0 4
Dunedin Rain Storm 4 0 4
Greymouth Tornado 2 1 3
BOP Tauranga / Matata Flooding 0 3 3
Gisborne/East Cape Flooding 1 0 1
Oamaru/Timaru Snowstorm* 8 1 9
TOTAL 102 20 122
*Areas chosen for the case study phase of the research  
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Responses were received from a variety of agencies, both governmental and 
non-governmental (see Table 2).  Within the non-governmental group there 
were domestic violence agencies, faith-based welfare organisations, and 
agencies working specifically with Maori (New Zealand’s indigenous people). 
 
This research suggested that because the surveys rely on the memories of 
individuals, research must follow shortly after the event.  Comments on many 
survey responses showed that record keeping has been limited as had been 
noted by head offices.  It would seem that past events are likely to yield poor 
and incomplete results as staff move and people forget.  This was observed in 
the survey phase.  Therefore in the case studies, a limit of five years prior was 
put in place.  The time window of five years allowed me to capture enough data 
to draw conclusions confidently about what happened at the time of the 
disaster. 
 
Phase 2: Case Studies  
Once the survey provided an overview, I utilised five case studies to examine 
the issue of increased domestic violence reporting during disasters more 
thoroughly.  The five case studies are examined in detail in Chapter Four.  A 
case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003:13).  Case 
studies have been shown to be particularly useful in looking at issues that have 
been neglected in earlier research (Yin, 2003).  There are only four published 
studies with a specific focus on domestic violence during and after disasters 
and none of these studies are particular to New Zealand.  For this reason, 
multiple cases studies, is an ideal method for this research.  Use of multiple 
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case studies achieves a greater level of consensus and generalisation than 
available from any one case study (Gerring, 2004).   
 
Case studies need to have clear boundaries defining what is being examined 
(Yin, 2003; Gerring, 2004).  This ensures that the focus is not lost when 
utilizing a holistic approach, examining every aspect of the case from as many 
angles as possible and using multiple types of data (Yin, 2003).  The case 
studies in this thesis utilised a mixed-method process that combines 
quantitative and qualitative data to establish whether reported cases of 
domestic violence increase after natural disasters in New Zealand, and 
understand what both agencies and individuals went through after the hazard 
event.  Understanding these issues and the relationships involved is central in 
creating policy that is both relevant and realistic.  Berg (1998) argues that a 
triangulation of methods gives three complimentary perspectives that is more 
likely to represent the situation correctly.  This research uses four different 
methods, two quantitative and two qualitative, to gain insight into domestic 
violence increases after disasters.   
 
Statistics 
The first data set within the five case studies is the collection of statistics from 
Women’s Refuge at a local and nationwide level.  Women’s Refuge is a non-
government organisation in New Zealand that provides both crisis response and 
prevention services for women and children affected by domestic violence 
(Buckley, 2008).  Women’s Refuge has a database that all clients are entered 
into at a local level.  Each individual Refuge can then produce summaries of the 
number of clients during a particular period, delineated by a specified set of 
criteria including ethnicity, service type and age.  Each local database is then 
transmitted to the national office for collation, which allows a national picture 
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to be built.   This established whether any local increases in domestic violence 
reporting found in the months following each disaster were part of a national 
trend, or if they were isolated events and thus may correlate with the impact of 
the associated disaster.  This quantified the increases, if any, and established 
the duration of any effects.   
 
Attempts were also made to attain statistics from the New Zealand Police.  
However, following discussions, it was decided not to present these within the 
results of the study.  New Zealand Police statistics are not suitable for simple 
time-series analysis due to ongoing changes in categorising and recording 
methods, and random shifts related to the training of new officers.  There have 
not been a sufficient number of Civil Defence emergencies in the period since 
the New Zealand Police’s database’s creation and, therefore, this was not a 
feasible task to complete. 
 
As already noted, the type of quantitative data gathered from Women’s Refuge 
appeals to policy-makers and planners that are concerned with funding 
agencies in the aftermath of disasters, as well as those with a preference for 
having tangible statistics to incorporate in policy debates.  The value of 
qualitative and anecdotal data is not as strongly recognised, or as appealing 
politically (Baehler, 2003: 30). 
 
Women’s Refuge statistics were collated into Microsoft Excel spreadsheets and 
simplified to the number of cases each month for the period two years before 
and two years after the events.  This was then graphed to illustrate any peaks or 
drops in the number of reported cases of domestic violence in communities.  
The qualitative data permits the identification and elimination of those 
increases due to other exogenous factors such as an increased awareness of 
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the agency, a high-profile case in the media or a new media campaign.  The 
quantitative data alone gives little insight into what is happening in the 
community.  It is the interviews in the final stage of the research that add 
substance to the quantitative figures taken from the Women’s Refuge database. 
 
Interviews 
Interviews provide the largest amount of data of the four methods used.  There 
were three types of interviews – one at the national organisation level, one at 
the community agency level and, finally, a small number of interviews with 
women living in rural areas in two of the case studies.  Interviews were used in 
all four previous studies on domestic violence and disasters (Wilson, Phillips & 
Neal, 1998; Enarson, 1999; Fothergill, 1999; Jenkins & Phillips, 2008) and 
provided the benefit of allowing readers to hear the voices of those affected by 
disasters, rather than relying on the researchers’ interpretations.  In deciding 
which methods to use, this was considered one of the most useful and 
advantageous as feminist research aims to give voice to marginalised groups as 
part of its fundamental values. 
 
The first set of interviews to take place (see Table 3) was with representatives of 
frontline agencies for domestic violence crisis response and other agencies who 
deal with domestic violence in a secondary role, such as through education 
programmes or by providing one-on-one counselling.  The agencies were used 
to identify commonalities between cases, such as demographics, extent of loss, 
levels of insurance, and of family and outside support, that explain rises in 
reporting of domestic violence.  These issues were all potential factors explored 
by the interviews.   
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Of the five case studies, four of the interview sets took place between 2007 and 
2008 in Palmerston North/Feilding, Lower Hutt, Masterton and Timaru.  The 
other set of interviews in Whakatane took place in 2005 as part of an Honours 
dissertation.  The data gathered in the Whakatane interviews has been included 
in this thesis and expanded upon with other forms of information such as the 
case files summaries, which are described below. 
 
All interviewees were given an information sheet on the research and asked to 
sign a consent form (see Appendices B & C).  Interviews were semi-structured 
but flexible enough to allow any extra input the individuals had to contribute 
and most lasted approximately an hour.  These were transcribed by myself for a 
thematic analysis. 
 
The use of interviews in evaluating historical events is one form of an oral 
history (Geiger, 1986: 336).  It is a method that has been both advocated for 
and contested by researchers (Berger Gluck & Patal, 1991; Thomson, 1998; 
Kirby, 2008: 23).  Early feminist researchers found the use of oral history a 
necessary method as much of the early written material did not include the 
perspectives of women, issues that affect women, or their stories (Berger Gluck 
& Patal, 1991: 9; Anderson & Jack, 1991: 11; Bornat & Diamond, 2007: 21).  
Interviewing is a technique that is informed by culture, which dictates forms of 
both oral and other communication (Thomson, 1998: 582), which means that in 
conducting interviews, researchers must at all times be aware that an interview 
method that may work perfectly with one individual will not necessarily 
engender the same response from another (Minister, 1991: 31; Thomson, 1998: 
583). 
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A consideration discussed by researchers who utilise oral history or 
interviewing in their research is that of memory and its subjectivity (Geiger, 
1986; Thomson, 1998; Kirby, 2008).  In the 1970’s interviews with individuals 
on historical events were criticised in three areas: 
1. Physical deterioration and nostalgia; 
2. Personal bias of both the interviewer and interviewee; 
3. And the influence of collective and retrospective versions of the 
past. 
(Thomson, 1998: 584; Kirby, 2008: 24-27) 
 
Physical deterioration and nostalgia refer to either the forgetting of or the 
romanticising of details that can occur in individuals that can create a distorted 
view of the event being discussed (Polishuk, 2005; Kirby, 2008).  Personal bias 
of both the interview and interviewee refers to the agendas of each side of the 
interview (Polishuk, 2005).  These agendas are suggested to reduce the 
reliability of the data being given and presented as either or both of the parties 
involved may be using the interview to get across a particular message which 
may not be accurate (Polishuk, 2005; Thomson, 2006: 61; Kirby, 2008: 25-26).  
The influence of collective and retrospective versions of the past refers to an 
individual’s memory being informed by subsequent information they have 
collected since the event itself, which in turn changes their memory of the event 
being discussed (Thomson, 1998: 585).  Thus, rather than relating the event in 
an objective manner, the data gained from an interview is subjective (Kirby, 
2008: 27).   
 
Initially, work began on how these criticisms could be mediated and what 
methods could alleviate these criticisms of the method (Thomson, 2006: 54).  
However, in the late 1970’s, these suggested shortfalls of the method were 
challenged and argued to be strengths (Sangster, 1994: 6; Thomson, 1998: 
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584; Bornat & Diamond, 2007; Thomson, 2006: 54) and the benefits of gaining 
access to information that is not usually recorded arguably outweigh issues 
with the method. 
 
Frequently, oral histories are used in conjunction with other data sources in 
establishing the events that occurred at a particular time and the implications 
of these events on individuals involved (Geiger, 1986: 337; Thomson, 1998: 
585).  This was seen in some of the interviews in this research, where 
interviewees required documentation (mostly monthly statistics from their 
respective databases, but also minutes from meetings) to remind them of the 
events, issues and solutions arising during the disaster in their area.  Added to 
this, in this research, a triangulation of data is used to compare the data from 
the interviews with other sources.  The data from statistics and case files 
summaries are used to provide a quantitative base.  The interviews are used to 
provide context and an understanding of what it was like on the ground after 
Civil Defence emergencies for agency representatives.   
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The nature of domestic violence and the associated social stigma means that it 
is hard to quantify the level of violence.  One of the few ways to do this is 
through levels of reported cases, although this is an under-representation of 
true levels of violence, as the majority of domestic violence cases are largely 
unreported (Mayhew & Reilly, 2007: 35).   However, often data gathered from 
those working in the field has been treated with contempt and there has been a 
reluctance to trust this perspective as it is considered to be influenced by the 
aims of the interviewee (Yllo, 1988: 43).  Researchers have historically been 
reluctant to utilise the analyses of field workers as their perspectives have been 
criticised as unscientific and politically motivated.  Yllo advocates for the 
dismissal of such prejudice in feminist research (1988: 44).  These workers are 
in the unique position of seeing multiple cases daily, which gives them a rare 
and highly valuable insight into any commonalities between cases that cannot 
be seen from a more distanced position.   
 
As with the survey phase, agencies were also asked about their relationships 
with other agencies in the context of both referrals and joint projects.  The aim 
was to build an accurate picture of the complexity within each community and 
establish the way in which inter-agency relationships are built and managed.  
Inter-agency relationships are vital to successful response to domestic violence, 
as no agency has yet managed to end or even curtail violence in a community 
on its own.  The focus of domestic violence response has now moved to inter-
sectoral approaches that aim to catch at-risk families through a variety of 
avenues: education, health, justice, and governmental and non-governmental 
institutions.  This approach holds the most promise, although it has yet to be 
fully realised in any community (Kelly, 2004; Robinson, 2006; Hague & Bridge, 
2008). 
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As the research progressed, the need for interviews with national level policy 
makers and planners became apparent.  The resulting policy recommendations 
are aimed at being multi-level including national and community.  To gain 
perspective on what was feasible and what is currently known at a national level 
about the rates of domestic violence after Civil Defence emergencies, it was 
decided to include a second tier of interviews with national level 
representatives. 
 
Through the interviews and survey, a clear picture of the key agencies that are 
involved in responding to increased domestic violence cases was formed.  This 
guided the choices for the national level interviews.  There were three 
significant organisations involved that were interviewed in this study: 
 New Zealand Police 
 Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management  
 Women’s Refuge  
 
Interviews were again semi-structured and involved questions about the 
national-level role in response and recovery from Civil Defence emergencies, 
and levels and perceptions of increased domestic violence.  For Women’s 
Refuge and the New Zealand Police, a portion of the time was spent discussing 
their specific continuity planning to enable them to continue providing services 
during medium- and large-scale Civil Defence emergencies.  The interview with 
the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management focussed on the 
institutional understanding of domestic violence and on the role that they see 
Civil Defence playing in dealing with increased domestic violence after 
emergencies.  The different focuses were designed to gauge what each 
organisation knew about the other’s work in order to create a base level for 
future discussions to begin from. 
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The interviews were also an opportunity to allow input from these agencies into 
the final policy recommendations in keeping with the feminist approach, whilst 
at the same time raising awareness of the issues at hand in the hope of planting 
a seed to initiate social change.  Gaining recognition from governmental and 
non-governmental agencies that domestic violence is a significant issue and one 
that is worth the effort of policy reform is a vital first step in using this research 
to make changes to bridge the gap between current policy and the actual reality 
of what is occurring on the ground during disasters. 
 
All interviews were transcribed and sent to participants to check for factual 
accuracy and final review before being analysed.  Analysis of the interviews took 
the form of establishing whether there had been a change in the agency 
workloads and then collation of common themes.  Interviews were placed in 
context by looking across communities at commonalities between agencies 
within the same organisation, and by looking across agencies in one 
community.   
 
As noted earlier, an initial goal of this research was to speak to women who had 
reported domestic violence to a Women’s Refuge in the areas being studied in 
the months after the respective event.  This is something that had not been 
undertaken before in any previous domestic violence and disasters study.  The 
closest example was Alice Fothergill’s interviews of 90 women in her study of 
the Grand Forks Valley flooding in the United States (Fothergill, 1999).  
However, these women did not seek help from an agency at the time of the 
event and interviews were not specific to domestic violence victims. 
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To maintain the privacy of the women, contact was to be made through the 
local Women’s Refuges.  This meant that if women did not want to participate, 
they could decline and their confidentiality with Women’s Refuge would be 
maintained.  Much time and planning went into this part of the research to 
ensure that any potential harm to the women was minimised and that 
interviews would be carried out in a respectful and safe manner.   
 
Initially, Women’s Refuge representatives were receptive to the idea of 
facilitating these interviews.  However, due to the nature of their work, it soon 
became evident that this was not a viable option.  Repeated requests were made 
for help in gaining access to women clients of Women’s Refuge.  However, 
these were met with a realisation that the heavy workloads of the local Women’s 
Refuges were prohibitive.   
 
In one case study, a local newspaper that had previously reported on the 
research was approached for a follow-up story.  It included a note that I was 
going to be in the community the following month and would like to interview 
any women who experienced abuse in their relationship, reported or not, about 
their experience of the event.  The story ran on the front page of the local paper 
with a photo of me and an email and phone contact for me (see Appendix D).  
Unfortunately, this also proved unfruitful and no women came forward to take 
part in the research. 
 
At this stage, I decided to admit defeat.  Although much effort was expended 
on trying to gain access to the victims of domestic violence during disasters, it 
proved much harder than imagined.  Given the secretive nature of domestic 
violence and confidentiality involved in prevention work, this is not a surprising 
result, though disappointing.  However, interviews with agency representatives 
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provided a wealth of knowledge and numerous issues were extracted during the 
research.  Agency representatives and, in particular, Women’s Refuges 
representatives, were able to discuss what women had been reporting to them.  
Interviews with victims of domestic violence during disasters is a potential 
future research project that would build on the findings of this work in 
understanding why domestic violence reporting is increased during disasters. 
 
Once all the interviews were completed, a thematic analysis was undertaken on 
the contents of each interview.  Themes included the factors suggested for why 
an increase in reporting occurred and problems the agency faced in their work, 
such as a staffing shortage or lack of communication.  Issues included whether 
agency representatives stated there was an increase, decrease or no change in 
their workload.  If an agency representative made reference to one of the above, 
their name was written on a post-it note and stuck on the relevant piece of 
paper.  Post-it notes were colour-coded by community and placed on the paper 
in columns by agency to allow for both community and organisation 
comparisons.  This eventually provided a map of themes and issues that will be 
discussed in the following chapters.  Data from other studies (Enarson, 1999; 
Fothergill, 1999; Wilson, Phillips & Neale, 1998) were then compared with the 
results of this research to find commonalities and differences.  The results of 
this analysis provide the bulk of the data in this thesis, supported by other 
empirical studies and relevant theory that may explain questions raised by the 
results. 
 
This research was approved by the Victoria University of Wellington Human 
Ethics Committee (see Appendix E).  A second ethics approval process was 
followed to gain approval to work with the New Zealand Police.  Ethical practice 
in domestic violence research is essential to ensure participants are not harmed 
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by the process, and also in ensuring that the researcher is not at risk (Ellsberg & 
Heise, 2001: 1; Sullivan & Cain, 2004: 603).   
 
 
Case File Summaries 
When it became clear that interviewing women who accessed Women’s Refuges’ 
services was not straight forward, I began to look at other ways of capturing 
information about any commonalities between women seeking assistance from 
agencies during the disasters studied.  Questions had been raised during the 
research process about whether there were any demographic commonalities, 
the length of time needed to be spent with each woman, whether this was their 
first time using Women’s Refuges’ services and anything else that might prove 
useful in formulating effective policy.  Having the knowledge that Women’s 
Refuge keeps a database of clients, both locally and nationally, that may have 
captured all this information, I sought permission from the national office to 
examine the database and pull out information that would be aggregated so as 
to make any identification of individual women impossible.  This involved 
aggregating the case studies from women using Refuges in the areas selected 
in the first three months after a Civil Defence emergency.  The limit of three 
months was chosen as the time period given by Women’s Refuge 
representatives during the interviews as the duration of increases in reporting.  
These ranged from three months in Lower Hutt (Williams, 2008) to 12 months 
in Whakatane (Te Are, 2005). 
 
The Women’s Refuge national database already has in place a measure that 
strips out the name of both clients and their perpetrators and any addresses 
given.  To ensure that the women could not be identified by the number of 
children they have or a birth date, this information will only be presented in 
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aggregate and birth dates were not recorded, only ages.  These types of 
measures were paramount in my mind at all times when working with the data 
as maintaining the privacy of these women is a priority for Women’s Refuge and 
access to the database is highly restricted.   
 
One of the key priorities when doing research on victims of domestic violence is 
to keep their safety paramount and always consider potential adverse effects of 
decisions made or actions taken.  This has been at the forefront of my thinking 
in all aspects of the research, from interviews to collation of the case file 
summaries.  The safety of the women included in the research could be 
compromised if they can be identified by their perpetrator or a member of the 
community.  Therefore, ensuring their anonymity is fundamental (Sullivan & 
Cain, 2004).  This limits how much detail can be used in discussions and 
necessitates constant checking of how recognisable any person is.  For the case 
file summaries this means that the data will only be presented in aggregate 
form.  For the interviews, this means that some details about the woman may 
need to be omitted or changed if it does not affect the context. 
 
The data gathered from the case file summaries were all coded and input into 
SPSS for analysis.  The Women’s Refuge database holds information on two 
types of clients, those who accessed Women’s Refuge services and those who 
were brought to Women’s Refuge’s attention through POL400’s (reports used 
by the NZ Police when responding to a domestic violence callout).   
 
Once input into SPSS, simple frequency tables were run and any common 
factors extracted.  This permitted evaluation of current models and theories on 
why domestic violence may increase after disasters.  Much of the previous work 
has highlighted that vulnerability is a concept that is strongly linked to negative 
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outcomes of natural hazard events.  Vulnerability can occur through a variety of 
factors including low-income, institutionalised racism, a lack of access to social 
networks or social support.  A prior history of domestic violence (which was 
measured through prior contact with a Women’s Refuge and duration of abuse 
collected by some Women’s Refuges) can be seen to link to a lack of access to 
social networks or social support.  Data collected also includes what the 
employment status and ethnicity of clients are, which were also analysed for 
any trends.   
 
Being able to look at the case notes of individuals also provided the opportunity 
to note if the Civil Defence emergency was mentioned at any point during the 
work the Refuge was doing with the woman.  This type of note may be the only 
direct link that can be made between the emergency and the reporting of 
domestic violence, and, therefore, is a very useful parameter. 
 
Limitations of the research 
The study of increased domestic violence after Civil Defence emergencies is a 
relatively new field and with only four other published studies with a specific 
focus on domestic violence (Wilson, Phillips & Neal, 1998; Enarson, 1999; 
Fothergill, 1999; Jenkins & Phillips, 2008), a case study approach was selected 
as the most effective way to examine the issue.  Much of the methodology used 
in the other studies was emulated in this research.  However, the number of 
data types has been extended.  The use of five different case studies that utilise 
diverse communities and events means this research is, to date, the largest 
systematic study of the topic.  The next largest studies are the three case 
studies in the study from Wilson, Phillips and Neal (1998) and the other two 
focussing on one event (Enarson, 1999; Fothergill, 1999). 
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However, as with all research, this study has limitations.  In particular, finding 
the scale of the increase that is directly linked to the Civil Defence emergency is 
something that currently could only be obtained by interviewing each woman 
that accessed services in the months after the event.  This has not been done 
and so the research can only discuss whether an increase has occurred and if 
those working in the field, who are in the best position to discuss, believe it was 
related to the emergency.  In the future, research could be improved by 
advocating to the agencies working with domestic violence victims to note 
down specifically if the clients they are working with mention the emergency 
has impacted on the violence.  Of course, because this is a new field, this sort 
of observation has not been integrated into agency systems. 
 
Secondly, this study utilised interviews and statistics from community and 
government agencies as the primary data for understanding the situation for 
domestic violence victims during disasters.  Whilst this is a good start to 
research into this area, future research could build on this study by interviewing 
the actual victims.  This does not invalidate the opinions of these agency 
representatives and I submit that these opinions are educated opinions and do 
supply an accurate impression of what was happening.  However, it must be 
acknowledged that second-hand information may come from sources with their 
own agendas (Miller & Glassner, 1998).  Awareness of this has meant the 
personal biases can be minimised but may not be entirely eliminated. 
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Conclusions 
In summary, this research has employed a variety of methods to examine the 
issue of domestic violence increases after Civil Defence emergencies or 
disasters in New Zealand communities.  It is rooted in feminist scholarship.  As 
in previous studies on the same topic, gender stratification is seen to lead to a 
situation where domestic violence victims are both at more risk from the 
disaster than non-victims, but also face increased levels of domestic violence 
following the disaster.   
 
A feminist framework has provided five governing principles for the study: to be 
concerned with gender and gender inequality; to give voice to marginalised 
groups; to use the research as a tool for political change; to have reflexivity; 
and to reject the traditional power dynamics between researcher and 
researched.  These principles have been practiced in this research and have 
influenced the research methods and design. 
 
The chapter also discussed the aims and objectives of the research before 
discussing the methods and research design in this study, and the limitations of 
this study.  This allows for future research to build upon the work and address 
some of the areas that were not covered in this study.  The next chapter 
discusses the three events and five areas examined in this research, as well as 
giving descriptions of the agencies involved in the research.  This is the last 
chapter of the three setting the context of the data that will be presented from 
Chapters Five to Seven. 
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There are three natural hazard events examined in this research; the first 
discussed is the February 2004 flooding of the lower North Island, the second is 
the July 2004 flooding of the Eastern Bay of Plenty and, finally, the June 2006 
snowstorm in South Canterbury (see Figure 3).  As can be seen in Figure 3, the 
events are spread across the length of the country.  In the first of these events, 
the February 2004 flooding of the lower North Island, three communities were 
studied.  The scale of the event meant many communities were affected.  This 
gave the opportunity to compare areas with different demographic 
compositions after experiencing the same event. 
 
Once the limit of five years was placed on events to be studied, communities 
were chosen that varied in demographic makeup.  This was done to capture as 
many of New Zealand’s different communities and groups as possible in the 
research, which is hoped would increase applicability of the findings and also 
help tease out why the increase occurred.  There are a number of distinctive 
markers for each community.  Whakatane is a community with a higher than 
average population of Maori people (New Zealand’s indigenous people).  The 
South Canterbury snowstorm case study includes Timaru in New Zealand’s 
South Island, as well as a high representation of rural communities.  Lower Hutt 
was chosen for its highly diverse population, which includes many different 
refugee and migrant groups as well as New Zealand Maori and New Zealand 
European.  As will be seen in this chapter, the communities at the heart of the 
five case studies also vary in size and in socio-economic conditions.  Census 
data from 2006 produced by Statistics New Zealand are the most current data 
available on all five areas and, therefore, have been used for the demographic 
information presented on each area.  (These statistics are collated in Table 4, 
found on page 119). 
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Figure 3: Locations of Case Studies  
Whakatane
Timaru
Masterton
Lower Hutt
Palmerston North
 
 
As well as being demographically diverse, each community had a different 
combination of agencies and organisations that are involved in the welfare 
response to disasters.  In each community, many agencies/organisations were 
approached and asked to participate.  Not all agencies agreed to participate in 
each community and, each case study consists of a different combination of 
organisations.  However, there were two consistent agencies who provided 
interviews: the New Zealand Police and Women’s Refuge.  These two agencies 
are the primary agencies responding on the frontline to domestic violence in 
New Zealand and, therefore, participation from these agencies was viewed as 
vital for this research. 
Lower North Island Flooding, 
February 2004 
Eastern Bay of Plenty Flooding, 
July 2004 
South Canterbury Snowstorm, 
June 2006 
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Explaining the roles of agencies and describing the events and communities is 
necessary in order to provide background information that puts this study into 
context.  Understanding which organisations are frontline agencies for 
domestic violence response will show why certain organisations take a 
predominant role in this research.  The communities chosen were diverse to 
demonstrate that increases in domestic violence reporting are universal.  The 
data also provides a snapshot of each community for comparison with other 
communities in future studies on domestic violence reporting during disasters. 
 
The Lower North Island Flooding July 2004 
The Lower North Island flooding in July 2004 was a sizeable event in terms of 
the number of areas affected.  Three of the case studies in this research were 
subject to the flooding – Masterton, Palmerston North/Feilding and Lower Hutt.  
These were not the only areas affected by the flooding, but were diverse 
enough in demographics to reflect the broader New Zealand population. 
 
The Lower North Island Flooding represented one of the largest Civil Defence 
emergencies in recent years in New Zealand, and the largest event in this 
research.  In all affected communities, the flooding began with heavy rain on 14 
February 2004 and continued for several days.  Many communities reported 
rainfall of five or six times the usual monthly average for February; Feilding 
reported 334mm compared to 57mm, Palmerston North reported 299mm 
compared to 60mm, and Lower Hutt reported 482mm compared to 68mm (Reid 
et al., 2004: 9) 
 
The levels of two rivers were at their highest (Manawatu River) or third highest 
(Rangitikei River) levels in over 100 years (Reid et al., 2004: 10; Vision 
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Manawatu et al., 2004: 3).  Four rivers burst their stopbanks during this period 
(Horizons District Council, 2004).  As occurred in the Bay of Plenty flooding 
later in the same year, this was described as a 100-year flood, meaning a flood 
as large as this one has the likelihood of occurring once every 100 years 
(Horizons District Council, 2004).  There were major roading disruptions from 
the flooding with four bridges destroyed and 21 others seriously damaged (Reid 
et al., 2004: 10).  Major highways were reported blocked, including the 
Manawatu Gorge, which was closed for 75 days until the end of April 2004 
(Horizons District Council, 2004; Reid et al., 2004: 10).  Power and 
telecommunication outages also occurred, with 15,500 households without 
power during the flooding (Horizons District Council, 2004).  The number of 
evacuated people was estimated at a minimum of 2,500 people across the 
whole region (Reid et al., 2004: 10) with 1,200 of those in the Palmerston 
North/Feilding district (Rounthwaite, 2008).  As with the other two events, 
schools were closed in response to this event (Reid et al., 2004: 10).  Schools 
were closed in Feilding and Lower Hutt but not in Masterton (Buckley, 2008; 
Harrison, 2008; Rodgers, 2008) 
 
This event had significant impacts on rural communities.  Communities, such as 
Scott’s Ferry (a village roughly 20km out of Bulls), were entirely flooded and 
required a complete evacuation of the village at short notice (Horizons District 
Council, 2004).  There were 10,000 dairy cows relocated in the Manawatu 
region and the estimated cost of sheep stock losses was placed at $2.5 million 
(Horizons District Council, 2004).  The cost to the insurance industry from 
claims was $124.58 million adjusted to 2007 dollars (Insurance Council of New 
Zealand, 2008), the largest insurance bill of all three events being researched. 
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Masterton 
Figure 4: Map of the Wellington Region  
Wellington Region 
 
 
 Area within region 
 
 Coastal water/oceanic area 
 
 Major town/city within region 
 
 City/district boundary lines within region 
 
  
(Image Source: Statistics New Zealand) 
 
The Wellington region is 8,124km2 (Statistics New Zealand, 2009) and is located 
at the southern end of the North Island in New Zealand.  It covers both the 
western and eastern sides of the island with nine districts in total.  It includes 
both urban and rural areas, including New Zealand’s capital city, Wellington.  
The Masterton district is located on the eastern side of the island and covers 
both coastal and inland areas.  Much of this district is rural, with an urban 
centre (Masterton) located at the southern end of the region. 
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Figure 5: Map of the Masterton District 
Masterton District 
  
 
 Area within city/district 
 
 River/lake 
 
 Coastal water/oceanic area 
 
 Major town/city within city/district 
 
 City/district boundary 
 
 Highway 
 
(Image Source: Statistics New Zealand) 
 
The geographic area of the Masterton district is 2,298 km2 (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2009).  In the 2006 Census, the Masterton district was found to have a 
total population of 22,623 people living in 9,033 dwellings (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2008c).  Of this, 16.9% identified as belonging to the Maori ethnic 
group, slightly higher than that of the New Zealand population size of 14.6% 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2008c).  The predominant ethnic group in the 
community is European, in line with the New Zealand population.  However, this 
is at the higher level of 76.7% compared with 67.6% in the New Zealand 
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population (Statistics New Zealand, 2008c).  The next largest group after this is 
Pacific Peoples at just under 3% (Statistics New Zealand, 2008c).     
 
Masterton district has a median income level of $21,700, which is lower than 
the median income in New Zealand of $24,400 (Statistics New Zealand, 2008c).  
This is the same median income as the Whakatane district, making them 
comparable in terms of income levels in the district.  However, the two 
communities have a very different ethnic make-up.  The Masterton district has a 
higher population on an annual income of $20,000 or less than New Zealand as 
a whole.  Masterton district reported 46.7% of the population making $20,000 
or less annually compared with New Zealand’s 43.2% (Statistics New Zealand, 
2008c). 
 
The Census in New Zealand also records other markers of socio-economic 
status, such as access to communications and education level.  In particular, 
access to a phone (or lack of it) is used in other measures of community well-
being, such as the Economic Living Standards Index (Jensen et al., 2006).  A 
lack of access to telephone communications is a marker on the deprivation 
scale used in the Economic Living Standards Index (Jensen et al., 2006: 53).  
Therefore, understanding what proportion of the community lacks access is an 
additional measure of socio-economic status for those wanting more than 
income levels.  Masterton district is also characterised by less access to 
internet, phones (both land and cell) and fax machines than New Zealand as a 
whole.  Measures of access to technology are used as part of the indicia of 
socio-economic status in an area.  51.9% of Masterton district households 
reported access to the internet compared with 60.5% in New Zealand as a whole 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2008c).  Cellphone access was reported to be 69.6% 
compared to New Zealand’s 74.2%, and landline phone access was reported at 
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90.2% compared with 91.6% in New Zealand overall (Statistics New Zealand, 
2008c).  Finally, in terms of education, residents of Masterton district are less 
likely than New Zealand as a whole to have any formal qualification.  32.8% of 
Masterton district residents reported having no formal qualification compared 
with 25.0% across New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 2008c). 
 
Masterton has 59 social service agencies available to the community (Families 
and Community Services, 2009).  This is an average of 2.6 agencies per 1,000 
people in the community, the second highest figure across the five case 
studies.  Agencies include adoption support groups, ante-natal classes and Age 
Concern.  The success rate for gaining interviews with social service agencies in 
Masterton was lower than in the other four case studies.  The agencies 
interviewed in Masterton were: 
- New Zealand Police 
- Women’s Refuge 
- Work and Income 
 
The second case study profiled was also affected by the Lower North Island 
flooding.  The impact of the flooding on the Manawatu-Wanganui region, and in 
this study, the Palmerston North/Feilding area was greater than that 
experienced in the Masterton and Lower Hutt areas.   
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Manawatu 
Figure 6: Map of the Manawatu-Wanganui Region 
Manawatu-Wanganui Region 
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(Image Source: Statistics New Zealand) 
 
The Manawatu-Wanganui region is 22,215km2 (Statistics New Zealand, 2009) 
and is located in the lower half of the North Island of New Zealand, above the 
Wellington region.  Geographically it is a large region, covering much of the 
North Island’s lower half.  There are ten districts within the region, some of 
which are coastal, where others are located on inland plateaus.  The Manawatu 
district is in the centre of the region, and includes large plains and many rural 
communities within its boundaries.   
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Figure 7: Map of the Manawatu District 
Manawatu District 
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(Image Source: Statistics New Zealand) 
 
Within the Manawatu-Wanganui region, the case study centres on the Manawatu 
district.  The Manawatu district is 2,628 km2 (Statistics New Zealand, 2009).  In 
the 2006 Census, the Manawatu district was found to have a total population of 
28,254 people living in 10,515 dwellings (Statistics New Zealand, 2008d).  Of 
this, 14.0% identified as belonging to the Maori ethnic group (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2008d).  The majority ethnic group in the community is European, in 
line with the New Zealand population.  However, this is at a higher level of 
77.9% compared with 67.6% in the New Zealand population (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2008d).   
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The median income in the Manawatu district is slightly lower than that of New 
Zealand’s median income.  The Manawatu district has a median income level of 
$24,200 compared with New Zealand’s $24,400 (Statistics New Zealand, 
2008d).  The Manawatu district reported 43.2% of the population making 
$20,000 or less annually, which correlates with the New Zealand overall 
percentage of 43.2% (Statistics New Zealand, 2008d). 
 
People in the Manawatu district, have less access to internet than New 
Zealanders generally, but higher levels of access to phones (both land and cell) 
and fax machines than New Zealand generally.  58.7% of Manawatu district 
households reported access to the internet compared with 60.5% in New 
Zealand generally (Statistics New Zealand, 2008d).  Cellphone access was 
reported to be 74.9% compared to New Zealand’s 74.2%, and landline phone 
access was reported at 92.9% compared with 91.6% in New Zealand overall 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2008d).  Phone access is only slightly higher than the 
general statistics for New Zealand’s, suggesting that in combination with 
income levels and ethnicity demographics, overall the Manawatu district mirrors 
wider New Zealand quite closely. 
 
Regarding education levels, residents of Manawatu district are less likely than 
New Zealanders generally to have acquired a formal qualification.  31.4% of 
Manawatu district residents reported having no formal qualification compared 
with 25.0% across New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 2008d). 
 
Palmerston North City is within the Manawatu district and is the major 
city/service centre of the district.  Palmerston North has 110 social service 
agencies available to the community according to Families and Community 
Services (2009).  The Manawatu district had the highest ratio of agencies to 
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population with 3.9 agencies for every 1,000 people in the area.  This is by far 
the highest and almost four times that of Timaru, the final case study examined 
in this chapter.  These agencies are as diverse as Amputee support, housing 
advocacy and multiple sclerosis support agencies.  This is the second-largest 
group of agencies of all the five case studies, second to Lower Hutt city.  The 
agencies interviewed in Palmerston North were: 
- Civil Defence 
- New Zealand Police 
- Rural Family Support Trust 
- Women’s Refuge 
- Work and Income 
 
The final community examined that was significantly affected by the 2004 
Lower North Island flooding is Lower Hutt.  Lower Hutt experienced less of an 
impact than Palmerston North/Feilding, but more than the Masterton district. 
 
Lower Hutt 
As previously stated, the Wellington region (see Figure 4) is on the southern tip 
of the North Island and is 8,124km2 in size (Statistics New Zealand, 2009).  The 
Lower Hutt City district is located at the southern end of the region and is 
mostly an urban district.  Sitting within 15km of the Nation’s capital city, 
Wellington, Lower Hutt city has a diverse population.  It is the most ethnically 
diverse of all five case studies in this research, although this did not appear to 
render the ethnic breakdown of domestic violence reporters after the flooding 
significantly different from that of the other four case studies. 
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Figure 8: Map of the Lower Hutt City District 
Lower Hutt City District 
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(Image Source: Statistics New Zealand) 
 
Lower Hutt City has a geographic area of 377km2 (Statistics New Zealand, 
2009), the smallest land area of all the five case studies.  The 2006 Census data 
showed that the Lower Hutt City district had a total population of 97,701 
people living in 35,724 dwellings (Statistics New Zealand, 2008e).  Of this, 
17.1% identified as belonging to the Maori ethnic group.  This is higher than 
that of the New Zealand population size of 14.6% (Statistics New Zealand, 
2008e).  The majority ethnic group in the community is European, in line with 
the New Zealand population.  However, this is at a lower level of 64.9% 
compared with 67.6% in the New Zealand population (Statistics New Zealand, 
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2008e).  The next largest group is Pacific Peoples at just over 10%, followed 
closely by ‘Asian’ at just over 8% (Statistics New Zealand, 2008e). 
 
The median income in Lower Hutt City district is higher than that in New 
Zealand generally.  Lower Hutt City district has a median income level of 
$27,300 compared with New Zealand’s $24,400 (Statistics New Zealand, 
2008e).  This can in part be explained by the large population of government 
employees in the wider Wellington region.  Lower Hutt City district reported 
39.0% of the population making $20,000 or less annually compared with New 
Zealand’s 43.2% (Statistics New Zealand, 2008e). 
 
Lower Hutt City district is also characterised by greater access to internet, 
cellphones, and landline phones than New Zealand generally.  However, the 
figures for Lower Hutt City district and New Zealand as a whole are all within 1% 
of each other, which is not a great difference.  61.2% of Lower Hutt City district 
households reported access to the internet compared with 60.5% in New 
Zealand generally (Statistics New Zealand, 2008e).  Cellphone access was 
reported to be 75.2% compared to New Zealand’s 74.2%, and landline phone 
access was reported at 92.3% compared with 91.6% in New Zealand overall 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2008e).   
 
Finally, with regard to education levels, residents of Lower Hutt City district are 
roughly equally as likely as New Zealander generally to hold no formal 
qualification.  24.8% of Lower Hutt City residents reported having no formal 
qualification compared with 25.0% across New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 
2008e). 
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Lower Hutt City has 124 social service agencies available to the community 
(Families and Community Services, 2009).  The services provided range from 
Addiction services, Aspergers syndrome support, and domestic violence 
prevention and intervention agencies.  Lower Hutt City has the largest number 
of social service agencies of all five case studies, with almost three times that in 
Timaru and Whakatane.  However, due to its larger population than other areas, 
the ratio of agencies to people is the second lowest at 1.3 agencies per 1,000 
people living in the area.  Agencies involved in the Lower Hutt case study were: 
- Civil Defence 
- New Zealand Police 
- Women’s Refuge  
- Work and Income  
 
The July 2004 Bay of Plenty Flooding 
The second Civil Defence emergency studied was the July 2004 flooding of the 
Bay of Plenty region.  This event, centred on Whakatane, was chosen in part 
because news reports suggested there was already a level of awareness among 
social service agencies that domestic violence reporting had increased in their 
community in the months after the flooding (NZPA, 2004: Online).  However, 
Whakatane also has a unique ethnic makeup, with a significantly higher than 
average population of New Zealand’s indigenous people, Maori, with respect to 
other towns and cities.  This will be discussed further in the demographics 
below.  The use of this community as a case study gives the opportunity to 
examine whether domestic violence reporting increases for Maori populations 
as well as non-Maori populations because the size of the sample is greater than 
in other communities.   
 
On 16 July 2004, the Bay of Plenty region and, in particular, the Whakatane 
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district, was struck by heavy rain (MetService, 2009).  This rain, coupled with a 
swarm of 30 earthquakes, caused many slippages around the district 
(MetService, 2009; AP, 2004).  Around 17,000 hectares of the Rangitaiki Plains 
and most of the coastal land were flooded, in part due to stopbank breaches as 
well as the swollen rivers (Environment Bay of Plenty, 2004a; Eastern Bay of 
Plenty Recovery, 2005).  The flooding also led to the temporary closure of 
Fonterra’s Edgecumbe factory, a major dairy factory that employs much of the 
Edgecumbe population (Eastern Bay of Plenty Recovery, 2005).  The cost of this 
event to the Insurance industry was $19.37 million in dollars adjusted to 2007 
dollars (Insurance Council of New Zealand, 2008).  This flood was considered a 
100-year flood and was the third major flood in the region in the previous 15 
years (Environment Bay of Plenty, 2004a). 
 
Whakatane and Opotiki were among the towns most severely affected with flood 
waters up to a metre deep in the town centres (AP, 2004; MetService, 2009).  
Within Whakatane, the area most seriously affected was Awatapu, which is 
surrounded in part by a lagoon that flooded (Peterson, 2005).  These houses 
were evacuated and many have remained uninhabitable since.  The figure put 
on the number of evacuees from the flooding and slippages was 1,500 people 
in Whakatane town (AP, 2004).  The flooding closed off all access roads to 
Whakatane for two days and a state of emergency was declared until 30 July 
2004 (Eastern Bay of Plenty Recovery, 2005; Peterson, 2005).  Although the 
state of emergency ended after a matter of weeks, the recovery period lasted 
much longer than this.  In particular the physical recovery continued into 2005 
(Environment Bay of Plenty, 2004b; 2004c) 
 
The Whakatane Council assessed 371 homes after the event and 228 of those 
were deemed unable to be reoccupied until repair.  In nine instances it was 
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unclear whether the homes could ever be repaired and three homes were 
condemned (Eastern Bay of Plenty Recovery, 2005; Peterson, 2005).  Many 
found themselves in the evacuation centre, the Whakatane War Memorial Hall, 
but others moved in with extended family.  Some elderly residents moved into 
the Salvation Army Hall, which was considered a little warmer and more 
comfortable (Anderson, 2005).  Anecdotally, it was reported up to two years 
later that some residents were still not back in their homes following the floods 
(Turner, 2006). 
 
The following data covers the Whakatane district as a whole.  Statistics New 
Zealand includes Ohope, Taneatua, Edgecumbe, Matata, and Murupara in this 
district.  The use of the entire district rather than Whakatane town is warranted 
as the July 2004 flooding affected all of the Eastern Bay of Plenty, which 
includes the entire Whakatane district.  Furthermore, the Whanau Awhina 
Women’s Refuge, which features in this case study, covers all these areas in its 
service provision so the two lots of data on demographics (census data and 
Women’s Refuge client data) are of comparable areas. 
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Whakatane 
 Figure 9: Map of the Bay of Plenty Region 
The Bay of Plenty Region  
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(Image Source: Statistic New Zealand) 
 
The Bay of Plenty region is 12,247km2 in size (Statistics New Zealand, 2009) 
and close to the centre of New Zealand’s North Island on the Eastern coast.  The 
flooding mostly affected the Eastern Bay of Plenty, which consists of the 
Whakatane District and the Opotiki District (Environment Bay of Plenty, 2004a). 
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Figure 10: Map of the Whakatane District 
The Whakatane District 
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(Image Source: Statistic New Zealand) 
 
Within the Bay of Plenty region, The Whakatane district is 4,441km2 in size 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2009).  In the 2006 Census, the Whakatane district was 
found to have a total population of 33,297 people living in 11,931 dwellings 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2008a).  Of this, 42.2% identified as being Maori.  This 
is almost three times that of the New Zealand population size of 14.6% 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2008a).  Put another way, whilst Whakatane district 
only has 0.8% of New Zealand’s entire population, it has 2.3% of New Zealand’s 
Maori population (Statistics New Zealand, 2008a).  The majority ethnic group in 
the area is still New Zealand European, in line with the New Zealand population.  
However, this is at a reduced level of 58.4% compared with 67.6% in the New 
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Zealand population (Statistics New Zealand, 2008a).  The next largest group 
after Maori and New Zealand European is Pacific Peoples at just over 2% 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2008a).     
 
The median income in Whakatane district is lower than that of New Zealand’s 
median income.  Whakatane district has a median income level of $21,700 
compared with New Zealand’s $24,400 (Statistics New Zealand, 2008a).  
Whakatane district reported 47.1% of the population making $20,000 or less 
annually compared with New Zealand’s 43.2% (Statistics New Zealand, 2008a). 
 
Whakatane district is also characterised by less access to internet, telephones 
(both land and cell) and fax machines than New Zealand generally.  53.6% of 
Whakatane district households reported access to the internet compared with 
60.5% in New Zealand generally (Statistics New Zealand, 2008a).  Cellphone 
access was reported to be 68.5% compared to New Zealand’s 74.2%, and 
landline phone access was reported at 87% compared with New Zealand’s 91.6% 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2008a). 
 
Finally, in terms of education, residents of Whakatane district are less likely 
than New Zealanders generally to have a formal qualification.  32.1% of 
Whakatane district residents reported having no formal qualification compared 
with 25.0% across New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 2008a). 
 
Whakatane town is listed as having 48 social service agencies available in their 
community (Families and Community Services, 2009).  These range from 
budgeting service agencies to domestic violence agencies to literacy support 
agencies.  Of the five communities involved in the case studies, this is the 
second lowest, with only Timaru having fewer at 44.  However, in terms of the 
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ratio of agencies per head of population it is the median figure with 1.4 
agencies for every 1,000 residents, only slightly more than Lower Hutt City. 
 
Whakatane was the most successful case study in terms of getting participation 
from social service agencies.  In total, there were eight interviews from this 
area, representing both non-government and government agencies.  
Representatives from the following agencies were interviewed: 
- Child, Youth and Family 
- James Family Trust (Presbyterian Support Services) 
- New Zealand Police  
- Ngati Awa Social and Health Trust 
- Salvation Army 
- Victim Support 
- Women’s Refuge 
- Work and Income 
 
The June 2006 Canterbury Snowstorm 
While four case studies focus on flooding events, the final event to be studied 
was a significant snowstorm in New Zealand’s South Island.  The Canterbury 
snowstorm event began on 12 June 2006 when, after a night of heavy snow, 
Civil Defence emergencies were declared throughout the Canterbury region (see 
Figure 11).  The snow was reported to have fallen from as far north as Amberley 
and covered (in differing depths) areas down to Oamaru from the east coast 
through to as far west as Mt Cook Village (Hendrikx, 2006: 13).  The snow 
levels varied from less than 10cm near the coastline to over a metre in the 
inland areas (Hendrikx, 2006: 13).  This meant the scale of the event was not 
the same for all areas in Canterbury.  Hendrikx attempted to compare the size 
of the snowfall in this storm (using snow depths recorded) with past storms and 
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concluded that for some communities this was the largest storm in 30 years, 
while for others it was the biggest in 60 years (2006: 15).  The greatest impacts 
were reported in the Timaru, Ashburton, MacKenzie, and Waimate districts 
(Wilson et al., 2008).  The cost to the Insurance industry from claims was 
$43.91 million adjusted to 2007 dollars (Insurance Council of New Zealand, 
2008). 
 
Wilson et al. (2008) examined the social and agency impacts of the snowstorm.  
This research pointed to the rural nature of this event by highlighting some of 
the key impacts.  These impacts included stock welfare issues, building 
collapses, damage to farm buildings, fences and trees, and loss of power to 
electric fences (Wilson et al., 2008).  However, there were also impacts across 
Canterbury including loss of power for up to six weeks in some areas, road 
closures, loss of telecommunications, loss of water, closure of schools, financial 
hardship for those unable to get to work, and financial pressure through the 
impacts on employers (Wilson et al., 2008).  The research concluded that the 
isolation felt by families through the road closures and disruption to services 
was a major issue.  This was perhaps felt most strongly by rural families who 
were characterised by having the slowest physical recovery in terms of 
infrastructure repairs, some were left without electricity for up to six weeks 
after the initial snow fall (Bang, 2008; Wilson et al., 2008). 
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Timaru 
 
Figure 11: Map of the Canterbury Region  
Canterbury Region 
 
 
 Area within region 
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 Major town/city within region 
 
 City/district boundary lines within region 
 
(Image Source: Statistics New Zealand) 
 
The Canterbury region is located on the eastern coast of New Zealand’s South 
Island and is 45,326km2 (Statistics New Zealand, 2009).  It covers a large 
geographic area and consists of ten districts, many of which have large rural 
populations.  The district studied in this research is the Timaru district (see 
Figure 12), which includes a coastal area as well as inland foothills, a large 
majority of which is rural. 
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Figure 12: Map of the Timaru District 
 
Timaru District 
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(Image Source: Statistics New Zealand) 
 
The Timaru district is the second largest studied in terms of land area at 
2,726km2 (Statistics New Zealand, 2009).  The 2006 Census data show the 
Timaru district had a total population of 42,870 people living in 17,688 
dwellings (Statistics New Zealand, 2008b).  As with many South Island districts, 
there was a very low level of Maori population in the Timaru district.  Only 6.2% 
identified as belonging to the Maori ethnic group, which is less than half the 
figure for the New Zealand population size generally of 14.6% (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2008b).  Stated another way, whilst Timaru district has 1.1% of New 
Zealand’s entire population, it only has 0.5% of New Zealand’s Maori population 
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(Statistics New Zealand, 2008b).  The majority ethnic group, European, is at the 
higher level of 81.2% compared with 67.6% in the New Zealand population 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2008b).  The next largest group after this is ‘Asian’ at 
1.5% (Statistics New Zealand, 2008b).     
 
In terms of income, the median income in Timaru district is lower than that of 
New Zealand’s median income.  Timaru district has a median income level of 
$21,200 compared with New Zealand’s $24,400 (Statistics New Zealand, 
2008b).  Timaru district reported 47.9% of the population earning $20,000 or 
less annually compared with New Zealand’s 43.2% (Statistics New Zealand, 
2008b). 
 
With regard to access to communication technology, Timaru district also has 
less access to internet, cellphones and fax machines than New Zealand 
generally.  54.0% of Timaru district households reported access to the internet 
compared with 60.5% in New Zealand generally (Statistics New Zealand, 2008b).  
Cellphone access was reported to be 71.5% compared to New Zealand’s 74.2%, 
and fax machine access was reported at 22.3% compared with New Zealand’s 
26.0% (Statistics New Zealand, 2008b).  However, in contrast to this, Timaru 
district residents reported a higher level of access to landline phones than New 
Zealand generally with 93.5% of residents having access compared with 91.6% 
of New Zealanders generally. 
 
Finally, in terms of education, residents of Timaru district are less likely than 
New Zealander generally to hold any formal qualification.  34.0% of Timaru 
district residents reported having no formal qualification compared with 25.0% 
across New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 2008b). 
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Timaru has 44 social service agencies available to the community (Families and 
Community Services, 2009).  These range from Alzheimer’s support agencies, 
to asthma support agencies, to a YMCA.  Timaru is the area with the least social 
support agencies of all five case studies.  It is also the community with the least 
number of agencies per resident, with only 1.0 agency per 1,000 people in the 
community.  A wide range of agencies were interviewed in Timaru: 
- Civil Defence 
- Federated Farmers/MAF 
- New Zealand Police 
- Presbyterian Support Services 
- Women’s Refuge 
- Work and Income 
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As has been noted, each community offered a different combination of agencies 
willing to take part in the research.  To understand the role the different 
organisations play in both Civil Defence and domestic violence response, each 
will be discussed below beginning with government agencies who have 
mandated roles in Civil Defence emergencies, or domestic violence, or both. 
 
Agencies 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
New Zealand’s Civil Defence and Emergency Management involves three layers 
of policy and planning – national, regional and local.  The Ministry of Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management is New Zealand’s national-level 
government-mandated organisation to prepare for and respond to disasters in 
New Zealand.  Within regional and local councils, there are positions 
responsible for Civil Defence that will run and co-ordinate the response to local 
and regional emergencies (Bang, 2008; Harrison, 2008; Rodgers, 2008).  Whilst 
other government agencies also have responsibilities during a disaster, Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management has the primary responsibility to co-
ordinate all these organisations and agencies, and ensure the response and 
subsequent recovery phases are conducted effectively (Mamula-Seadon, 2009). 
 
New Zealand Police 
The New Zealand Police is New Zealand’s only law enforcement organisation 
and is the lead agency responsible for reducing crime and enhancing 
community safety.  The New Zealand Police have a statutory obligation to 
respond during a Civil Defence emergency.  In most cases, this includes 
carrying out evacuations but may extend to other tasks where suitable when 
asked by Civil Defence. 
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The Police list their work as: 
 
• Empowering communities to deal with issues of community safety and 
creating more effective community partnerships. 
• Reducing the fear of crime by reducing actual crime.  
• Helping to support and rehabilitate victims. 
• Maintaining order and keeping the peace. 
• Keeping people free from intimidation, civil disturbance and 
unreasonable annoyance. 
• Helping to keep traffic flowing easily. 
• Increasing people's personal safety. 
• Reducing the risk of property theft, loss or damage. 
(NZ Police, 2009) 
 
Work and Income New Zealand 
Work and Income is an agency of the Ministry of Social Development and is the 
government agency that provides financial support to New Zealand residents 
and citizens.  This is available to residents and citizens who are not in 
employment or in some cases in special needs situations, such as disasters and 
women leaving abusive relationships: 
Work and Income provides financial assistance and employment 
services throughout New Zealand.  We offer a single point of 
contact for New Zealanders needing job search support, financial 
assistance and in-work support.  Work and Income helps people 
into work and pays income support on behalf of the Government.  
This includes New Zealand Superannuation and Veteran's Pension 
payments along with the administration of residential care and 
support subsidies.  They work with other government agencies, 
employers, business and community groups to design and run 
projects that generate work opportunities.  These projects assist 
people throughout New Zealand to improve their and their 
family's lives through paid employment. 
(Work and Income, 2009) 
 
During a Civil Defence emergency, Work and Income have a statutory duty to 
respond and be available to provide their services, and other tasks where 
suitable when asked by Civil Defence. 
 
Child, Youth and Family  
Child, Youth and Family is the second agency of the Ministry of Social 
Development, which has been dealing with family violence.  It is the statutory 
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agency that is responsible for the safety and welfare of those in New Zealand 
under the age of 18 years: 
Child, Youth and Family is the government agency that has legal 
powers to intervene to protect and help children who are being 
abused or neglected or who have problem behaviour.  We work 
with the Police and the Courts in dealing with young offenders 
under the youth justice system.  
(Child, Youth and Family, 2009) 
 
Alongside state agencies, non-government agencies provide help and support 
for domestic violence victims and those affected by Civil Defence emergencies. 
 
Women’s Refuge  
One of the primary non-government agencies involved in domestic violence 
response is Women’s Refuge.  Women’s Refuge is a national, women-run 
organisation that provides services for women and children who are victim to 
domestic violence.  The first Women’s Refuge opened in Christchurch in 1973 
(Women’s Refuge, 2009: Online).  The services provided range from crisis 
response, to early intervention and prevention.  These services include crisis 
accommodation, advocacy and support when working with other agencies 
including the New Zealand Police and Work and Income, and national lobbying 
(Te Are, 2005).  The National Collective of Independent Women’s Refuges was 
established in 1981; each Women’s Refuge in the National Collective is 
independently run, however, they are part of a national body with a national 
office in Wellington (Women’s Refuge, 2009).  The national office provides 
support, advice, quality assurance, policy, and fundraising services to the 
National Collective. 
 
Victim Support 
Whilst Women’s Refuge is the only domestic violence-focussed non-government 
agency, there was a second non-government agency involved in helping victims 
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of crime, including domestic violence that was interviewed in this research.  
“Victim Support provides 24 hour emotional support, personal advocacy and 
information to all people affected by crime and trauma throughout New 
Zealand” (Victim Support, 2009).  These services can be offered at the scene of 
a crime, or after the fact.  Victim Support works closely with the New Zealand 
Police and is provided with administrative support by the Police.  However, it is 
an independent non-government agency (Thomas, 2005).   
 
Alongside the major national agencies, there were a number of other non-
government agencies interviewed. 
 
James Family Trust and Presbyterian Support Services 
The James Family Trust has since renamed itself Family Works Northern.  Family 
Works is a Presbyterian Support initiative (Family Works, 2009).  Family Works 
Northern is the child and family services division of Presbyterian Support 
Northern (Presbyterian Support, 2009).  Presbyterian Support Services is a 
nationwide faith-based agency that provides social services for New Zealand.  
This includes domestic violence work including women’s education 
programmes and one-on-one counselling and support (Oomen, 2005). 
 
Ngati Awa Social and Health Trust 
New Zealand has a number of indigenous run non-government agencies – one 
was found to be relevant in this research.  Ngati Awa Social and Health Trust in 
Whakatane “is constituted and mandated to provide all social, health and 
employment services to Ngati Awa and the wider community within the Ngati 
Awa tribe” (NASH, 2009).  Ngati Awa Social and Health Services Trust is a non-
governmental agency that provides a myriad of social and health services to 
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Whakatane residents, particularly Maori who are affiliated to the Ngati Awa iwi.  
After the flooding event, they provided: 
 
Everything from Social Work services right though to Health, like 
they were doing checks because we’ve got three registered 
nurses here, and they were going down to Marae looking after 
families with young children, making sure – because we didn’t 
want people getting Meningococcal so there were education 
rounds, don’t share drink bottles.  It was quite warm so they did 
education programmes around that, wellchecks for babies and 
young children. 
(Hetet, 2005) 
 
 
Conclusions 
There are a broad range of communities and agencies in this research.  This 
broad range captures a wide range of avenues through which domestic violence 
victims seek help during disasters – through primary domestic violence non-
government agencies, the justice system, religious organisations and 
indigenous agencies.  This wide scope aids in meeting the aim of this research, 
to draw generalisations that will aid in understanding the intersection between 
natural hazard events and domestic violence in New Zealand broadly. 
 
This chapter was a descriptive chapter focussing on setting the context of the 
research areas in the case studies and the agencies involved for those 
unfamiliar with either.  The next chapter will discuss any increases observed in 
the postal survey and the case studies. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five:  The Increase 
 

 Chapter 5 
 
 125   
Chapter Four demonstrated that the communities in the case studies are 
diverse in terms of their demographic makeup.  The three events they 
experienced are two of the most common Civil Defence emergencies in New 
Zealand, flooding and snowstorms.  Each case study offered different findings 
for the research, the first of which was the scale of any changes in domestic 
violence reporting observed.  There were also differences in the duration of any 
increased reporting, in the level of agency response to this, and the amount of 
inter-agency communication during the event.  This chapter will focus on any 
increased reporting and on the level of awareness across domestic violence and 
Civil Defence agencies in each community. 
 
This chapter will discuss those increases in domestic violence reporting after 
Civil Defence emergencies that were identified in both the postal survey and the 
five case studies.  The postal survey was conducted in 2006 and, as has been 
noted, provided some of the input for the selection of case study sites.  The 
case studies took place over 2007 and 2008 with the exception of the 
Whakatane interview set, which was conducted in 2005.  Typically, the statistics 
were collected first and the interviews with agency representatives conducted 
afterwards.  The first section of this chapter will focus on the postal survey and 
the information gained about the increases in domestic violence from a wide 
group of social service agencies from 17 different hazard events in New Zealand 
from 1997 onward.  Results of the five case studies will follow.  Incorporated 
into this section will be a summary of what each agency in the case studies 
experienced.  This is described to show where the increase has been felt most 
intensely in the past and, therefore, where it will most likely impact in the 
future. 
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Survey 
As noted in Chapter Three, the survey had 30 closed- and open-ended 
questions (see Appendix A).  The survey base was kept very broad at the outset 
to cover all possibilities where increases could have been felt and to avoid the 
limitation of assumptions as to who should have experienced an increase in 
workload due to an expected intersection between domestic violence and 
natural hazards.  This meant that a broad range of social service agencies were 
included in the mail out, many of which do not work primarily with domestic 
violence but do encounter cases in their work.  This breadth risked the dilution 
of any significant changes in domestic violence reporting.  However, this proved 
not to be a substantial issue and defined clearly those agencies that would play 
a significant role in this research.  Agencies who did not feel the survey was 
relevant to their work may not have responded, or in some cases sent an email 
or letter stating it was not relevant. 
 
One of the initial questions asked was whether the number of active domestic 
violence cases had changed after the respective event in their area.  Domestic 
violence was reported to have increased after 11 of the 17 events (see Table 
Five). 
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Table Five:  Changes to Domestic Violence Reporting found in Survey by 
Civil Defence Emergency (1996-2006) 
Event Year Change?
Ruapehu Eruption 1996 No 
The Northland Floods  1999 Increase 
Dargaville Floods 1999 No 
Clutha District Flooding 1999 No 
Central Otago Floods  1999 Increase 
Queenstown Lakes District Floods 1999 No 
Thames/South Waikato Weatherbomb 1999 No 
South Taranaki Storm 2004 No 
Marlborough Storm  2004 Increase 
Hawkes Bay Floods  2004 Increase 
Lower North Island Floods  2004 Increase 
Eastern Bay of Plenty Floods  2004 Increase 
Dunedin Rainstorm  2005 Increase 
Greymouth Tornado 2005 Increase 
BOP/Matata Floods 2005 Increase 
Gisborne/East Cape Floods 2005 Increase 
Canterbury Snowstorm 2006 Increase 
 
Most of the communities that did not report an increase were linked to events 
that occurred five or more years ago and comments were made by some 
participants that they could not remember that far back to the event: 
The flood was seven years ago and in those days we didn't 
retain the incidents of domestic violence, therefore unable to 
provide you with any data.  I do remember we had to lift all 
carpets & get new ones & empty the storeroom/filing room.  
(Survey Response 1) 
 
As Table Five shows, all but one event from 2004 on that were surveyed 
reported an increase in domestic violence in the months after their respective 
event.  This further demonstrates that time is a significant factor in the lack of 
increased reporting noted by agencies in previous events.  However, this is not 
a concrete indicator as a growing awareness and recognition of domestic 
violence more generally in New Zealand is likely to be part of the dynamics 
affecting the prevalence of increases reported. 
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As previously noted, this highlighted some of the limitations of this type of 
research.  Because it is qualitative in nature and based on the memories of 
individuals working in the organisations at the time of the event, it seems 
research should not take place too long after an event and a triangulation of 
data collection will provide more reliable results than interviewing alone.  
Moreover, in this area of domestic violence response, record keeping has 
traditionally been limited, and staff are mobile, both of these factors mean 
there is little institutional knowledge.  Based on this discovery, events that 
occurred earlier than five years prior were excluded from the second phase of 
the study. 
 
Further, whilst reports of domestic violence did not increase in every case, they 
did not decrease either.  This means that all agencies, regardless of an increase 
or not, will need to plan to keep their services running in an event, despite the 
possibility of direct impact on their facilities and operations of the hazard 
event.  This finding is in keeping with what Enarson (1999) concluded in her 
work examining domestic violence shelters’ responses to disasters across the 
United States and Canada.  The quality of agency response impacts on whether 
a woman will stay separated from the abusive partner or not (Berk & Newton, 
1985; Berk, Newton, & Berk, 1986; Holiman & Schilit, 1991; Sullivan, 1991; 
Davis et al., 1994; Barnett et al., 1996; Sullivan & Bybee, 1999; Allen et al., 
2004; McDermott & Garofalo, 2004).  Therefore, maintaining a high standard of 
service is vital.   
 
Three time periods were used to establish when any changes were occurring.  
The first time period was in the first two weeks from the onset of the event; the 
second period was between two weeks and six months after the event; the final 
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period was six months and over.  Increases were reported by survey 
participants in all three time periods used.   
 
The length of increased workloads also varied greatly across agencies.  Some 
agencies only reported workload increases in the first two-week period, whilst 
others reported workload increases consistently across all three periods.  
Increases in the number of women seeking assistance with regard to domestic 
violence were reported to last up to 24 months after the onset of the event in 
one survey.  This highlights that these increases will need to be planned for 
from the outset of a natural hazard event, and planning will need to consider 
the impact lasting at least as long as two years: 
 
 
Probably the long term effects on victims - two years on say - 
often those people have had to totally relocate and start again - 
the financial burden of this, the effect on their relationships etc. 
(Survey Response 2) 
 
The reported increases in domestic violence reporting ranged from 5% to 50% in 
each of the three time periods mentioned above.  These percentages were not 
exact; participants were asked to provide their best estimate of any percentage 
change in their workloads (see Appendix A).   
 
After establishing an increased, decreased or consistent workload, participants 
were asked about the demographics of their clients.  The respondents reported 
that 88% of their clients were female.  The 12% of male clients recorded were 
from agencies that work with both victims and perpetrators, therefore, it is not 
clear whether these men were victims or perpetrators.  With such a clear 
majority of women affected, the issue is not gender-neutral and this suggests 
that any policy created to address increased reports of domestic violence 
cannot be gender-neutral either.  This finding is consistent with much of the 
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domestic violence literature (Yllo, 1983; Buzawa & Buzawa, 1996: Fanslow & 
Robinson, 2004) and with the figures practitioners in the domestic violence 
field report (Bartlett, 2004; National Collective of Independent Women’s 
Refuges, 2006). 
 
In terms of the other demographic characteristics of the people presenting to 
agencies following all of the events, the clients were reported to be across all 
ethnic groups but with the two majority ethnic groups comprising of NZ 
European/Pakeha and Maori.  These two groups were essentially equal in 
numbers of clients (35.3% and 36.8% respectively).  However, this constitutes an 
over-representation of Maori as the Maori population of New Zealand currently 
sits at 14.6% (Statistics New Zealand, 2008c).  This over-respresentation is not 
uncommon, Women’s Refuge consistently reports an over-representation of 
Maori clients accessing their services (National Collective of Independent 
Women’s Refuges, 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009).  Age representation was 
also across the spectrum with all age groups reported to be accessing services 
in the months after the event.  However, the two main age groups were 25-34 
and children 17 years and under.   
 
A further question asked participants about whether the clients they were 
assisting after their respective Civil Defence emergencies were first-time clients 
or repeat clients (see Appendix A).  Of the respondents, 68.0% said their clients 
were first-time reporters (of domestic violence).  This has significant 
implications for researchers, policy and planning, and organisations.  If first-
time reporters do not receive a high quality of service on their first attempt, this 
could significantly hinder or prohibit any future attempts to leave (Berk & 
Newton, 1985; Berk, Newton, & Berk, 1986; Holiman & Schilit, 1991; Sullivan, 
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1991; Davis et al., 1994; Barnett et al., 1996; Sullivan & Bybee, 1999; Allen et 
al., 2004; McDermott & Garofalo, 2004).   
 
The survey also asked participants how able they were to continue on their 
services in the months after the Civil Defence emergency.  Positively, 88.4% of 
the respondents reported that they were able to keep their normal services 
running during the disaster in their area.  This does not guarantee quality was 
maintained but does speak well of the agencies’ ability to adapt to such a 
situation. 
 
Whilst 11 of the 17 events surveyed reported an increase in domestic violence 
reporting, the events impacted on agencies differently.  A small number of 
agencies felt the event had little effect on their work and caseloads.  Others felt 
that there had been a significant impact from the event on both the resources 
of the organisation and the amount of work: 
It's true to say the magnitude of this event caught all agencies, 
both government and non, by surprise.  Had it not been for 
defence forces’ availability (helicopters and machinery) there 
would no doubt have been loss of life.  Much has been learnt 
through the exercise and debriefing sessions have been 
valuable in establishing new policies. 
(Survey Response 3) 
 
 
What we experienced was that as a community agency we 
considered closing down our whole agency because: huge 
impact on staff; personal loss as staff; workload too heavy; no 
extra staff; loss of experienced staff due to above; compliances 
from extra government money; compliances to government 
contracts; financial strain on agencies; gatekeeper from local 
groups; long-term financial/resource strain. 
(Survey Response 4) 
 
 
Flooding was isolated to a few same farm blocks, didn't have 
any major effects.  Martinborough was only isolated for a day so 
no long effects. 
(Survey Response 5) 
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The survey provided a valuable base set of data for this thesis.  The data 
conclusively demonstrated that domestic violence reporting had increased in a 
majority (11 of 17) of the events surveyed.  It also showed the diversity of 
impacts that could result from very little disruption to everyday work to an 
agency considering closing down due to the extra pressure on resources 
created by the increased reporting.  The results of the survey provided guidance 
as to which communities to base the case studies on by giving initial data on 
any increases.  The case studies were designed to expand on this data and to 
piece together some of the reasons for increased reporting of domestic violence 
during disasters in New Zealand. 
 
Case Studies 
The second phase of the research was the five case studies.  The case studies 
gave the opportunity to obtain more in-depth data and perform analysis of the 
impacts of Civil Defence emergencies and re-examination of questions that 
arose from the surveys.  The next section will focus on these case studies and 
will give voice to the experiences of agency representatives working in the 
aftermath of significant Civil Defence emergencies in their community. 
 
The five case studies were selected because survey data showed an increase in 
domestic violence reporting to varying degrees and each offered different 
demographics for comparison.  The increases found through the survey data 
were substantiated either quantitatively (through Women’s Refuge statistics), 
qualitatively (through interviews) or both.  The differences in awareness and in 
other response characteristics, and the issues that stem from these, will be 
examined in the next chapter.   
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In all five case studies, an increase in domestic violence reporting was found 
most commonly in the month of, or the month directly after, their respective 
hazard events.  However, as in the survey, the onset and timing of the increases 
varied from event to event, and from agency to agency.  The pattern of increase 
by agency was in congruence with the agency’s place in the domestic violence 
field.  Agencies such as the New Zealand Police, Victim Support, and Women’s 
Refuge who offer crisis assistance as part of their core workload were the 
agencies that experienced immediate increases.  Agencies such as the James 
Family Trust that offer women’s education programmes and counselling 
experienced a delayed increased workload, with the impact coming months 
after the natural hazard event itself. 
 
As explained in the methodology chapter, during the course of the research, it 
became clear that two agencies are central in terms of providing response to 
domestic violence and as a result provide crucial data for this research - 
Women’s Refuge and the New Zealand Police.  Women’s Refuge provided 
monthly statistics in each area involved in the case studies as well as 
participating in the interviews in each community.  Women’s Refuge also 
allowed access to their case file summaries.  Case file summaries are the 
records kept at the national office of the National Collective of Independent 
Women’s Refuges of client data, such as the demographics and characteristics 
of the cases, (e.g. whether the client needed housing, was a rural or urban 
client) and any other notes pertinent to each case.  These will be addressed 
later in this chapter in order to demonstrate any common characteristics of the 
clients seeking help from Women’s Refuge in the months after each event.  The 
purpose of this is to glean as much information as possible about the specific 
nature of any increased reporting and to examine the Pressure and Release 
model’s applicability to the situation of domestic violence and disasters.  The 
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New Zealand Police participated in the interviewing in each community.  
However, as explained previously, statistics were not used from the New 
Zealand Police due to changes in their recording systems and a lack of 
sufficient numbers of Civil Defence emergencies to carry out significant 
statistical analysis on. 
 
Whakatane and the July 2004 Flooding 
The Whakatane case study indicated the greatest awareness in terms of the 
level of increase.  The factors involved in this case study will be discussed first.  
Whanau Awhina Women’s Refuge in Whakatane was very aware of the increase 
in domestic violence reporting and of all the five case studies demonstrated the 
greatest level of awareness of the effect the flooding event had on their work, 
both at the time it was happening and at the time of interviewing.  When asked 
about the scale of the increase immediately following the flooding, Whanau 
Awhina Women’s Refuge workers reported that their caseloads had tripled (Te 
Are, 2005).  This level remained high but progressively decreased in the 
subsequent months until the point where other social agencies pulled out of the 
flood-affected area.  When the other agencies removed their services from 
Whakatane, Women’s Refuge experienced a second surge in the number of 
women coming to them: 
 Wini: What we’re finding…is that the services that were present at 
the beginning of the flood dissipated rapidly, within about two 
months from the July floods, by September/October those 
services had gone, had retracted back into wherever they went.  
The council went into a committee, which didn’t provide 
services.  So community agencies were left with very little 
support and hence I think the numbers grew as well.   
(Te Are, 2005) 
 
This case study was complicated by a second flooding in May 2005 that 
impacted heavily on the community of Matata, which falls under the Whakatane 
umbrella for services.  At the time of interviewing, Women’s Refuge was in the 
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middle of another wave of increased service demand, following the Matata 
flooding.  However, the Women’s Refuge representative also stated that they 
were still dealing with the repercussions of the first event, a year on from the 
flooding, as families were still not back in their homes and the earlier event 
continued to a be a real issue for families on an everyday basis. 
 
Awareness of the issues of escalating domestic violence in the wake of disasters 
has consistently been highlighted throughout this research as a key factor in 
the extent to which agencies perceive an increase in the incidence of domestic 
violence (Wilson, Phillips & Neal, 1998).  If an agency was aware of a link 
between the domestic violence they were seeing and the Civil Defence 
emergency, at the time that the Civil Defence emergency was impacting on 
families, its representatives were more likely to discuss this with their client 
base and an increased proportion of their caseloads was seen to be related to 
the emergency.  In the Whakatane district, the level of awareness of the first 
flood’s impact on domestic violence reporting meant that this Refuge, in 
particular, was conscious of whether enquiries were specifically disaster- 
triggered during the 2004 floods. 
 
Whakatane Police was the only Police station of the five involved that was aware 
of increased domestic violence callouts both during the event and at the time of 
interviewing.  This station had a Family Violence co-ordinator in place at the 
time of the flooding, meaning there was an individual in a position to identify 
change in the caseload.  Whakatane Police reported an immediate doubling in 
their domestic violence callouts in the weeks after the floods, from 14 in June 
before the flooding to 29 callouts in the month of July 2004.  The Whakatane 
Police representatives felt that this increased workload was maintained for six 
months after the event.  The participant noted that the first three months were 
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the most intense, before a gradual reduction to a level similar to that 
experienced prior to the flooding: 
 Neil: …the first two or three months after it was quite a marked one, 
but we were probably stretched for six months after.  Looking 
at our weekly, normally we have 5 family violence cases a 
week, we went up to 10 and that probably lasted for six 
months.  I think there’s still impact out there – people are still 
recovering from last year’s one.   
(Peterson, 2005) 
 
It was not only front-line agencies that experienced the effects of a rise in 
domestic violence reporting in Whakatane following the flooding.  The James 
Family Trust in Whakatane, a faith-based agency that is part of Presbyterian 
Support Services nationally, experienced such a significant increase in demand 
for their women’s education programme that they needed to create a waiting 
list.  This was a first time for them and has not been repeated since, suggesting 
the increase in work was directly linked to the flooding in Whakatane: 
 Diana: I don’t know that our family workers who went out and did 
work with the families came back and reported an increase but 
I do know that after the floods we had a waiting list which we 
don’t normally have.  However, because of the size of our 
rooms and the number of people wanting to attend, we created 
it and we’ve never had that before and that is a direct result of 
the floods.   
(Oomen, 2005) 
 
Whakatane’s Work and Income New Zealand representative also reported a 
tripling in their domestic violence caseload following the flooding in their 
community.  They were in the fortunate position of having a domestic violence 
co-ordinator at the time of the flooding, which meant the increased workload 
was evident to both the co-ordinator and the manager of the centre.  The co-
ordinator went from working between five and fifteen hours per week to full-
time employment on domestic violence cases in the months after the flooding: 
Ros: Did you notice an increase in domestic violence any time after 
the floods, related to the floods? 
 
Roberta: Yes, very much so.  To the point where I took responsibility for 
bringing the key agencies together to look for alternative, sorry 
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additional housing because our own Women’s Refuge was 
bursting at the seams. 
 
Ros:  …Did you get the impression that there was domestic violence, 
did they tell you, I mean to say how does WINZ recognise 
domestic violence?  
 
Roberta: Oh okay, what happens is I have a Women’s Refuge co-
ordinator in place.  That person’s responsibility is to be 
available at very short notice for Refuge – when they get a 
woman into the refuge they ring up my key person because 
they need to be seen right there and then.  So, they are booked 
out on a daily basis for a half hour everyday.  Sometimes it’s 
never used, over this particular period there weren’t enough 
hours in the day to cope with the influx of people that were 
arriving at the refuge.  And I’m only talking from a Refuge 
perspective here. 
 
Ros:  So can you give an estimate of how much of an increase there 
was?  Was it 50% more, did it double, triple? 
 
Roberta: So in comparison to what we usually have?  Oh, it tripled, 
tripled.   
(Ripaki, 2005) 
 
Victim Support in Whakatane reported a doubling in caseload in parallel with 
the trend observed by the New Zealand Police during this time.  For Victim 
Support, the first three months were the most intense.  However, the number of 
cases remained high for six months before subsiding back to a more typical 
level: 
 Jenny: I would say also that it would be found that the initial three 
months was an intense increase, you know, a heightened 
number of notifications of family violence, but it would be six 
months before the situation went back to be something of 
more familiar numbers… 
(Thomas, 2005) 
 
Other social service agencies (both NGO and government) such as the Salvation 
Army and Child, Youth and Family, stated that although they did not experience 
an increase in their own work with incidents of domestic violence, they were 
aware of the increased domestic violence work in the community in the months 
after the event: 
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Ros: Did you have any, because I don’t want any specifics or 
individual cases, but with any of the people you were dealing 
with, did you ever have to deal with domestic violence? 
 
 Glen: Not in a way of where physical violence was involved, no, but I 
know there were some instances of that from Neil’s [the New 
Zealand Police Family Violence coordinator] point of view – he 
would have filled you in – there was an increase.   
 (Anderson, 2005) 
 
 
 Pania: There were significant amounts of domestic violence reported 
to the forum – we have a forum here in Whakatane called 
Family Violence Forum which in encompasses across the 
Eastern Bay and it’s all those agencies that are associated with 
working with people who are subjected to domestic violence 
and we meet monthly there.  And significantly with Women’s 
Refuge and those types of organisations.  So we go to the 
meetings and clearly there was an increase in domestic 
violence, but they didn’t necessarily come back to Child Youth 
and Family for investigation.   
(Hetet, 2005) 
 
Overall, Whakatane displayed a sector-wide awareness of the increase and was 
the only community of the five to do this.  Participants in the other four case 
studies displayed different levels of awareness and understanding of the 
situation.  The community with the second highest level of awareness was 
Timaru though the patterns of reporting and assistance are different from 
Whakatane. 
 
Timaru and the June 2006 Snow Storm 
South Canterbury Refuge in Timaru experienced a decrease in the number of 
women coming to them during June 2006 when the snowstorm hit the region 
with the number of women seeking help falling to just four women.  However, 
in July 2006 the numbers jumped to 25 women seeking crisis support.  The size 
of this increase is clear from the two-year long cycle of data surrounding the 
flood.  Women’s Refuge statistics show the July 2006 figure was almost double 
the average value of 14 new women a month who seek the NGOs help.  While 
there were other peaks, none reached the level of July 2006. 
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South Canterbury Women’s Refuge stated that they were only aware of the 
increase in caseload as a consequence of the request for participation in this 
research.  When I approached the Refuge to ask for an interview, they went back 
to look at caseloads and held discussions amongst the staff, to find there was a 
very noticeable increase that was felt by caseworkers at the time of the event.  
After discussions within the collective, it was remembered that one of the head 
caseworkers was significantly over-committed in the months following the 
snowstorm.   
 
Dawn: Well, from talking to the caseworker, she said, I remember at 
that point, she said she was absolutely snowed in, if you don’t 
mind the pun, with caseloads coming out her ears. 
(Rangi-Smith, 2008) 
 
However, without this study, it is unlikely this increase would have been 
recognised by staff.  This was a common feature of many of the agencies 
interviewed across numerous events, and provides some explanation of why 
increased domestic violence reporting has not been brought to the attention of 
Civil Defence in the past.  This example illustrates the active role of feminist 
research, when participation in the research itself serves as a catalyst for 
change (Ramazanoglu, 1992; Thompson, 1992; Eichler, 1997; Renzetti, 1997: 
133; Fonow & Cook, 2005; Skinner, Hester & Malos, 2005: 14; Landman, 2006: 
431).  Creating increased awareness at the level of community-based agencies 
is required to ensure that any policy changes suggested by this research and 
instituted at a national level are also implemented at the local level. 
 
The South Canterbury snowstorm provided an interesting case study for 
comparison with the other communities, as many of those affected by the 
snowfall were living in rural communities.  Refuge workers noted that the 
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women were mostly from lifestyle-block and share-milking families.  The 
representative stated that whilst there were some women coming to them from 
the urban (Timaru) population, the majority were from rural areas (Rangi-Smith, 
2008).  Rural Timaru was affected for the longest duration by the snowfall, both 
in terms of the length of time it took to clear snow from the roads and also in 
terms of the time it took for the power supply to be restored to households (up 
to six weeks in some areas) (Bang, 2008).  Much like the Whakatane case study, 
those living in areas significantly affected by the natural hazard event formed 
the majority of those seeking help for domestic violence.  Whilst this does not 
establish a causal relationship between the events and the increased domestic 
violence reporting, it does show a relationship between the degree of impact 
the event has and the level of domestic violence reporting. 
 
Timaru Police also reported a decrease in domestic violence reporting during 
the month of June 2006, which is consistent with Women’s Refuges’ reports.  
However, rather than an increased level of reporting, Timaru Police felt that the 
numbers reverted to a more common level during July 2006, which was 
maintained in subsequent months.   
Stephen: …in fact during the snow period – sort of the week or two 
after, we actually had a decrease in reported incidents.   
(Wills, 2008) 
 
The decrease in reporting was attributed by the Police representative to a lack 
of access to phones and Police stations due to the snowfall, rather than a 
decrease in the incidence of domestic violence itself.   
 
Stephen: We actually found there was a lower increase in reporting than 
normal sort of day-to-day because basically people weren’t able 
to get out and about so people hunkered in houses and that 
sort of thing… 
(Wills, 2008) 
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Other agencies in the community did not report any noticeable change in 
domestic violence cases in the months after the snow event.  Most agencies 
stated that there was no formal way of recording domestic violence cases 
specifically in their reporting and that, therefore, they could not say, with any 
certainty, whether there was a change.  At this stage it appears the increased 
domestic violence reporting did not extend past the crisis agencies in the 
community, as seen in this quote from the Federated Farmers representative.  
Federated Farmers employed co-ordinators in the months after the snowstorm 
who visited farmers in the area to assess their needs for recovery. 
 Ros: Did you hear, of any increase, in family tension or family 
violence? 
 
 Rob:  No, certainly not in terms of family violence, no.  I know of 
several cases where it’s been commented that dad was 
grumpy.  Well, probably mum was grumpy too.  I wasn’t aware 
of any violence at all actually – not saying that violence didn’t 
occur, but I wasn’t aware of any. 
 
(Phiske, 2008) 
 
 
Palmerston North/Feilding and the February 2004 Flooding 
Palmerston North has two Refuges; one is a Refuge solely for Maori clients, and 
it works with a kaupapa Maori focus and one is a general Refuge, which takes 
clients of all ethnicities including Maori.  When looking at the number of cases 
reported in the national database, Te Roopu Whakaruruhau Women’s Refuge 
went from three women clients in January 2004 to 13 clients in February (the 
month of the event).  This figure stayed at this level for three months before 
dropping back slightly.  Palmerston North Women’s Refuge (the general Refuge 
in Palmerston North) went from 16 clients in January to 25 women in February, 
over three times their two-year average of eight new women per month. 
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Palmerston North Women’s Refuge staff were unable to participate in the 
interviewing phase.  However, both Refuges co-operate closely with daily 
contact and discussion about work so the representative from Te Roopu 
Whakaruruhau Women’s Refuge had knowledge of the impact on Palmerston 
North Women’s Refuge also (Tukariri, 2008).  The response of Te Roopu 
Whakaruruhau Women’s Refuge was similar to that of the South Canterbury 
Women’s Refuge and staff stated that they were aware of an increased work 
level by the time of interviewing, but not during the event.  Although conscious 
of the impacts of the event and the limitations it placed on their ability to 
respond to rural calls, the increase in work went unnoticed - as for of all the 
studied Refuges with the exception of Whakatane. 
 
Te Roopu Whakaruruhau Refuge have a second recording system which had not 
been detected at the time of collation of the base line statistics, which they 
refer to as  the “crisis call statistics”.  Every time a crisis call is received by a 
Refuge, it is logged into a crisis calls’ log and later entered into the national 
database.  The staff found the flooding itself had been in part responsible for 
some of the women to call:  
 Julie: We had an unbelievable log of crisis calls of women, they had 
some concerns.  Funnily enough it was the natural disaster that 
caused them to double-think around their environment.  They 
already were prisoners, and that’s what we found.   
(Tukariri, 2008) 
 
The calls include women that sought help from a Women’s Refuge but may not 
have accessed the service formally, for a variety of reasons.  One of these 
reasons women may not have accessed these services, particular to the flooding 
in Palmerston North and Feilding, was that the Refuge was geographically 
isolated from women.  The Refuge is based in Palmerston North but services a 
far-reaching area that includes Feilding, Dannevirke and other rural areas in the 
Manawatu.  During the flooding, many of these areas were cut off from 
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Palmerston North by road and the Refuge was unable to work with women via 
any medium except the telephone. 
Julie: It was terrible.  We didn’t have any contingency plans.  We were 
blocked North, South, East and West.  We had one road to 
Dannevirke, but that was it…a lot of them rang us up, and we 
tried to place them till the flood subsided…in the Foxton area.  
Most of them were talking about the fear of no one knowing 
what was happening to them.  It was like, “I better let Refuge 
know that I’m going through this, because I don’t know if 
something’s going to happen to me.”  They felt totally isolated, 
just isolated from everything. 
(Tukariri, 2008) 
 
One specific case discussed with the representative of Te Roopu Whakaruruhau, 
centred on a woman involved in a long-term violent relationship whose partner 
was unable to get home due to the flooding.  During this time the woman 
wanted to leave the abusive relationship and felt that she had enough lead-time 
to pack up her and her children’s possessions and escape.  However, the 
Refuge workers could not reach the woman because of the flooding.  An offer 
was made by the Police to come and collect the family but this was not a 
suitable option for the woman as her partner’s past criminal background and 
current gang involvement meant that the Police were not welcome in her 
neighbourhood.  She was in fear of the repercussions if it became known that 
she was co-operating with the Police (Tukariri, 2008).  This case highlights how 
the complex needs of domestic violence victims can mean an ad hoc 
arrangement is not always a feasible solution for domestic violence agencies.  
This case was unresolved; the woman stayed in the relationship and, to the 
knowledge of the Women’s Refuge workers, had not left at the time of 
interviewing.   
 
The Palmerston North Civil Defence representative noted that domestic violence 
had been discussed at “a couple of meetings” during the recovery phase of the 
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event.  However, Women’s Refuge was not present at the meeting and he was 
unsure of the context of this discussion. 
 
Mark: In respect to domestic violence, there were no major reports 
about increases, even though tensions were probably running 
high, but as I say a lot of it probably was external.  It was, “the 
council was at fault,” that sort of stuff. 
(Harrison, 2008) 
 
No action was taken by the local Civil Defence to follow up on the discussions 
of domestic violence.  More will be discussed in Chapter Seven on this issue. 
 
The representatives of the New Zealand Police in Palmerston North and Feilding 
did not recall any significant change in domestic violence callouts in the months 
after the event.  At the time of the event, there was not a specific Family 
Violence Co-ordinator to interview.  
Zane: You won’t find a significant peak I don’t think [in the number 
of domestic violence callouts], and even if you did, you could 
only loosely tie it back to the event I suppose because the files 
won’t have enough detail in them to know. 
(Kearns, 2008) 
 
Palmerston North Work and Income were also unaware of changes in levels of 
domestic violence, at the time of the flooding:   
Penny: We have very good connections with the local Refuges at each 
of our offices, but I wasn’t made aware of any increases 
directly as a result of the flooding and the event. 
(Rounthwaite, 2008) 
 
However, this was constrained by the fact that Work and Income Palmerston 
North did not have any system for recording cases of domestic violence at that 
time (Rounthwaite, 2008).  Finally, domestic violence cases were assigned to 
whoever was available, rather than one specific individual, so lack of 
communication between staff meant that any evaluation of increases or 
decreases was difficult and not straightforward.  Work and Income co-ordinated 
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a one-stop, welfare shop on behalf of the New Zealand government 
(Rounthwaite, 2008).  Women’s Refuge was not a part of this co-ordinated effort 
meaning the potential opportunity for capturing any increased need for 
domestic violence services through this medium was lost.  
 
Other social service agencies, such as the Rural Family Support Trust and Rural 
Women New Zealand networks, were not aware of any increased violence at this 
time.    
 
Lower Hutt and the February 2004 Flooding 
Lower Hutt City has two Women’s Refuges, a Maori Women’s Refuge and a 
general Refuge.  Kokiri Marae Women’s Refuge is the Maori Women’s Refuge in 
Lower Hutt.  Kokiri Marae Refuge went from working with 14 women in January 
2004 to 21 in February and remained at an elevated level for three months, 
before dropping back slightly.  Hutt City Women’s Refuge is the general 
Women’s Refuge in Lower Hutt.  This Refuge experienced an increase from 71 
women clients in February 2004 to 80 in March 2004.  This figure dropped back 
slightly for the following three months before increasing up to 87 in June 2004. 
 
Hutt City Women’s Refuge displayed a significant level of awareness of the 
effect the flooding had on their work.  This was seen in the context of the effect 
that remote traumatic events both nationally and internationally had on their 
work.  When asked to further speculate why this increase had occurred, the 
representative of the Refuge stated that for many of the women they work with, 
watching other women and families go through such a trauma motivated them 
to face traumas happening in their lives and seek help to deal with this.   
Lorraine: I can’t say off the top of my head, I can’t recall any statistics 
for you, but I can recall that, you’re talking about the floods 
here, but any traumatic event over the years, we’ve found, has 
increased the number of women contacting us.  And I think 
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what it does is trigger their own stuff.  Like after September 
11th, our stats went up dramatically and when people are 
watching traumatic things, it’s like they have a parallel to their 
own stuff.  It’s not necessarily because it’s happened to them, 
but it’s because it’s trauma and we do have a hell of a lot more 
people contact us – that was with the tsunami, after September 
11th and other incidents that have happened around the world.  
We’ve found that there’s been a pattern with that and the 
floods. 
(Williams, 2008) 
 
Clearly shown in the above quote is the impact that traumatic events have on 
victims of domestic violence.  This expands upon, and confirms the hypothesis, 
that the event impacts not just on the abuser and the level of abuse in the 
relationship, but also on the victim of the abuse and their level of acceptance 
(Fothergill, 1999).  The Hutt City Women’s Refuge offers a long-term one-on-
one counselling service as well as other, more standardized, Refuge services.  It 
is during these sessions that staff members are able to discuss with women 
their reasons for seeking help and, therefore, they are in a sound position to 
comment on similarities in women’s stories. 
 
The Lower Hutt Police did not have a Family Violence Co-ordinator at the time of 
the flooding.  Therefore, no specific individual was assigned to the recording 
and monitoring of domestic violence callouts.  The Lower Hutt Police stated that 
there had not been a noticeable change in domestic violence callouts in their 
area after the flooding (Smith, 2008). 
 
Other agencies in the Lower Hutt area, such as the Salvation Army, did not 
report a change in the number of domestic violence cases following the 
flooding.  Again, much of the explanation for this was a lack of ability to 
produce statistics to track any changes.  If changes did occur, they did not 
create a level of awareness for the agency. 
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Masterton and the February 2004 Flooding 
In the final case study, another clear increase in domestic violence reporting 
following a natural hazard event was observed.  Wairarapa Women’s Refuge 
went from 23 new women clients in January 2004 to 50 women in February 
2004.  This is more than double its two-year average of 19 new women a 
month.  These numbers then fell away in March and so it would appear that, in 
the case of Masterton, the increased reporting of domestic violence was 
relatively short-lived compared to other case studies.   
 
I specifically asked about other campaigns or events in the community that may 
have caused the increase in reporting.  If the Refuge had undertaken an 
outreach campaign, or had there been another significant event in the 
community at this same time, then this could perhaps explain the data.  
However, no other event was found to have occurred at this time that would 
contribute to such an increase. 
 
Wairarapa Women’s Refuge appeared to have the lowest level of awareness of 
any increase of all the five Women’s Refuges interviewed and yet presented with 
one of the largest quantitative increases in reporting.  At the time of 
interviewing, staff were not aware of this increase or of what may have caused 
the increase aside from the event:   
Lyn: …God I’m really sorry – most of the years all meld together…I 
just really really cannot remember.  Because there are many 
things that cause this, so far back, it could have been, 
somebody could have died, like, yeah.  I’d even forgotten 
about the flooding till I got the email, I thought “flooding, what 
flooding?”  Just completely forgot. 
(Buckley, 2008) 
 
The representative at the Masterton Police station reported that domestic 
violence callouts for their area had spiked in the month after the flooding, 
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March 2004.  However, this was prefaced with the fact that domestic violence 
callouts had spiked in March in years before and after 2004.   
 
Glenn: If we look at ’06, ’05, ’04, you’ve got peaks in March…you’ve 
got peaks in May…the other interesting thing is in ’04, there is 
a huge peak in the August/September…so is that an increase 
six months on?  It’s inconclusive really 
 
Ros: Did any of the frontline officers comment on people saying the 
flooding was affecting the families they were seeing? 
 
Glenn: No.  No, so there’s nothing that came through.  It was 
something that we looked at.  We get told that you’ve beaten 
up your intimate partner, we will go and deal with the fact that 
you’ve beaten up your intimate partner.  Those things aren’t in 
the mix from a policing perspective, we’re looking at the now. 
(Taplin, 2007) 
 
However, in looking at the breakdown of domestic violence crimes reported, 
offences that were categorised as assaults (one type of domestic violence 
offence) had increased in the month of March 2004, up from 15-17 in the 
months before and after March, to 23 in March.  This was an anomaly from 
other years.  This finding is consistent with theory presented by Enarson (1999) 
and the findings in Fothergill’s empirical study (1999) that the nature of the 
domestic violence within the relationship had changed from abuse that was not 
physically violent to violent abuse. 
 
The February 2004 event was perceived to be relatively small in scale in 
Masterton.  Agencies noted that much of the flooding occurred either in rural 
areas or limited to a small geographic area in the south of the town.  The event 
did not cause major disruptions to the everyday lives of the residents in 
Masterton and no forced evacuations were conducted (Taplin, 2007) and so was 
the smallest event studied in this research.  The Police representative noted that 
there had been some septic tanks that had flooded in a small part of the town, 
and families in these houses stayed with families until an alternative 
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arrangement for a bathroom and repairs got underway (Taplin, 2007).  
However, whilst there was a low-level of awareness about increased domestic 
violence work, and the event was relatively small in terms of its impact on 
Masterton, an increase in reporting still occurred for Women’s Refuge and the 
Police. 
 
Agency Profiles 
Looking at each community as a whole showed any community-specific 
commonalities or differences.  It is also important to understand the increase 
for each agency, and its length and timing, as this will be essential in 
formulating policy for that organisation.  This chapter will now re-examine the 
increases through each key agency before moving to a discussion of any 
differences in increased reporting between agencies or communities. 
 
New Zealand Police 
The New Zealand Police presented varied levels and types of increases across 
the five case studies.  For Whakatane Police, the increase was observed to be 
immediate.  In Timaru there was initially a decrease in caseload, most likely due 
to the lack of phone reception.  In the case of the Timaru Police, the breakdown 
of communication media may explain the reduced level of reporting of 
domestic violence (and other events) during the first two weeks of the 
snowstorm.  An increase in reporting in Timaru coincided with the restoration 
of communication lines.  In Palmerston North, no significant change was 
reported.   
 
The lack of a recognised increase in Palmerston North, given the increase 
reported by Women’s Refuge representative, appears to be an anomaly.  The 
New Zealand Police and Women’s Refuges reported good working relationships 
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and therefore, the lack of data could relate to the statutory nature of the New 
Zealand Police that involves the criminalisation of perpetrators, which can deter 
women from reporting.  Women’s Refuge offers the perceived benefit to women 
that they are neither a government or statutory agency.  Therefore, the option 
of seeking help from a Refuge, as opposed to the Police or another government 
agency, is preferred by many women (Felson et al., 2002; Apsler et al., 2003; 
Felson & Pare, 2008). 
 
Again, levels of domestic violence reporting to Police did not reduce during the 
events except when reporting was extremely difficult for the majority of the 
community who were physically isolated from the Police and lacked access to 
telephone lines or cellphone coverage.  When telephone coverage is maintained 
or restored, the research suggests that the level of reporting may increase to 
double that observed prior to the event.  Responding to these calls and coping 
with increased duties during the emergency means an increased workload for 
the affected stations.  Moreover, ensuring that the quality of their service does 
not drop necessitates advanced planning. 
 
Work and Income New Zealand 
Work and Income discussed differing levels of change in domestic violence 
reporting.  Many of the differences related to whether domestic violence cases 
were formally recorded at the time of the Civil Defence emergency or not.  
Whakatane Work and Income was the only agency that felt confident that it 
could categorically state there was a change in domestic violence cases.  This 
certainty stemmed from an increased awareness through reporting by other 
agencies.  Once the issue of increased domestic violence was raised in the 
Whakatane Family Violence sector, all the agencies involved became more 
acutely aware of their own enhanced caseloads. 
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Work and Income Whakatane stated that they experienced a tripling in the 
number of domestic violence cases they were working with, leading to a staff 
member being assigned full-time to such cases in the weeks following the 
event.  Other Work and Income agencies did not have a formal method for 
recording domestic violence cases and, therefore, were unsure of whether any 
changes had occurred.  Since the time of the events, Work and Income have 
initiated a Family Violence programme in their offices and, in the future, this 
may lead to more significant levels of awareness of the impact of Civil Defence 
emergencies on staff caseloads. 
 
Women’s Refuge 
Clear increases were found either quantitatively, qualitatively or both for 
Women’s Refuges in each of the five case studies.  This suggests that in future 
natural hazard events, it is probable that Women’s Refuge will again experience 
a surge in service demand.  It is also likely that it will experience the largest 
increase across all agencies.  The response will be discussed in more detail in 
the next chapter but one clear issue arising from the interviews was that a lack 
of planning for such an increase has placed the Refuge itself and, subsequently, 
the women and children clients wanting access to its services, at an enhanced 
level of risk following Civil Defence emergencies in New Zealand in the last five 
years. 
 
The figures included in the research only include clients that initiate contact in 
the period during and immediately after the event.  It does not include the 
impact on those women that Women’s Refuge is already working with.  
Women’s Refuge can work with women consistently for years after they first 
seek help.  Not only is the agency working with an increased number of new 
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cases, they also have a responsibility to the women clients that they are already 
working with. 
 
Women’s Refuge was consistently the agency most affected by the event, with 
increased demand for services and a diminished level of staffing (which will be 
discussed in the next chapter).  Women’s Refuge has consistently had the most 
difficult experiences during Civil Defence emergencies.  It is clear from these 
five case studies that Women’s Refuge will need to take steps to ensure that 
their services are still functional during both small-scale and very large-scale 
events and to ensure that women in the affected communities know how to 
access services during and after the event. 
 
Other Social Service Agencies 
Each community had a different combination of agencies that played roles in 
the post-disaster domestic violence response.  These agencies consisted of 
combinations of faith-based, iwi-based, non-governmental, and government 
agencies.  Statistics were not available from all these agencies.  However, 
interviews were conducted with representatives from the majority of agencies 
involved in each case.   
 
Victim Support’s work is tied closely with the New Zealand Police’s role.  
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that increases in reporting of domestic 
violence to Police would lead to increased workloads for Victim Support.  This 
correlation was observed in Whakatane where Victim Support’s work increased 
in parallel with the Police in that community.  Victim Support Whakatane was 
the only agency that participated from the Victim Support organisation.  
Therefore, it is unknown whether this trend was present in other communities.  
However, this seems likely given the nature of the relationship with the Police. 
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Why such disparate differences in reporting? 
The agencies reported significant differences in the levels of reporting of 
domestic violence they experienced after the events in their areas.  
Understanding the differences between these agencies in terms of their role in 
domestic violence response, the types of services they provide and the level of 
awareness displayed by agencies, will explain why some organisations 
experienced significant increases while other agencies in the same community 
experienced no change. 
 
Statutory/Non-statutory 
Women’s Refuge experienced the greatest increase in caseloads across the 
board, followed by the New Zealand Police and then other agencies.  One of the 
fundamental differences between Women’s Refuge and organisations such as 
the New Zealand Police and Work and Income is that Women’s Refuge is a non-
statutory agency.  Victims of domestic violence often report a feeling of 
powerlessness when dealing with the criminal justice system (Felson et al., 
2002; Apsler et al., 2003; Felson & Pare, 2008).  The experience of 
powerlessness, or fear that this could happen, deters women from reporting 
domestic violence to statutory or governmental agencies.  It was repeatedly 
noted throughout the interviews that Women’s Refuge routinely has more 
clients than the Police and other agencies throughout the interviews (Peterson, 
2005; Thomas, 2005; Kearns, 2008; White, 2008; Byers, 2009).  Therefore, the 
additional caseloads following Civil Defence emergencies came as no surprise 
to interviewees.   
 
Many of the findings of this study are consistent with Enarson’s work, in which 
domestic violence was observed to increase, not just in women’s shelters but in 
other domestic violence agencies, in the United States and Canada following the 
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Red River Valley flooding.  In Enarson’s study (1999), the increases were noted 
to last between six and twelve months after the event.  This research found an 
even longer impact period of up to 24 months following an event. 
 
Alice Fothergill (1999) studied domestic violence reporting after the 1997 Red 
River Valley flooding in North Dakota and Minnesota in the United States.  As 
stated previously, Fothergill’s work involved interviews with two women who 
reported domestic violence to her during the course of a wider study on the 
impacts on women of the flooding and the collection of statistics from the 
domestic violence agency in the area during the months after the initial event.  
Fothergill also considered the resources available to the agency in the months 
after the event to gauge what form of impact the event had on both demand 
and supply. 
 
Because the agency was not a shelter, the statistics used are that of protection 
orders sought during the relevant period.  Fothergill found a significant 
increase in the number of protection orders sought.  The number almost 
doubled, from 20 orders in the same period the year before, to 33 in the period 
following the flooding.  At the same time, the agency experienced a drop in the 
number of volunteer hours. 
 
Both Enarson (1999) and Fothergill (1999) focussed specifically on the impact of 
events on women’s shelters, whereas this study includes other types of agency 
as well.  This was done to build on their work and to gauge how widely the 
increases were experienced in the domestic violence sector. 
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Type of Service 
The type of service being offered also influences reporting levels.  Agencies 
such as the James Family Trust and Presbyterian Support Services, both faith-
based agencies, do not provide crisis assistance.  Both work with women (and in 
some cases, men) after the violent incident has occurred.  This was evident in 
the timing of increases experienced.  James Family Trust’s creation of a waiting 
list for their women’s programme three months after the event is congruent 
with the way in which they work.  This demonstrates that potential increases in 
domestic violence reporting and help-seeking can appear months after the 
actual Civil Defence event is “over”.  If agencies are not aware of these powerful 
yet indirect links, these less direct impacts will go unrecorded and, therefore, 
undetected. 
 
Awareness Levels 
Wilson, Phillips and Neal (1998) examined domestic violence rates in three 
American communities after natural hazard events.  This research involved 
newspaper searches, collation of statistics and interviews with representatives 
of agencies in three communities in the United States.  Most significantly, this 
study concluded that awareness of domestic violence as a social issue within 
the community impacted significantly on whether an increase in reporting was 
found after each respective event (Wilson, Phillips and Neal, 1998).   
 
Similarly, this thesis found that the attitudes and awareness of domestic 
violence agencies impacted on their level of awareness of increased domestic 
violence after the natural hazard events in their communities.  Agencies such as 
the local Civil Defence and wider social support agencies who do not see 
domestic violence as a significant social problem in their community, in part 
due to lack of knowledge rather than denial, were most often the agencies that 
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did not report any change in the level of domestic violence reporting.  Agencies 
that are in the vanguard of domestic violence intervention and prevention, such 
as Women’s Refuge and the New Zealand Police, were far more likely to be 
aware of and speak about an increase in domestic violence reporting.   
 
It was also concluded in the Wilson, Phillips & Neal study that if an increase in 
demand occurred, and the agency was able to meet this demand, then the 
agencies were not aware of the increase as an issue (Wilson, Phillips & Neal, 
1998).  This study also found that the ability to meet increased demand with 
existing resources had an impact on the agencies’ reporting of domestic 
violence.  The majority of agencies interviewed had a minimal level of 
awareness that reporting of domestic violence had increased in their area 
during and after their respective events.  These agencies were also the agencies 
that were able to meet increased demand with very little or no external support.  
In the case of Women’s Refuges, at the time of the events, only one Women’s 
Refuge was aware of an increase in caseloads.  This was also the Refuge that 
experienced the greatest increase in clients in the immediate aftermath of the 
flooding in their area and sought external support to continue their services.  
For other Women’s Refuges, awareness was only raised through participation in 
this research and, subsequently, some Refuges reported that an increase had 
occurred and they had not known.  Others were still unaware at the time of 
interviewing that an increase had occurred.  It was only through evaluating their 
monthly figures that an increase was established and no other factors identified 
for the spikes.  These Refuges did not seek outside help with the increased 
demand, and because of a coping mentality that is systematic in Women’s 
Refuge (Henare, 2009), the Refuges made do with what they had.  This meant 
the disaster increase was no different to everyday life, where the same coping 
exists (Henare, 2009). 
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Access to other agencies’ figures was not possible in this study.  Therefore, it is 
unclear if the lack of awareness played a role in the lack of increases reported 
in some of these agencies.  However, it is unlikely that Women’s Refuge alone 
was influenced by a lack of awareness and, therefore, it may be concluded that 
the increase in domestic violence was experienced more widely than established 
in this study.  Wilson et al.’s research (1998) has clear implications for 
explaining why some agencies may not have reported an increase in domestic 
violence reporting when others in the same community did.  However, future 
measures to address the increase in domestic violence established in this 
chapter will need to include considerations for future measurement of 
increases, and for how agencies involved in domestic violence response can 
capture this data effectively.  This type of data will be invaluable for the 
evaluation and review of future policies. 
 
Conclusions 
This study has established that domestic violence reporting did increase in the 
months across the five case studies in New Zealand.  An increase in reporting 
was concentrated in the Women’s Refuges in Masterton, Lower Hutt, Palmerston 
North/Feilding, Whakatane and Timaru but was also felt across the domestic 
violence sector in one community - Whakatane.  These rises in domestic 
violence reporting are congruent with other studies previously conducted on 
domestic violence reporting during disasters. 
 
The scale of the increase ranged from doubling to tripling in workloads across 
frontline agencies such as Women’s Refuge and the New Zealand Police.  For 
some agencies, the increase was instantaneous, particularly those on the 
frontline.  For others, the caseloads rose three to six months after the event.  
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The impact of the increased workload had continued for over a year after the 
event officially began in cases such as the Whakatane 2004 flooding.  This 
period is longer than other research had previously suggested and points to the 
complexity of the relationship between domestic violence reporting and 
disasters. 
 
Once an increase is established, it is important to look further into the increase, 
and examine factors and issues that arise in order to formulate effective policy 
recommendations.  The next chapter will discuss the factors suggested by 
agencies and any common demographics of the women accessing Women’s 
Refuges’ services in the months after the events, while Chapter Seven will 
discuss the policy and response issues that were mentioned or established 
during the course of this research. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Six:  Factors and Demographics 
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Chapter Five established that domestic violence reporting increased in 11 of the 
17 areas surveyed, and in all five case studies within the 17 Civil Defence 
emergencies surveyed in the months after each event.  This documented rise 
shows the need for policy and procedures in Civil Defence emergencies that 
both meet the needs of domestic violence victims, and potentially mitigate 
some of the stresses created by both the disasters and potential policy 
shortcomings.  Therefore, agency representatives were asked to discuss factors 
they felt were involved in the increased reporting and a picture of the 
demographic backgrounds of the women seeking help from Women’s Refuge 
was constructed. 
 
This chapter will first discuss those influences that the agencies suggested as 
causes for the changes in their workloads.  It will then discuss the results of 
comparisons of the case file summaries from the Women’s Refuge national 
database together with the implications of relevant theory on women’s decision-
making process when deciding to stay or leave an abusive relationship.  The 
chapter will conclude by examining the fit of the demographic data of the case 
file summaries in the database and consider these in relation to the Pressure 
and Release model adopted in this research. 
 
Knowledge and Understanding on the Ground 
Agencies considered that the principal contributing factor for the increase in 
the reported cases of domestic violence was financial strain.  The events had 
impacted on people’s financial situation in a variety of ways, including creating 
unemployment as businesses were closed, the loss of possessions (both 
material and sentimental) and the destruction of homes in some cases: 
   
Neil: Financially, a lot of people were hit pretty hard.  Suddenly 
they’ve been displaced, a lot of people had to move to other 
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houses and of course just getting day to day stuff, so because 
of the increased stress, we saw more of family violence cases… 
(Peterson, 2005) 
 
 
Glen: …Urban people who have no other means but one solitary 
source of income and their worldly goods, when that’s taken 
away they’re just thrown into a topsy turvy and even though, 
like for beneficiaries and so on, their benefit is carrying on – 
the time that it takes to recover tangibly, for urban poor takes 
a long, long time.   
(Anderson, 2005) 
 
Financial strain is shown in the disaster literature as a factor that increase the 
likelihood of domestic violence following natural hazard events, though not in 
isolation (Davis & Ender, 1999; Ariyabandu, 2000; Rashid, 2000).  
Compounding the stress of the financial situation were factors such as 
increased abuse of alcohol and drugs, an absence of childcare, and a lack of 
accurate information about the hazard event and options available to affected 
families.   
 
An added complication to the financial strain is that, in some instances, the 
natural hazard event impacted more severely physically on areas that were 
home to lower socio-economic groups, because cheaper housing is often 
developed in low lying areas.   
Glenn: Well I think in a community like this [Whakatane], and it’s 
intense, I think it affects the poor – the urban poor.  The rural 
setting’s different.  In terms of the urban setting, generally it’s 
the poor that get affected because the poor have housing in 
the most vulnerable parts of the community because of the 
cost and the entire economic and the societal/sociological 
causes.  And economically it’s because the poor can only afford 
rents or if they have the ability to take a mortgage, generally 
they’re going to buy at the lower end of the housing market 
because that’s where they can get in.  Otherwise, the poor have 
been taken advantage, because you have unscrupulous 
landlords who want to make the most out of their properties 
and do the least to them.  Also, the poor or the marginalised 
generally feel disempowered to actually go to bat with their 
landlord and they feel like the landlord has all the power and if 
they rock the boat too much, they might get ousted.  There’s a 
whole tie up – you know self-worth, self values, and the ability 
to feel that you are empowered, that you are a person that 
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should be treated like anyone else and you shouldn’t be 
treated by a measure of your affluence.  But often it is.  And in 
this community, of course Awatapu – a community that was 
affected greatly by this flood – a strong percentage of the 
community are Maori, not all Maori but a strong percentage 
and at the lower end of the socio-economic scale.  So there’s a 
lot, in those families, many of those families grapple with 
dysfunction as a part of everyday life and to have this come 
against them too is… 
(Anderson, 2005) 
 
In Whakatane, the community of Awatapu was completely flooded, an area of 
state and local council housing.  The flooding in Awatapu was so severe and the 
risk so great that the NZ Police needed to evacuate residents overnight 
(Peterson, 2005).  The flooding in Masterton also created the greatest physical 
impact on a poorer suburb of the town (Buckley, 2008).  This type of unequal 
financial impact on the poor was observed in international disasters such as 
Hurricane Katrina, where residents of the Lower Ninth Ward (home to lower-
socioeconomic families) had their homes destroyed by the hurricane, and other 
wealthier parts of the city escaped comparatively unscathed (Colten, 2006: 
731).  This is another aspect of the Pressure and Release model wherein 
existing economic, political and social structures within societies result in those 
who can afford to lose the least, living in areas that will inevitably have the 
largest losses. 
 
The disproportionately greater impact on lower-socioeconomic groups leads to 
other factors that both stem from having less disposable income and 
compound the lesser amounts of resources.  Lack of insurance was one of the 
major factors cited in the increase, as it placed additional financial and 
emotional stress on individuals.  454 out of the 509 families that responded to 
a mail survey performed by the Whakatane District Council following the floods 
did not have flood insurance.  During interviews for this thesis, agency 
representatives in Whakatane and Palmerston North reported that the majority 
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of women they dealt were without insurance and they felt the pressure this put 
on families was a contributing factor in these cases.  Lower-income groups have 
less disposable income and, therefore, are less likely to insure their homes and 
household possessions or more likely to live in State housing, which is insured 
by the Housing Corporation of New Zealand for damage to the house only, not 
household possessions. 
 
Existing international literature also pointed to a lack of insurance being a 
contributor to increases in domestic violence (Ariyabandu, 2000; Rashid, 2000).  
The financial losses create an immense amount of stress on the family and, in 
turn, without insurance to replace major material possessions and provide the 
peace of mind that this can happen, the event is that much more stressful for 
individuals.  Those on lower incomes can least afford to lose their possessions 
and the impact is, therefore, far greater on lower socio-economic groups.   
 
This situation demonstrates and corroborates the Pressure and Release model, 
which would suggest that the economic structure of New Zealand, which 
reinforces a level of poverty and lower socio-economic standards in portions of 
communities as unsafe conditions, leads to an unequal impact from the disaster 
on these members of a community.  The impact is greater on those with less 
wealth and a smaller pool of financial resources to draw on day-to-day, let alone 
in an emergency.  They are less able to recover from an event because they are 
unable to replace items lost in the same way that higher socio-economic groups 
are able to.   
 
The financial impacts are not limited to the immediate aftermath of the natural 
hazard event.  Financial strain and a lack of resources also led to women 
returning to unsafe situations, which they might otherwise not have done.  
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When asked, few agency representatives knew how many had returned.  
However, Whanau Awhina Women’s Refuge in Whakatane suggested 85% of 
those who had come to Women’s Refuge returned to their partners and, of that 
85%, 50% subsequently returned to Women’s Refuge (Te Are, 2005).  
Representatives of Women’s Refuge in Palmerston North, Timaru and Lower 
Hutt also stated that they noticed women returning to abusive situations post-
event due to a lack of financial support to leave: 
Ros: Did any women return to the situation because they felt they 
couldn’t leave with the snow situation? 
 
Dawn: I think a couple of women did say when they returned that they 
felt sorry for him, because the farm was in disarray.  Because 
he’d worked so hard for it and it was all gone.  So they put 
away their own needs and sort of gone back, that emotional 
sort of, can’t do it to him now sort of thing. 
(Rangi-Smith, 2008) 
 
Women were returning to dangerous situations solely because their financial 
situation was one that they were not willing or able to stay in.  Victim Support 
also noted some repeat offenders in the months after the flooding in 
Whakatane, confirming that women stayed or returned to relationships where 
continued violence occurred.  This is important for policy and planning as 
women returning to a dangerous situation solely because they cannot afford 
any alternative does not reflect well on policy or agencies who are charged with 
administrating domestic violence policy and prevention programmes. 
 
The impact of the events on agencies and victims were both more complex and 
long-lasting that initially expected.  Previous literature pointed to impacts 
lasting up to a year after the event (Enarson, 1998: 756; Fothergill, 1999: 87-88 
& 93).  However, the consequences of many of the events in this study were still 
being felt by the agencies and those directly affected, one to two years after the 
event.  Women that Women’s Refuge had been working with to help leave an 
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abusive relationship and start an independent life faced immense difficulty 
years after the official natural hazard event had finished: 
Wini: It’s still happening now [in 2005].  And that’s the thing that’s 
not widely known either.  A case in point is a woman we’re 
working with now – she’s got 6 children, she’s been a 
beneficiary since she was probably 17 or 18, she lives in a 
house in Awatapu that the landlord still refuses to mend, has 
made it okay for the power and that to go on but other than 
that hasn’t done any structural thing, it’s still damp, it still 
stinks…Charging rent.  And she lost all her stuff… 
 
 
Only one overseas publication has suggested that the consequential effects 
would continue for up to a year (Fothergill, 1999).  These prolonged impacts 
were described as being in the form of family separations, domestic violence, 
children losing interest in school, increases in the price of housing and having 
to replace lost possessions whilst on a limited income (Anderson, 2005; Te Are, 
2005).  This has maintained financial and social pressure on families who were 
already struggling to cope.  Civil Defence plans mention that recovery is a 
medium- to long-term prospect, but discuss only those non-social aspects, such 
as the return of infrastructure and economy, without providing any recognition 
of the above social effects (MCDEM, 2008). 
 
Many of the factors described above are linked to lower socio-economic groups 
and, therefore, not only stem from lower socio-economic status, but feed back 
to compound fiscal uncertainties and place an enormous amount of pressure on 
the most vulnerable members of society.  In Palmerston North, Whakatane and 
Timaru, Women’s Refuge representatives felt they were working with a majority 
of lower socio-economic women (Te Are, 2005; Rangi-Smith, 2008; Tukariri, 
2008).  This confirms the argument of the Pressure and Release model that 
lower socio- economic groups will experience greater negative consequences 
from a natural hazard event than those in higher socio-economic groups 
(Wisner et al., 2004).  In at least three of the five case studies, agencies working 
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closely with women experiencing domestic violence during disasters noticed 
that the impact was greater on women with less access to financial resources 
than those with more: 
 
 
Wini: The flooding didn’t have one specific finance.  The only thing I 
would say about that is probably the lower socio-economic group 
was the one we had more ongoing work with whereas the support 
that we gave to the families of Awakere and Edgecumbe was more 
around not so much resources but information, support, just 
giving them options of where to go – just that sort of stuff.  They 
were the ones more likely to have insurance cover, they were 
more likely to be able to have a few days in a hotel for some R & 
R, whereas our families in Taneatua, especially in Awatapu, 
Ruatoki, Murupara and down didn’t have that same kind of 
access.   
(Te Are, 2005) 
 
As noted above, agencies reported that the increases were across the board in 
terms of levels of family income and, therefore, it cannot be solely financial 
pressures driving the increases in domestic violence.   
Ros: One thing I wanted to know, in terms of demographics, if there 
was a specific group in the community that was over-
represented in the family violence statistics... 
 
Neil: Yes 
 
Ros:  Was there an age range? 
 
Neil: No, I think the easiest way, is its location really I think.  Our 
lower socio-economic area in Whakatane is called Awatapu and 
that’s surrounded by a stopbank and has got a lagoon running 
through it and what happened was, the system didn’t work and 
the lagoons flooded and the stopbanks kept the water in.  So 
that lower socio-economic area was hit hard.  We’re talking two 
metres of water through that area, and I was there, up to my 
waist rescuing people.  So that was one area.  But then it went 
out to, well we had slips as well as floods, so we’ve got Ohope, 
which is quite a wealthy area, had slips and then the farms out 
in the rural area.  They had real problems – the whole plain was 
under water so again the farming community were hard hit.  
Out Edgecumbe where Jenny is from, that was another town on 
the edge of the river that was flooded.  So no, every part of the 
community was affected by the floods, as far as who got 
involved in domestic violence, that was across the board as 
well.  There were people in the farming community that were 
under stress, but I think if we look at the figures I still think it 
would have been perhaps the lower socio-economic areas who 
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were hit hardest as far as family violence because they don’t 
have the safety mechanisms in place and I think they react a lot 
differently…My thoughts are it was well spread across the 
whole community but worse in the areas like Awatapu. 
 
Ros: So it was across ethnicities? 
 
Neil: Yes 
 
Ros: And age? 
 
Neil: Yes 
(Peterson, 2005) 
 
Adding to the stress of material loss, four of the agency representatives pointed 
out that alcohol and drugs had been a factor in a number of the domestic 
violence cases they had dealt with (Anderson, 2005; Peterson, 2005; Te Are, 
2005; Tukariri, 2008).  Whilst alcohol and drugs alone were not the cause, they 
were contributors or aggravators to the situation.   
Neil: Alcohol is the aggravator, obviously there’s trigger points but 
alcohol leads up to the trigger points.  The trigger points are 
stress, lack of money…   
(Peterson, 2005) 
 
 
Wini: I believe what the flooding did was accelerate any of those 
hyped feelings – in some cases drugs were still present.  But 
the flooding definitely had like a century kind of boom. 
(Te Are, 2005) 
 
Interview participants noted that substance abuse was an aggravating factor in 
domestic violence cases but all those interviewed stressed that, whilst there had 
been alcohol abuse present in some cases, this was not the principal cause of 
the violence, confirming a pattern noted in other studies of domestic violence 
(Kaufman Kantor & Straus, 1987; Farris & Fenaughty, 2002, p. 343; Raskin 
White & Chen, 2002).  Focusing on addiction or misuse of drugs or alcohol 
sidesteps the question of why abuse, if any, is directed only against intimate 
partners or children rather than friends or co-workers, and why those who 
abuse are often able to function well in the public sphere.   
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The stress of a natural hazard event not only affects the perpetrators of 
domestic violence, but also the victims (Enarson, 1998: 755).  Both parties are 
under a lot of pressure and their abuse thresholds may change.  Events not only 
pushed perpetrators of domestic violence beyond their limits but they 
influenced victims too.  The level of violence that was ordinarily tolerable was 
now excessive, not only because it may well have escalated but also because 
the bar was lower.  .  The disaster brought things to a head, and in one case, a 
woman speaking to Women’s Refuge no longer felt able to live in a violent 
relationship:   
Julie: One woman said to me, I wrote it in her file, she said it would 
have been better for her to perish in the floods than to live one 
more day with the violence. 
 
Added to everything else that was transpiring, the women would no longer 
accept the violent behaviour of their partners.  An increase in the number of 
reported cases is indicative of this.  With a lowered tolerance level, women are 
more likely to report domestic violence and, therefore, not only do the number 
of incidents of domestic violence potentially increase, but the number of 
reported cases does also: 
Wini: I think there was family violence present in those relationships 
prior to that – I think what was noticeable was a huge 
percentage of them hadn’t asked for assistance before that.  It 
may be like, one of the woman I’m thinking about, you know it 
only happens a couple of times a year, or he’s not so much 
hitting me but psychologically abusing me and putting me 
down.  And that was more the families on the Awakere plains 
and families on Brian’s beach and from Waiotahi and the 
farming communities out in Waimana, you know, violence had 
been present in their relationships however they’ve never made 
contact with anybody to actually either find some way through 
that... 
(Te Are, 2005) 
 
 Julie: The violence is always there…always there… 
(Tukariri, 2008) 
 
 Dawn: …They are already, long before the snow comes, and they are 
in a situation that is not quite as healthy as they would want it 
 Chapter 6 
 
 
 170   
to be.  So anything like this – be it a major flood or snow, is 
going to accelerate the feelings this women has got.  And 
make everything seven times worse…no it was definitely 
underlying and this sort of brought it up to the surface.  It was 
tolerable before but the event kind of pushed it up, yeah, and 
so it wasn’t any more... 
(Rangi-Smith, 2008) 
 
On top of the stress of the event itself and the financial impacts, interviewees 
brought up certain structural factors that added, rather than relieved, the stress 
individuals were experiencing.  Themes such as unclear information, too much 
bureaucracy and a lack of guidance were evident and need to be explored in 
depth. 
 
The uncertainty concerning the future that many of those affected by Civil 
Defence emergencies felt was marked (Te Are, 2005; Millard, 2008; Phiske, 
2008; Rangi-Smith, 2008).  This was in part because they had no timeframe for 
when life would return to normal.  The downstream impacts of the events 
continued long after expected recovery times.  In Feilding, residents were 
without water for weeks, in some cases.  For rural Timaru residents, electricity 
that was lost due to the heavy snowfall was not restored for up to two months 
after the initial snowfall.  In Whakatane, it took significantly longer than 
expected for people to get back into their homes and gaining access to any sort 
of compensation took months.  The agency representatives interviewed noted 
that many of the women who reported domestic violence to an agency spoke of 
how frustrating it was to not know accurate timeframes for infrastructural and 
lifeline repairs to be completed.   
 
There was also problematic communication between Civil Defence and the 
community, as well as with other agencies.  Communication lines were not 
immediately open, both between, and within, agencies.  This meant that there 
was some contradictory information issued to agencies and the public, and it 
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became a time-consuming and frustrating process to gain access to the 
resources available to cope during and after the event and accurate information 
on what was transpiring.  Getting mixed and inconsistent messages and not 
knowing how to meet the official requirements for attaining food parcels or 
bedding or any other basic necessity, adds more stress to the situation rather 
than mitigating it: 
Wini: It would be time-consuming, you had to have the right 
documentation to get it, the families we were feeding weren’t 
necessarily families that were…not evicted from the 
flood…there’s another word they use… 
 
Ros: …Oh right, so they couldn’t go home… 
 
Wini: …Yeah, couldn’t go home and yet if they didn’t have the 
documentation or the tag that said they were Civil Defence 
number so and so, they weren’t able to access readily the 
things they needed.  Whereas our families were doubling up in 
different family groups – like we had a grandmother who was 
struggling to feed her six grandchildren which didn’t 
necessarily mean she fitted under the criteria of Civil Defence, 
that those grandchildren came from the flooded area – like 
Awatapu – and they didn’t go to the War Memorial meant they 
weren’t eligible for that help.  So they didn’t get it. 
(Te Are, 2005) 
 
The lack of communication also resulted in agencies not knowing what partner 
agencies were experiencing.  In all but one of the case studies, government and 
non-government agencies were unaware of the increase in workloads for 
Women’s Refuges.  Whilst all agencies involved spoke of a strong, open working 
relationship between themselves and other domestic violence agencies, this 
appears to have broken down for some period in the time of the Civil Defence 
emergencies.  Four of the five Refuges did not express the doubling of their 
workloads to other agencies at the time.  Instead, the attitude was to “pitch in” 
and get the work done: 
Ros: So you just had to cope? 
 
Dawn: Yeah.  We had to cope with what we had.  Well I think too Ros, 
it was a matter of I didn’t ask.  I think I could have gone to the 
Mayor or could have asked but I didn’t.  So we made do with 
what we had.  
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(Rangi-Smith, 2008)  
 
This will be discussed further in Chapter Seven in the context of all response 
issues. 
 
A number of interviewees felt that government agencies they were working with 
did not have the autonomy needed to get things done and this slowed down the 
recovery process and led to stress for the agency workers:   
 
Ros: What, if anything created frustration for staff members? 
 
Roberta: Just with regard to, I suppose not having been set up for the 
rise in domestic violence and having to go through 
bureaucracy, an incredible amount of bureaucracy, in order 
to find safe houses for the women affected 
(Ripaki, 2005) 
The representative went on to discuss the numerous agencies that needed to be 
consulted and the number of managers that had to concur, which produced a 
protracted bureaucratic process, without finding extra housing for women and 
children staying in the Women’s Refuge safehouse.  As a consequence of this 
extensive bureaucracy and a lack of trust between agencies, the needs of 
domestic violence victims were not being met at a time where they were in an 
exceptionally vulnerable situation. 
 
A further process of the Civil Defence response in all communities that caused 
difficulties for families was the closure of schools and childcare facilities for 
varying periods of time.  Some were as short as a day while others extended to 
10 days.  No alternative was given and, therefore, parents were left with 
children in the home or in temporary accommodation all day whilst trying to 
sort out the future of their house, possessions, lost income and, for farmers, 
livestock.  Safety of the children is the rationale for this type of decision.  
However, as in the case of Feilding, whilst there was no water supply at school, 
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there was also no water in the homes.  Following the snowstorm in Timaru, 
schools were closed for one week, but many of the rural families were snowed-
in for weeks after the initial fall.  Having children at home in the immediate 
aftermath of the natural hazard event is problematic.  The interviews showed 
that currently policy neglects parents to have time out and children’s needs to 
have an ordered routine in times of upheaval such as Civil Defence emergencies 
(Ronan & Johnston, 2005).  Participants stated: 
 
Ros: Did any of the women say that that was a part of it [why they 
were seeking help] – having the children home while they were 
trying to deal with it, clean up? 
  
Jenny: My memory is yes it was, it was extra stress put on the families 
at that time, and it was having children at home. 
(Thomas, 2005) 
 
Dawn: …it was like a combination of the stress – the stress that the 
women were on, and general, a lot of children couldn’t go to 
school so children were home, just the whole thing. 
(Rangi-Smith, 2008) 
 
Relieving the adults of parental care duties for at least a few hours a day during 
the first weeks of the state of emergency would have given individuals a chance 
to regroup and plan without the additional stress and concern of ensuring the 
safety, and entertainment of, their children.  This is also relevant for policies for 
meeting the needs of children post-disaster, who if given a chance to meet and 
play with their peers can discuss what has happened, and find adjustment to 
the losses they experienced less stressful (Ronan & Johnston, 2005).  Other 
studies have also suggested childcare options during events are a part of the 
wider network support that would help mitigate domestic violence increases 
(Davis & Ender, 1999: 187).     
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The issue of what tasks are categorised as “recovery work” and how this 
affected women was raised during interviews.  Agencies had differing 
perspectives of what recovery involved.  For some agencies, recovery was 
simply a matter of offering financial support and aiding in the physical 
recovery, while other organisations expected recovery to involve a welfare-
focussed approach, offering support and counselling as well as advice where 
appropriate.  The Whanau Awhina Women’s Refuge representative spoke of 
cases where people were given money from funds like the Mayoral Relief Fund 
and then it was assumed that all obligation to those people had ended.  These 
people then used the money unwisely and rather than putting their home back 
together, they purchased items they had never owned before, or used the cash 
as down payments for purchases on credit.  Some agencies were infuriated by 
the seemingly senseless purchasing and did not look further to understand that 
when people go from having little to no purchasing power to sudden access to 
an extremely large amount of money with no advice on what to do, this 
situation is almost inevitable.  The Women’s Refuge representative observed, 
“That’s just charity at its worst isn’t it?  Their obligation to this family is done 
because they’ve issued it (money) and what she does with it is her 
responsibility,” (Te Are, 2005).  She argued that entities, such as the Mayoral 
Fund, have an obligation over and above financial considerations, to help 
members of the community in the form of guidance and advice. 
 
Financial strain was reportedly at the core of the stress that led to the new 
domestic violence cases dealt with following the Whakatane floods.  The 
financial uncertainty and loss that accompanies a Civil Defence emergency 
affected all parts of the community but, in particular, the poorer members of 
the group who were over-represented in the domestic violence statistics.  The 
disproportionate effect resulted from a lack of work when businesses were 
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closed and the overwhelming losses that without insurance were crippling for 
the lower-socioeconomic groups.  Compounding this were aggravators such as 
alcohol and drugs, having the children at home during the response phase, a 
lack of accurate information and guidance about how to recover, and the length 
of the displacement (which was still affecting people more than three years 
after one event and up to two years after the remaining four case studies).  
These factors increased the incidence of domestic violence and coupled with 
different thresholds of abuse on both sides, (i.e., perpetrators’ violence being 
heightened and victims’ tolerance levels lowering) led to an increase of abuse 
reporting of between 100% and 300% for agencies in the wake of the five 
different Civil Defence emergencies. 
 
The Relationship between the Increases and the Events 
The data contained in this research clearly establish a relationship between 
increases in reported domestic violence and the Civil Defence emergencies 
occurring in the same community.  However, the relationship is complex and 
multi-faceted.  It is not simply that the event causes a man to abuse his 
domestic partner or turns a healthy relationship abusive.  It seems that in most 
cases, some level or form of abuse was present in the relationship before the 
event but the event has exacerbated the situation, potentially in multiple ways 
and, consequently, more women reported domestic violence or seek help.  This 
was discussed by those in frontline agencies: 
Diana: …I would say that in the majority of cases there had been an 
element of violence or control present in the relationship 
previous to this.  And that it had escalated following the 
floods. 
(Oomen, 2005) 
 
 Wini: I’ve said this before, if there was violence in the relationship 
beforehand, what the floods did was escalate it.   
(Te Are, 2005) 
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This situation was also highlighted in Fothergill’s study (1999), in which one of 
her interviewed women stated that her husband had not been violent in the 
relationship in 20 years, but had maintained a pattern of controlling behaviour 
during that period.  Immediately after the flooding struck in their area, the 
violence returned, and she subsequently left the relationship (Fothergill, 1999). 
 
It is not only perpetrators that are affected by disasters.  Enarson (1999) points 
out disasters often have a multitude of effects on the individuals involved in 
abusive relationships.  The destruction of a house can reduce the level of 
investment a woman holds in the abusive relationship and provide motivation 
for reporting of current violence.  Aid money can provide the financial means 
needed for transport out of the area or to a Refuge.  This was also seen in 
Fothergill’s work in which one of the women interviewed had experienced an 
increase in self-esteem and her feeling of self-efficacy as a result of having to 
respond to the flooding in her area (1999).  The woman left the abusive 
relationship in the period following the flooding, and put much of her decision 
down to the increased self-esteem and self-efficacy she felt (Fothergill, 1999).  
In addition, for the perpetrator, the loss of control and increased stress can 
cause a heightening of the severity and frequency of abuse (1999: 748).  This 
was also exemplified in one of the cases presented by Fothergill discussed in 
the previous paragraph (1999). 
 
Without interviewing every woman and man involved in the caseloads of 
domestic violence agencies in the months after each event, the degree to which 
the event impacted on domestic violence levels cannot be stated irrefutably.  
What can be shown is that reporting of domestic violence did increase in the 
months after these events and, other than the event, there is no other changed 
set of circumstances or explanation offered in each case to explain this.  During 
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the interview, each agency was asked if there was an outreach campaign, 
another event, or any other explanation that could account for an increase in 
domestic violence reporting at that point in time.  No other significant 
explanations were offered to explain this increase.  Therefore, it is reasonable 
to assert that it was the event that acted as a catalyst to varying degrees for 
different people to report or seek help during the months following each event. 
 
As a measure to probe deeper into the situation of domestic violence during 
disasters in New Zealand, this study examined 263 case file summaries of 
women reporting domestic violence to Women’s Refuge in all five areas in the 
months after their respective natural hazard events.  The use of the case file 
summaries from Women’s Refuge is a way to examine any commonalities 
between women seeking help from Women’s Refuge in all five case studies and 
to understand the type of work staff members were undertaking. 
 
Accessing the demographic information will aid in evaluating the Pressure and 
Release model for its utility in terms of multiple vulnerabilities, as well as giving 
more insight into factors causing the increase in domestic violence reporting 
itself.  The Pressure and Release model presents intersecting vulnerabilities 
creating different levels of risk to disaster, stemming from underlying social 
structures based on factors such as class, race, gender, age, and ability.   
 
The age range of women accessing help from Women’s Refuge noted in the 
case file summaries during the three-month period after each event in the five 
case study areas was 15 to 81 years of age.  However, there were two principal 
age groups presenting across all seven Refuges.  The first is women aged 35-44 
years and the second is women aged 15-24 years.  Women aged 35-44 years 
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comprised 30.1% of the total women seeking assistance, and women aged 15-
24 years comprised 29.4% of all cases.   
 
In terms of ethnicity, the two major groups reporting domestic violence to 
Women’s Refuge were NZ European/Pakeha and NZ Maori.  NZ European/Pakeha 
made up 51.3% of the total women and NZ Maori made up 43.5%.  Whanau 
Awhina Women’s Refuge in Whakatane was an exception to this trend with 
71.7% Maori clients in the aftermath of the flooding in 2004, an expected result 
as Whanau Awhina Women’s Refuge is a Maori Refuge and the Maori population 
in Whakatane 42.2% (Statistics New Zealand, 2008a), three times higher than 
the national average of 14.6% (Statistics New Zealand, 2008c).  With only 42.2% 
of the population listed as Maori, the Maori in Whakatane make up 71.7% of the 
domestic violence reports.  However, both figures equate to an over-
representation of Maori reporting domestic violence after disasters.  In saying 
this, ethnicity in isolation does not emerge as a strong predictor of whether 
domestic violence was reported by women during disasters in New Zealand.  
The higher percentage or Maori clients was coupled with a majority 
representation of those in lower socio-economic groups.   
 
Socio-economic status is much harder to measure through the data available in 
the Women’s Refuge national database.  However, the employment status of the 
women was part of the information collected by Women’s Refuge workers and 
can be viewed as a rough proxy for income.  A clear majority of the women 
seeking help from the seven Refuges in the months after each event were not 
employed in the labour force.  Employment status varied from being recorded 
as a “Stay-at-home mum” to “Unemployed” on a relevant benefit (welfare 
payment).  Grouping these categories together, women not in paid employment 
represented 76.5% of the women.  Within the 76.5%, the most significant group 
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were “Stay-at-home mums” who comprised 45.4% of the 263 case files analysed.  
However, what is not clear is whether the women in the “Stay-at-home mum” 
category are on a welfare benefit also putting them in a lower socio-economic 
group, or if they are at home and their partner/husband is earning the family 
income.  What this highlights is that the majority of women were either in a low 
socio-economic group or were solely dependent on their partner/husband for 
financial support.  Both of these positions may leave the women vulnerable 
during a disaster, as regardless of the family income, their access to finances 
may be restricted. 
 
This intersection of race/ethnicity and class can be seen in this study in the 
statistics from Women’s Refuge and in the interviews conducted across 
agencies.  Domestic violence research also suggests that race/ethnicity alone is 
not a significant indicator of domestic violence prevalence although ethnic 
minority women are more highly represented in reporting statistics (Lockhart, 
1987: 609; Fisher, 2006).  However, the intersecting variable of social class 
makes it difficult to separate racial and ethnic over-representation from lower-
class over-representation (Lockhart, 1987: 608). 
 
A lack of access, or strongly restricted access, to financial resources is one of 
the “unsafe” conditions discussed in the Pressure and Release model.  In the 
context of the Pressure and Release model, domestic violence would be the 
dynamic pressure that translates an underlying patriarchy in society into unsafe 
conditions.  For many of the women, it is not just a situation of not having 
financial resources; it is not being able to participate in the decision-making 
process of how money should be spent.  Both of these limit a domestic violence 
victim’s ability to respond to and recover from a disaster.  These conditions are 
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complicated by other factors, as well as intersecting dynamic pressures from 
other social, political, and cultural structures in the society.   
 
To further understand the relationship between the event and domestic violence 
reporting, specifically whether there is a strong relationship, the case notes 
written in each case file summary were examined.  Case notes are the part of 
the case file summary where Women’s Refuge workers can enter any extra 
information that they want recorded that does not fit in the other categories.  In 
reviewing case notes, any references made to the respective events were noted, 
and this offers the most direct link between the woman seeking help and the 
event.  Interestingly, in one particular case, the worker notes specifically, “the 
violence has been much worse since the flooding.”  Given that, at this point in 
time, there is no formal system for recording that situations such as an 
emergency are impacting on a case, this type of note is not found extensively 
throughout the database.  However, the existence of such notes further 
indicates that Civil Defence emergencies impact on levels of reported domestic 
violence. 
 
The case file summaries provided the opportunity to look at what form of work 
Women’s Refuge was undertaking in the months after the Civil Defence 
emergencies in their community.  Issues such as how long the enhanced 
workload lasted, how much time was devoted to each case, whether the women 
were first-time clients or repeat, and whether the women returned again after 
the initial contact during the post-event period, were examined.   
 
Many of the interviewees reported that they believed the abuse in the 
relationship had preceded the event (Te Are, 2005; Rangi-Smith, 2008; Tukariri, 
2008; Williams, 2008).  This is not to say that the violence within the 
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relationship had not changed.  It may have become more frequent, more severe, 
or shifted from emotional and financial abuse to more physical abuse.  Rather 
the agency representatives felt that natural hazard events were not turning 
healthy relationships into abusive ones.  To examine this further, two variables 
that are captured in the national database were considered:   
 
1. Whether the women seeking help in the months after the Civil Defence 
emergency had sought help from Women’s Refuge previously. 
   
2. How long the abuse had been occurring prior to reporting.   
 
The first variable is considered to demonstrate what proportion of the women 
were first-time reporters.  Although this does not create a causal relationship 
between the event and the reporting, it identifies the number of women who 
had not previously been motivated to report.  The second figure, the duration 
of abuse prior to reporting, is a much more telling statistic in terms of 
understanding whether domestic violence had increased, or whether it was the 
reporting that had increased. 
 
When looking at whether the women had accessed Women’s Refuge services 
before the events, 57.2% had not been to a Refuge before.  This means the 
majority of clients that Women’s Refuge work with during disasters are first-
time reporters.  As has previously been observed in this thesis, if a woman 
seeks help and is met with less than satisfactory service, this will negatively 
influence the likelihood of her reporting again (Berk & Newton, 1985; Berk, 
Newton, & Berk, 1986; Holiman & Schilit, 1991; Sullivan, 1991; Davis et al., 
1994; Barnett et al., 1996; Sullivan & Bybee, 1999; Allen et al., 2004; 
McDermott & Garofalo, 2004).  If these first-time reporters are finally able to 
make the decision to leave an abusive relationship, but come in contact with an 
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agency that is unable to manage its caseloads, the opportunity to work with this 
woman could in all likelihood be lost forever. 
 
In contrast to the first-time reporting majority discussed previously, the most 
common duration of abuse reported was between five and ten years (23.7%), 
followed by between three and five years and between two and three years 
equally (21.1%).  Combining these three groupings indicates that the majority of 
the abuses had been occurring for between two and ten years (65.9%) before 
the women reported at the time of the emergency.  This supports the assertion 
put forward by numerous agency representatives that the abuse was not new, 
or caused by the Civil Defence emergency (Te Are, 2005; Rangi-Smith, 2008; 
Tukariri, 2008).   
 
Wini: It was the biggest part of the group that we worked with, I 
think there was family violence present in those relationships 
prior to that – I think what was noticeable was a huge 
percentage of them hadn’t asked for assistance before that.  It 
may be like, one of the woman I’m thinking about, you know it 
only happens a couple of times a year, or he’s not so much 
hitting me but psychologically abusing me and putting me 
down.  
(Te Are, 2005) 
 
 
For those interested in a causal analysis of the situation, this moves the focus 
of research away from looking at factors involved in domestic violence, to 
looking at factors contributing to domestic violence reporting.  An awareness of 
why a Civil Defence emergency would prompt more women to report domestic 
violence, if this is the case, is vital in creating effective policy and planning to 
address increased domestic violence reporting. 
 
Research into a woman’s decision to stay or leave an abusive relationship has 
established six differing theories on the dynamics at play: Learned 
Helplessness; the Investment Model; Traumatic Bonding; Rational/Planned 
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Behaviour Theory; Psychological Entrapment Theory; and the 2-Part Question 
Model.  The theories can be separated into two groups.  There are theories 
based at the individual level which look at the victim’s self-esteem and other 
psychological traits: Learned Helplessness; Traumatic Bonding; and 
Psychological Entrapment Theory.  The second group focuses on both the 
woman and the society she is based in: Investment Model; Rational/Planned 
Behaviour; and the 2-Part Question Model. 
 
Learned Helplessness 
Learned helplessness theory was most commonly applied to understanding 
depression before Walker used its basic principles to examine the case of 
battered women (1979).  Walker (1979: 46) argued that learned helplessness 
explained why some victims of domestic violence displayed “passivity” and a 
dependence on their perpetrators.  This theory argues that women learn that 
there is little they can do to reduce the violence in the relationship, as their 
differing attempts over time to appease the abuser all result in the same 
response (Launius & Lindquist, 1988).  A hypothetical example would be if a 
woman constantly tries to perfect her cooking to avoid a confrontation at 
dinner-time and none of her actions manage to achieve this, her belief in her 
self-efficacy is diminished.  This type of response pattern wears the victim down 
until she eventually does not believe that the violence will ever stop, regardless 
of whether she leaves the perpetrator or not (Rhatigan et al., 2006: 332). 
 
Rhatigan et al. (2006: 332-333) point out that this model does explain some 
women’s behaviour in an abusive relationship, but fails to account for why 
some women do leave, and the motivations behind their decisions.  If abused 
women lose all self-efficacy, then the question of what causes them to try to 
leave remains unanswered in the Learned Helplessness model.  Rhatigan et al. 
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further posit that this model, although it explains some of the internal barriers 
to a woman leaving an abusive relationship, does not address the external 
barriers to leaving (2006: 333).  It also does not allow for those women who 
actively choose to stay in a relationship, instead tacitly assuming all women 
want to leave but do not have the agency.  Finally, it is in conflict with other 
empirical studies, which find that the level of violence in a relationship makes it 
more likely for a woman to leave (Rhatigan et al., 2006: 333). 
 
Relating the Learned Helplessness hypothesis to increased reporting of 
domestic violence in disasters will only explain part of the story.  Enarson 
points out that the disasters may give some women a sense of their own 
strength and lead them to think that if they can survive such a disaster, then 
they will be able to survive outside of the relationship (1999: 748).  By building 
their self-esteem through achieving during the disaster, this may break the 
cycle of learned helplessness and, therefore, is a possible explanation as to why 
women are more likely to seek help in the months following a disaster.  
However, it does not go as far as to explain how women can carry out their 
decision, again because the Learned Helplessness model does not include 
external factors that may affect the decision to leave or stay. 
 
Traumatic Bonding 
Traumatic Bonding theory is based on the premise that the victim of the abuse 
develops a bond with her abuser (Dutton & Painter, 1981).  Based in 
psychology, Traumatic Bonding theory argues that the victim of domestic 
violence develops a strong emotional link with her abuser through a cycle of 
alternating negative behaviours (such as the violent outburst) and positive 
behaviours (such as the “honeymoon period” that follows the outburst) 
(Rhatigan et al., 2006: 333).  The cycle begins when the perpetrator uses 
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coercive techniques to make the woman feel as though she cannot look after 
herself and erodes her self-esteem.  This is paired by intermittent violent 
outbursts followed by periods of remorse on the part of the perpetrator when 
the perpetrator may try to “make it up” to the woman.  This fits with the cycle of 
violence that other theorists (Walker, 1979; Strube, 1988) and practitioners 
(National Network of Stopping Violence, 2005; Women’s Refuge, 2009) argue 
exists. 
 
Traumatic bonding theory also submits that if a woman does try to end the 
abusive relationship, the bonding that has occurred will cause the woman to 
return to the relationship.  Dutton and Painter argue that a period of separation 
actually increases the bond the woman feels for the man as she minimises the 
impact of the violent outbursts and focuses on the good aspects of the 
relationship (1993: 109). 
 
Although this model may explain part of the dynamics involved in an abusive 
relationship, it also insufficient to explain how women decide to leave the 
relationship and the external and internal barriers to this.  As in the Learned 
Helplessness model, it only accounts for part of the picture and, therefore, 
cannot explain, in isolation, the factors involved in a woman’s decision to stay 
or leave an abusive relationship. 
 
Traumatic Bonding theory seems to stand in direct opposition to what has been 
observed of domestic violence reporting in disasters.  Traumatic Bonding theory 
would argue that if a woman is in an unstable situation then she is more likely 
to bond with the abuser than if in a stable situation.  By extrapolation, this 
would suggest that the women are less likely to report.  Moreover, if agency 
representatives are correct that, in some cases, the violence in the relationship 
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became more intense during the disaster, this would suggest that the woman 
would build a stronger bond with the abuser during the event and would be less 
likely to report.  Therefore, the Traumatic Bonding theory does not explain the 
situation observed in this research and other similar studies (Enarson, 1999; 
Fothergill, 1999). 
                                                                                                                                                             
Psychological Entrapment 
Psychological Entrapment focuses wholly on the victim of domestic violence and 
argues that, as the level of the violence in the relationship escalates, she will 
increase her efforts to continue the relationship in order to “make good on 
previous contributions” (Brockner & Rubin, 1985: 5; Strube, 1988: 241; Ben-Ari, 
2003: 540).  Strube (1988: 241) submits that when the abuse first begins in a 
relationship, women will put effort in to try and mitigate it.  These efforts 
inevitably fail but rather than accepting their efforts were wasted and the abuse 
will continue unless she leaves, the women put in even more effort to try and 
stop the abuse, thus making the previous efforts worthwhile.  This cycle 
continues and is sustained by periods of harmony in the relationship, when the 
abuse subsides and the perpetrator apologises and attempts to “make it up” to 
the woman.  This act leads the woman to believe she is making progress in her 
pursuit of a healthy relationship and is one of the reinforcers of the cycle.  The 
good phases of the cycle must be of a sufficient quality that the woman still 
values her relationship.  If the quality decreases, it must do so in a slow fashion 
such that the accumulated invested effort in the relationship is sufficient to 
keep the cycle going.  If the relationship quickly deteriorates, the invested effort 
may be insufficient for the woman to continue and, therefore, she will not 
become entrapped (Strube, 1988). 
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Strube (1988) and Rhatigan et al. (2006) discuss the five requisite 
circumstances needed for a woman to become psychologically entrapped in an 
abusive relationship.  These state that victimised women must: 
1. Actively try to maintain their relationships 
2. Continue their efforts in spite of violence received 
3. Question the benefit of the continued efforts 
4. Acknowledge the choice involved in deciding whether or not they should 
maintain their relationships 
5. And the goal of a healthy relationship must be unlikely or hugely costly 
to be attained. 
(Strube, 1988: 241) 
 
This model and others that do not account for external factors acting on the 
woman and perpetrator, is insufficient to explain a woman’s decision to stay or 
leave.  In a similar manner to the Traumatic Bonding theory, this theory would 
suggest that women are less likely to report during disasters as increased 
violence leads to women choosing to put more effort in maintaining and “fixing” 
the relationship.  This was clearly not evident in the cases studied in this 
research. 
 
Investment Model 
The Investment model was initially applied to relationships in general, including 
friendships and romantic relationships.  According to Rusbult and Martz (1995: 
559), the model successfully explained why a person would continue in a 
relationship after a negative experience within it.  Proponents of the Investment 
model argue that victims of domestic violence, as in all relationships, become 
committed to the relationship through a range of actions, and the level of 
commitment to a relationship will determine whether a woman chooses to stay 
or leave. 
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Commitment is the degree to which the woman wishes to maintain the 
relationship, feels attached to it, and sustains a long-term mindset about it.  
Commitment is a complex concept within which, Rusbult and Martz (1995) 
argue, there are three further factors that affect an individual’s commitment to 
a relationship: satisfaction, alternative quality and investment size.  Satisfaction 
is the degree to which the individual evaluates the relationship positively.  
Alternative quality refers to the attractiveness of alternatives to the relationship, 
including other potential relationships, the quality of life when single, housing 
opportunities, income opportunities, and so on.  Investment size refers to the 
size and number of resources tied to the relationship, such as mutual friends, 
children and, of course, material possessions (Rusbult & Martz, 1995: 559-560). 
 
Rusbult and Martz (1995) argue that if there is a high level of commitment, 
limited or poor-quality alternatives and a large investment of resources, then an 
individual may stay in a relationship that is otherwise not satisfying.  This, the 
authors submit, is why women may choose to stay in an abusive relationship, 
even after they realise the abuse will not stop with time (Rusbult & Martz, 
1995). 
 
When this model was applied to a study of 100 women seeking help from a 
battered women’s shelter in the United States between 1978 and 1982, it was 
found that women had a greater commitment to the relationship if they were 
satisfied in those non-abusive parts of the relationship.  That is, the honeymoon 
stage of the abuse cycle was good, the quality of alternatives were poor, and 
the level of investment of resources was high (Rusbult & Martz, 1995).  The 
research involved interviews with the women consisting of both quantitative 
questions and qualitative measures.  
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This model offers a more thorough explanation of why women leave abusive 
relationships than the previous models, which were all based on the individual.  
It is able to include both the dynamics of the individual relationship in looking 
at the satisfaction the woman feels, as well as external forces through the 
quality of alternatives and the size of the investment.  The size of the 
investment includes the concept put forward by the Psychological Entrapment 
theory, in which the woman looks at not only the level of shared resources, but 
also the effort already put into the relationship when deciding the level of 
commitment she feels towards the relationship.  Rhatigan et al. point out that 
whilst the model does allow for the dynamic nature of relationships, by 
acknowledging that commitment changes with time, it does not account for the 
women who stay in the relationship because of fears for their safety if they 
leave and not because of a commitment to the relationship (2006: 336). 
 
This model has more success than the previous three in explaining why 
reporting of domestic violence increases during disasters.  During a disaster, all 
three factors that influence a woman’s level of commitment are affected.  If the 
violence becomes heightened (as reported by some of the interviewees) and the 
good parts of the abuse cycle are reduced during a disaster, owing to the stress 
of the event and its impact on the home, work and possessions of the couple 
(also reported by interviewees), then the level of satisfaction a woman derives 
from the relationship will be reduced.  At the same time, the unanticipated 
access to recovery funds and alternative housing during evacuations may 
increase the quality of the alternatives a woman sees for herself.  Finally, if the 
household and its possessions are damaged or destroyed (also reported by 
interviewees) or the social network is broken due to relocation, then the size of 
a woman’s investment in the relationship may be substantially reduced.  Any 
combination of these effects may be enough to reduce a woman’s level of 
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commitment to a level where she will seek help to leave the relationship.  
Again, the Investment model does not predict the behaviour of those women 
who stay in a relationship due to fear of the violence that could follow an 
attempt to leave.   
 
Rational Action/Planned Behaviour 
Rational Action theory was first proposed by Fishbein and Ajzen (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) and is based on the premise that all 
individuals, including domestic violence victims, make rational decisions based 
on outcome expectancy and the societal norm (Strube, 1988: 247; Choice & 
Lamke, 1997: 293; Rhatigan, 2006: 335).  In essence, it contends that domestic 
violence victims make decisions based on a cost-benefit analysis, where 
potential costs (such as future violent acts or income loss) are weighed against 
potential benefits (such as being free from the violence, or children not having 
to witness or be victim to the violence).  It argues that the women will make 
decisions based on all the information available to them at the time, and will 
base this decision on the expected outcomes of this decision (Strube, 1988: 
247; Choice & Lamke, 1997: 293; Rhatigan, 2006: 335).  Factored into this is 
the societal norm, which is deemed to include the woman’s social networks, as 
well as wider cultural and societal norms, and the influence this has on her 
decision-making.  If the woman has a network or is part of a community that is 
strongly in favour of reconciliation, this will influence whether she decides to 
leave an abusive relationship or return in the future (Rhatigan et al., 2006).   
 
Planned Behaviour theory goes one step further, as an extension of Rational 
Action theory (Ajzen, 1985), and posits that these decisions are then influenced 
by a range of external forces (such as ease of access to alternative housing or 
the existence of an independent means of income) which will affect whether or 
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not the woman is able to leave the relationship (Rhatigan et al., 2006).  This 
incorporates the concept that the woman is not entirely in control of the 
decision-making process and that there are external forces acting upon her that 
will make the decision to leave either more or less easy. 
 
The main criticism of the Rational Action and Planned Behaviour theories are 
that they are mostly concerned with other decision-making processes, not 
relationship choices.  They assume that the decision to stay or leave a 
relationship is a rational one.  However, when fear is a factor in a decision, the 
decision cannot be guaranteed to be carried out on a rational basis (Rhatigan, 
2006) 
 
Two-Part Question Model 
In response to such varied models as the ones above, Choice and Lamke 
present a model that amalgamates four of the five models discussed earlier: 
Learned Helplessness; Reasoned Action/Planned Behaviour; the Investment 
Model; and Psychological Entrapment (1997).  This is the model chosen for use 
in this research as it offers the greatest understanding of why women may 
choose to report domestic violence during disasters.  Choice and Lamke argue 
that victims of domestic violence ask themselves two questions with regard to 
leaving the relationship.  The first question is “Will I be better off?”  To answer 
this question, Choice and Lamke suggest that the woman will examine her 
feelings of satisfaction in the relationship, her perception of the existing levels 
of investment, the quality of available alternatives and a subjective norm (1997: 
294).  Many of these concepts are derived from the Investment model, which 
combined satisfaction, quality of investments and size of investment, to create 
a level of commitment to the relationship.  By not using the term commitment, 
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Choice and Lamke avoid the difficulty of not accounting for women who are not 
committed to the relationship but stay out of fear of reprisal if they leave. 
 
If the woman decides that her quality of life would be better without the 
relationship, then the second question asked is “Can I do it?”  To answer this 
question, Choice and Lamke purport that the woman will look at both personal 
and structural resources and barriers (1997: 297).  Personal resources and 
barriers consist of self-efficacy and perceived control.  Structural resources 
include money, education, employment and the availability of social service 
agencies.  Structural barriers include ineffective levels of assistance from the 
said social service agencies, marriage, and having no alternative place to live 
(Choice & Lamke, 1997: 297). 
 
In combining aspects of the previous models, Choice and Lamke are able to 
come up with a theory broad enough to cover many factors suggested by 
researchers and theorists, but also a theory that can be personalised to 
individual cases.  Applying the two-part question model to the situation of 
domestic violence reporting in disasters, the impact of natural disasters is 
indicated by the factors that influence both questions. 
 
As with the Investment model, the disaster can reduce the previous investments 
in the relationship (by destroying houses and possessions as well as 
incapacitating social networks through evacuations) and the level of satisfaction 
with the existing relationship (through stress-induced more frequent or intense 
violence), whilst also increasing the quality of alternatives.  This may cause the 
woman to answer “yes” to the question, “Will I be better off?”  Interviewees 
reported that some of the factors being recounted to them as causing reporting 
were a loss of possessions and their home, increased violence due to the stress 
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of the event and its subsequent impacts on finances, and a lack of childcare 
facilities.  If having the children in the home for extended periods during the 
cleanup meant the children were the target of, or perhaps witness to the 
violence, this may also prompt the woman to feel she will be “better off” out of 
the relationship. 
 
As predicted by the Learned Helplessness model, the disaster could increase a 
domestic violence victim’s self-efficacy and perceived control over her destiny, 
as the response and recovery to the disaster provide an opportunity to step out 
of her normal role.  This will render the answer to the question “Can I do it?” 
more positive.  If this is also coupled with available alternative housing or more 
social support within the community, then increased reporting of domestic 
violence in disasters would be a potential by-product of these changes.  During 
Civil Defence emergencies, a wealth of social service agency support is made 
available to the community (Te Are, 2005; Bang, 2008; Rodgers, 2008).  
Isolation is a significant aspect of domestic violence (Gelles, 1976; 
Landenburger, 1998; Barnett, 2000; Bornstein, 2006) so it is reasonable to 
assume that, in their normal lives, some women are unaware of the support 
available to them when in an abusive relationship.  Evacuation, or a home-visit 
from a social worker or Civil Defence worker, may be the prompt necessary for 
a woman to feel she is able to leave. 
 
If this is the reality during disasters, then what can policy do to 
mitigate/enhance any of these factors, and should it do this?  Regardless of 
whether domestic violence is already present in the relationship prior to the 
disaster or not, if an event causes increased reporting then perhaps policy 
should try to maximise the positive benefits that could be accrued from the 
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interaction between disasters and domestic violence and assist agencies to 
meet the increased demand. 
 
Conclusions 
So far, there is a strong case that a relationship does exist between the Civil 
Defence emergencies and the increase in reporting experienced by agencies in 
New Zealand charged with helping domestic violence victims.  Whilst the 
relationship is not causal, that is to say that the events do not directly create an 
increase in domestic violence, there is a complex relationship that results in 
more women reporting domestic violence to agencies in the months following 
the events.  These findings for New Zealand align with international studies 
(Enarson, 1999; Fothergill, 1999) and with theory on the factors behind 
domestic violence reporting (Walker, 1979; Dutton & Painter, 1981; Strube, 
1988; Rusbult & Martz, 1995; Rhatigan et al., 2006).   
 
Agencies interviewed for this thesis and prior empirical studies have indicated 
that the effects of a disaster are demonstrated in both the domestic violence 
itself and domestic violence reporting.  The Pressure and Release model 
explains why domestic violence may increase in frequency and severity of 
domestic violence during a disaster, and highlights the greater risk that 
domestic violence creates for its victims during disasters (Wisner et al., 2004).  
The increase in severity and frequency was seen in the empirical work 
undertaken by Fothergill (1999) in the United States and noted by Enarson 
(1999) in her work examining domestic violence shelters in the United States 
and Canada.  However, these studies also suggest that the disasters can create 
an increase in reporting also.  It is highly probable that both domestic violence 
itself and domestic violence reporting have increased in New Zealand, and 
therefore, domestic violence agencies and Civil Defence will need to prepare for 
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this.  If this does not happen, significant issues can arise from a lack of 
planning and policy.  The issues that arose for agencies in the five case studies 
will be discussed in the next chapter to highlight key lacunae in policy, before 
moving to policy recommendations in Chapter Eight. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Seven:  Planning and Response Issues 
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In earlier chapters, an increase in domestic violence reporting was established.  
This chapter discusses any complications brought up in interviews with agency 
representatives in terms of their response to any increased reporting of 
domestic violence faced in the weeks and months after the Civil Defence 
emergency in their area.  If an agency representative reported increased 
domestic violence reporting to their agency, the interviews moved to delve 
deeper into the capacity of the agency to deal with reporting increases and any 
potential issues, for both agencies and the women reporting domestic violence 
during disasters.   
 
This chapter has a different form from Chapter Five.  Rather than discussing 
each event, with a breakdown of each agency in the area followed by a 
summary of commonalities and differences, this chapter will discuss each 
agency, with a summary of common issues across agencies at the end.  The 
case-study focussed format of the previous chapter allows examination of the 
overall increase in reported cases of domestic violence within each area.  
However, issues of response and planning are better explained by looking at 
each agency in turn.  There were some issues that were specific to an agency, 
such as safehouse issues for the Women’s Refuge.  However, other issues 
crossed agency boundaries, such as a lack of communication, that need to be 
addressed by all agencies. 
 
As will be discussed in this chapter, the majority of the non-governmental 
agencies had little or no planning in place that specifically targeted Civil 
Defence emergencies.  When a plan did exist, it was a basic plan that dealt with 
the evacuation of a single building.  In the absence of planning, the focus of 
specific agencies will be an ad-hoc response to increased workload.  The 
absence of policy and planning speaks volumes for the situation currently in 
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New Zealand with regard to response to domestic violence during and after Civil 
Defence emergencies.  This chapter will first look at government agencies that 
have statutory roles during disasters, such as Civil Defence and the New 
Zealand Police, before moving to non-governmental agencies, such as Women’s 
Refuge and Victim Support. 
 
Agency Issues 
Civil Defence 
Civil Defence planning does not currently include provision for dealing with 
increased domestic violence reporting during any stage of events.  There is a 
level of anecdotal and informal awareness of increased domestic violence at 
both a national and local level, but this is not recognised in any formal way and 
has not resulted in any formal planning and preparation by Civil Defence. 
 
What characterises the Civil Defence response to increased domestic violence 
most strongly is the complete lack of a formal response.  Some Civil Defence 
representatives had anecdotal information given to them after the event had 
ended officially (Bang, 2008) while others had no awareness at all (Harrison, 
2008; Rodgers, 2008).  The Timaru Civil Defence representative stated that he 
had heard anecdotally after the event that domestic violence had increased, but 
this was not until Civil Defence had ended the Civil Defence emergency 
officially.  The information was imparted in a casual conversation with an 
agency and the impact of this information ended there.  No changes had been 
made to Timaru Civil Defence policy since the event and no contact had been 
made with domestic violence agencies (Bang, 2008). 
 
The Lower Hutt Civil Defence representative was unaware of any increases in 
domestic violence reporting, either at the time of the event or at the time of 
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interviewing.  There was no formal relationship between the local Refuges and 
Civil Defence at the time of interviewing (Rodgers, 2008).   
 
Palmerston North Civil Defence staff interviewed had no awareness of increased 
domestic violence up until the time of interviewing.  It was also evident that this 
was not perceived to be an issue of concern for Civil Defence.  When asked 
about the relationship between Civil Defence and Women’s Refuge, the Civil 
Defence representative expressed the view that there was no need to establish 
such a relationship and it was reiterated that this was outside the scope of the 
work of Civil Defence.  When asked if there was any contact between Women’s 
Refuge and Civil Defence during the flooding or the months after, the 
representative stated that it was not a priority: 
Ros: Did anyone at Civil Defence make contact with Refuge at all?  
To check, for example, if their safehouse got flooded, or 
anything like that? 
 
Mark: No. 
 
Ros: Would you have thought to have checked? 
 
Mark: No, because where would you draw the line?  Would you then 
call the SPCA and ask them if they’re ok…if Palmerston North 
city had flooded…to be quite frank, ringing people to see if 
they’re alright would be done in a couple months time.  It 
would not happen. 
(Harrison, 2008) 
 
Understanding the capacity of non-governmental agencies to respond in Civil 
Defence emergencies is key to effective disaster response and recovery.  This 
understanding will need to be established by Civil Defence staff, before an 
event occurs and updated at the time of the event, to ascertain the capacity at 
the time of the event.  When discussing the role of Civil Defence, the local Civil 
Defence officer felt that it was one of co-ordination rather than operations, and 
that existing non-government agencies could do the work on the ground with 
the community under the guidance of Civil Defence: 
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Mark: Historically Civil Defence has been like this “Dad’s Army,” with 
all sorts of volunteers all trained up for this and trained up for 
that and the other thing, and what we started to do was say, 
“Well hold on, there’s a bucket of agencies that do this sort of 
work already, and it’s really now just around co-ordinating it.”  
And it’s like we used to have plans around feeding animals 
when there were evacuations going on.  You know, one of the 
questions asked was, “Is there a cat at home,” because we 
needed to get out and feed the cat.  Well SPCA do that already, 
so they do it...and I suppose it would be the same with family 
violence…so it’s very much about just having those building 
blocks and just bringing it all together. 
(Harrison, 2008) 
 
Non-government agencies differ greatly from their government counterparts in 
terms of the levels of resources available to them for day-to-day work.  Agencies 
such as Women’s Refuge are reliant on volunteers to continue their work and 
are characterised by being significantly under-resourced.  The assumption that 
these organisations can undertake a role in Civil Defence response with Civil 
Defence only offering co-ordination in return is short-sighted.  Agencies such as 
Women’s Refuge will be dealing with their own workloads during an emergency 
with (as seen above) a likely decreased staff, and it is unreasonable to presume 
that they will also be available to be co-ordinated into wider work. 
 
At a local level, opinions were varied as to whether domestic violence reporting 
increases were within the scope of Civil Defence and Emergency Management.  
One of the Civil Defence representatives stated that domestic violence 
considerations were outside the scope of their mandate (Harrison, 2008), while 
other representatives were willing to consider the issues arising from increases 
in domestic violence reporting, but required more information on how Civil 
Defence could improve the situation of increased reporting during emergencies 
(Bang, 2008; Rodgers, 2008). 
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New Zealand Police 
The New Zealand Police have a statutory obligation to respond to Civil Defence 
emergencies.  This has led to comprehensive planning with regard to staffing 
levels and continuity of services during events.  Each Police station is required 
to have staff available for deployment to an affected area with a declared Civil 
Defence emergency at short notice.  In addition, during an emergency, leave is 
cancelled where possible and staff are required to work longer hours where 
needed (Harrison, 2008; Peterson, 2008).  This ensures that the Police are able 
to respond to everyday policing, as well as fulfil their statutory obligations to 
help with evacuation and other Civil Defence response activities. 
 
However, specific planning for increased domestic violence as an issue during 
Civil Defence emergencies is not in place, locally or nationally, in the New 
Zealand Police Civil Defence plans.  Nothing currently exists to warn and 
prepare staff that domestic violence callouts are likely to increase at some point 
during or after the event, or that their partners in domestic violence response 
(such as Women’s Refuge, Victim Support, faith-based support agencies) may be 
dealing with an increased workloads (Byers, 2009). 
 
Most officers interviewed in the five case studies expressed surprise at the 
increased domestic violence reporting in their area following an event; both for 
themselves and for other agencies.  Whakatane Police was the only station 
aware of the increased work at the time of the events and, therefore, this 
affected the response, if any, to the situation.  In all five cases, the increased 
domestic violence workload was absorbed into existing staff caseloads.  No 
resources were specifically allocated to domestic violence callouts or to dealing 
with the increased domestic violence.  The workload increase was not due to 
domestic violence alone; the statutory obligations placed on the New Zealand 
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Police during emergencies meant that there was a large number of extra tasks 
arising directly from the event, such as evacuations, checks on families in 
remote areas, and information dissemination, which fell under the purview of 
the New Zealand Police during emergencies.   
Neil: The police, no we just absorbed the increase in work.  It’s just 
part of our structure, we just absorb it.  We have calamities and 
floods and problems all the time, so we just absorb it through 
normal policing.  So we didn’t get any extra staff, we just 
absorbed it. 
 
Ros: Were you stretched quite thin then? 
 
Neil: Yip we were, because the first week especially, I was actually 
out there evacuating people from homes, we had the uni mobs, 
the army going through there.  Probably for a week period, it 
was just all hands to pump.  I suppose we just absorb it by not 
having days off, by working 12, 15, 16 hour days and so for 
that week period initially, we all worked very long days with no 
days off.  It gradually eased off, but that’s how we absorb it – 
longer days and no days off.  No extra resources, I’m just 
trying to think, we did bring staff from outside.  Well, we 
brought staff from outlying stations like Kawerau and Opotiki, 
but they were all part of the disaster anyway, so we just 
absorbed it. 
(Peterson, 2005) 
 
These obligations and the resulting increase in overall workloads may explain 
why an increased domestic violence workload went unnoticed in some 
situations. 
 
 
The Whakatane Police displayed the most significant response to the increased 
domestic violence reporting.  The increase was acknowledged, and the Police 
actively sought to help Women’s Refuge and other agencies with their increased 
demand.  Whakatane Police had a Family Violence co-ordinator in place at the 
time of the flooding, which may, in part, explain why there was such a high 
degree of awareness and reaction from the Police in this community after the 
flooding.  In two of the case studies, there were not specific Family Violence co-
ordinators in place in the Police station at the time of the event (Lower Hutt and 
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Palmerston North/Feilding).  This meant no single person had responsibility for 
monitoring the domestic violence cases occurring in the months following the 
event.  From this stemmed a lack of awareness of the increases in domestic 
violence reporting.  In Whakatane, where there was a designated co-ordinator, 
the benefits were clear.  The increased domestic violence recorded across 
different agencies, including the Police, was recognized and acknowledged, and 
a more co-ordinated approach was taken to responding to the increase.  This 
has since changed with the role of Family Violence co-ordinator being more 
widely instituted across New Zealand.  The benefit of Family Violence co-
ordinators may be evident in future events. 
 
Attitudes towards the Police’s responsibilities during the events differed from 
officer to officer.  Whilst in the case of Whakatane, it was evident that the officer 
was concerned not just about the scale of the workload for Women’s Refuge but 
also the impact it was having on the staff personally, this was not universal.  In 
the case of Palmerston North and Feilding, when asked if Women’s Refuge had 
been contacted after the event, the Police representative, like the Civil Defence 
representative, scoffed: 
Dave: We wouldn’t ring them, just like we don’t ring the Fire Service 
to see if they’re alright… 
(White, 2008) 
 
The question asked was, in fact, related to whether Civil Defence had sought to 
find out if non-government agencies were coping after the event, not 
emotionally, but in terms of resources and staffing.  Although it would also be a 
productive move to check on the welfare of staff in agencies, the first question 
related to how agencies coped at a very basic level of physical and human 
resourcing.   
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Work and Income 
Work and Income and the New Zealand Police have similar policies in place for 
working during a Civil Defence emergency.  Work and Income also have a 
statutory obligation during emergencies and, therefore, have more extensive 
Civil Defence planning than non-government agencies.  However, as with the 
New Zealand Police, domestic violence is not specifically included in the 
planning.  Work and Income also have a requirement that each office has the 
ability to mobilise a group of staff to go to an area affected by a hazard event 
(or other significant event such as plant shutdowns or major layoffs).  However, 
there is a delay in this plan being implemented following an event, and in the 
flooding of Palmerston North/Feilding in February 2004, workers at the Feilding 
Work and Income office were unable to work for the first couple of days as their 
premises were flooded: 
Penny: In Feilding initially, we said to the whole staff, “Stay home,” for 
their safety on that first day.  We thought it was better for them 
to not be walking round in muddy, sewerage-y water.  Then 
once we set up the emergency centres, we brought staff on 
slowly.  Once the roads were open, we brought staff into 
Palmerston North so they could do processing work.  We did 
have some staff down, because of care-giving.  What we did 
have the benefit of, was once we saw the scale of what we were 
dealing with – it really was huge – other parts of the country 
offered us help, so we brought staff in from other regions.  
Probably only half a dozen, but good experienced staff who 
really made a difference. 
(Rounthwaite, 2008) 
 
Work and Income displayed a relatively limited response to the increased 
domestic violence, again tied to a relatively low level of awareness of increases.  
At the time of each event, there were no protocols in place to record domestic 
violence cases (this has changed since).  Without any way of recording specific 
cases of domestic violence and with each caseworker handling the domestic 
violence cases individually, there was no way to tell if the aggregate caseloads 
had increased for Work and Income in four of the five communities.  However, 
the Whakatane flooding in July 2004 coincided with a new programme within 
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Work and Income to assign all domestic violence cases to one staff member 
nationwide.  This assignment of a staff member with responsibility for all 
domestic violence cases meant that the increased domestic violence reporting 
during the months after the flooding was more easily noticed in Whakatane. 
 
This chapter will now move to discussing issues reported by non-governmental 
agency representatives across all five case studies. 
 
Women’s Refuge 
Women’s Refuge is the organisation that experienced the greatest increase in 
domestic violence reporting in the five case studies.  At the same time, it is one 
of the organisations that have the least planning in place to ensure continuity of 
services during a natural disaster.  I will begin by first discussing the general 
planning and policy before moving to the specific details of the responses in 
the case studies. 
 
As noted earlier, all of the Women’s Refuges involved in this study were 
members of the National Collective of Independent Women’s Refuges, a 
national organisation with 49 refuges across New Zealand.  There is no national 
plan in place for increased domestic violence reporting during disasters.  The 
five Women’s Refuges interviewed experienced a doubling or tripling of their 
caseloads in the months following events, yet there was little prior planning in 
place at a local level to help them deal with this reality.  This lack of planning 
engendered tension and stress during the emergency and subsequent months: 
 
Wini: We needed to not be worried about could we afford a couple of 
hundred dollars more of food, could we afford to house 
another set of families individually.  We couldn’t afford to put 
anymore people in the house – the house was just busting at 
the seams, a lot of children – it would have been good if we 
could have got some child minders or some advocacy so we 
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could take the kids away for the day, you know something like 
that.  But we did not have the resources to be able to pull that 
in. 
(Te Are, 2005) 
 
All of the staff at the five Women’s Refuges interviewed had very limited Civil 
Defence planning in place.  No Refuge had a plan in place for monitoring 
services during an emergency.  There was some variability as to whether the 
Refuge had a supply of food, water and other emergency supplies stored in the 
safehouse.  However, most commonly the Refuges had nothing or a very limited 
stock of non-perishables.  The safehouse accommodation that all five of the 
Refuges in this research use for both emergency and longer-term housing for 
women and children were significantly impacted in two of the cases.   
 
South Canterbury Women’s Refuge workers in Timaru were physically isolated 
from the safehouse for a one-week period during and after the snowstorm: 
 Dawn: Yeah for a whole week…We couldn’t get in to the safehouse for 
a start.  I mean the snow blocked all the roads and that.  So it 
was a matter of not getting in to the safehouse at all – we were 
fortunate enough that the phones were still going, so we had 
phone contact with those women.  We eventually got in, but it 
wasn’t just an easy task just to get in there… 
(Rangi-Smith, 2008) 
 
An inadequate supply of food in the house for the women and children to eat, 
meant that they were left to themselves to manage food rationing whilst 
completely isolated from the community.  A second issue is the immense risk 
this places the women and children at, should an abuser find the location of the 
safehouse and attempt to enter the property.  The snowstorm and subsequent 
loss of power, intermittent coverage by cellular telephones and access to food 
may cause a woman to contact her abuser under the impression that her 
situation may improve if she is with him and not in the safehouse.  Secondly, 
the perpetrator may know the location of the safehouse and use the storm as 
an opportunity to gain access to the house in a time when law enforcement may 
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be distracted by the snow and cleanup work.  Regardless of the reasons, should 
a perpetrator have attempted access to the house, Refuge workers and the 
Police would not have been able to get to the location quickly.  Staff members 
were aware of this issue: 
 
Dawn: If there was a dire emergency there, we would never have been 
able to get in there… 
(Rangi-Smith, 2008) 
 
 
Despite this awareness, no plans were made with other response agencies to 
either deliver food parcels to the house and check on the women and children 
there, or to have a vehicle available that would allow access to the safehouse in 
an emergency.  This lack of planning was still evident at the time of 
interviewing, two years on from the event. 
 
Isolation was not only an issue for women inside the safehouse, as women 
elsewhere in rural areas were physically unable to access Women’s Refuge 
services in three of the case studies.  Te Roopu Whakaruruhau in Palmerston 
North reported no issues with their safehouse.  However, in a similar vein to 
South Canterbury, Te Roopu Whakaruruhau reported that they were physically 
cut off from women trying to access their services.  The flooding isolated areas 
covered by Te Roopu Whakaruruhau and, due to a lack of planning for specialist 
vehicles that could pass through the flooded areas, women calling for help from 
the cut-off areas were only able to get service over the phone.  If a woman 
wanted to leave the house and utilize the safehouse, this was not an option, as 
the Refuge did not have the ability to collect the women.  Four years on from 
the event, a plan to make available four-wheel drive or other rough terrain 
vehicles that are able to get through the flooding is still not in place.  This 
leaves women living in rural and remote areas that are prone to flooding in a 
position of isolation with the perpetrator.  Any opportunity for them to leave 
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during the crisis has been wasted due to an absence of strategic planning to 
maintain access to the Refuge facilities. 
 
Te Roopu Whakaruruhau reported that if the flooding was repeated, they would 
still be unable to help those women living in rural areas as there was no 
contingency plan in place to get to women in such isolated areas: 
Julie: If the flood happened again, we would obviously not be able to 
help anyone in the rural area. 
(Tukariri, 2008) 
 
It is clear that the issue of rural women and how to ensure they are able to 
access domestic violence services is not currently adequately dealt with.  Te 
Roopu Whakaruruhau were not the only Refuge to discuss the issue of rural 
isolation.  Whanau Awhina Women’s Refuge in Whakatane also made mention of 
the difficulties that rural residents faced in getting access to any services or 
gaining recognition of their needs: 
Wini:  I guess I really want to emphasise that being rural has a total 
disadvantage in terms of people recognising – you know a bit 
of farmland under water is nothing but of course those families 
out at Ruatoki were locked out of coming into town.  They were 
people who had less access to money, less access to working 
transport – they’re the most disadvantaged group in our whole 
area, in terms of financial, ethnicity, low socioeconomic, there 
was very little said about that. 
(Te Are, 2005) 
 
The issue of rural women’s access to Women’s Refuge services during disasters 
is another layer that will need to be included in any policy changes.   
 
Whanau Awhina Women’s Refuge in Whakatane also reported that the numbers 
of women seeking shelter in the safehouse had increased so greatly that there 
were women and children sleeping in the garage, and staff were each housing 
at least three families in their private homes at any point in time during the 
disaster.   
 Wini: I had three families living with me. 
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 Ros: Three families? 
 
 Wini: Three families, and (worker one) had must have been about 
two or three families too, because her house was bigger and 
(worker two) had about two or three families. 
(Te Are, 2005) 
 
To respond to this increase in client numbers, the Refuge sought a second 
safehouse to try and relieve some of the strain on resources.  However, the 
process was complicated by the very specific needs of a safehouse, the amount 
of bureaucracy involved in obtaining a second house, and the lack of time the 
staff had to put into the acquisition of a house during the time: 
Wini: We just dispersed people between the workers.  And because 
we couldn’t get a solid agreement from the funders that we 
didn’t go in to getting another house and find out a month 
later that we didn’t have for the rent, the power, the 
infrastructure to keep it.  Even though we had put the 
proposals together, the agreements weren’t forthcoming so we 
decided as a group that we couldn’t go on panic, we had to 
have some solid agreements or else we wouldn’t do it.  So what 
we did was then dispense the women amongst our houses, it 
was easier to… Yeah, it was easier to do that, at least then we 
would have the opportunity to work with them without the 
headache of worrying about the other bits like if we got 
another house it would cost us on average $4500 a month and 
we couldn’t guarantee, no one could guarantee us that, in 
terms of rent, in terms of power, and phone. 
(Te Are, 2005) 
 
The Women’s Refuge representative was not the only interviewee to notice this 
problem.  The Whakatane Victim Support representative and the New Zealand 
Police representative also spoke about this issue: 
 
Jenny: I am aware that the resources weren’t enough for Women’s 
Refuge, that they needed another residence…and to actually do 
that we came up against brick walls all the time to try and find 
a suitable place for another refuge to be up and running to 
cater for the large numbers of women and children who were 
needing refuge at that time… 
 
Neil: We spent six months on that…I went to repeated meetings with 
Housing Corp, with WINZ, all these people – we sit there and 
we just never got anywhere.  It’s hard to identify a suitable 
house as well, it was another problem, you’ve got to have it in 
certain areas, it’s got to… 
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Jenny: …Close to the schools and the shops…because most women 
would not have vehicles so they’ve got to have accessibility to 
medical, shopping, all the things like that… 
 
Neil: I know some of the ladies at the refuge were taking people 
home with them, the refuge itself was chocka block, the garage 
was full and there were people sleeping on mattresses and that 
was just the shocking thing.  We tried and tried and tried to get 
another house for them… 
 
Jenny: …And one of the clear indications of the level of the high 
increase in family violence was the stress on the workers…it 
was very evident to us that the impact for the workers was 
enormous (Neil – it was, wasn’t it) and we had great concerns 
about the well-being of the workers and we were doing our 
best to ensure that they… 
 
Neil: …Because when you’re meeting with the same people every 
Monday – 1 o’clock in this room – you see them, they were 
shaking and they were going downhill, they were stressed and 
they were running around and you just saw the decline in the 
people, yeah, it took a shocking toll and they were volunteers, 
the two main ladies were volunteers, they weren’t even 
getting paid to do it. 
(Thomas & Peterson, 2005) 
 
The existing safehouse had also been damaged during the flooding: 
Wini: It was flooded, not so much that we couldn’t wash out and 
clean out.  Our safe house, the damage was the consistent rain 
and it came through the roof.   
(Te Are, 2005) 
 
 
Although it was not structurally damaged, the house still needed to be cleaned 
and washed out, which had to be undertaken whilst the house was overflowing 
with women and children.  Having no alternative location to house the women 
and children that were in the safehouse during the clean-up meant already 
cramped quarters were even more constrictive during this time as women and 
children needed to move from room to room during the cleaning phase. 
 
One action taken by those in Whakatane was the setting up of a transfer 
arrangement with other Refuges in the Hamilton area during this time to 
alleviate the housing pressure.  This was an ad hoc arrangement and put 
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extended pressure on neighbouring Refuges, for which they received little or no 
extra resources to deal with.  Other Refuges did not make this arrangement 
perhaps, in part, because their safehouses were not as severely affected as 
Whanau Awhina Women’s Refuge’s one. 
 
Hutt City Refuge in Lower Hutt and Wairarapa Women’s Refuge in Masterton 
reported that most of their increased workloads were not safehouse clients.  
However, if they had a need to use the safehouse, the Refuges would not have 
been prepared. 
 
It was not simply access to the safehouse that presented issues to Women’s 
Refuges.  Three of the Refuges reported that their safehouse did not have 
enough supplies during the emergency to cope with the demand.  Whilst Te 
Roopu Whakaruruhau reported no issues with the safehouse, there was a level 
of awareness that the safehouse would not have been prepared if there had 
been a large spike in the number of women wanting safehouse accommodation: 
Julie: We didn’t have any spare water.  We weren’t prepared at all, for 
anything like that. 
(Tukariri, 2008) 
 
South Canterbury Women’s Refuge stated that there was little food stored in the 
safehouse.  This was due to a lack of funds to buy enough food to stock up: 
Dawn: I know we are not very stocked up very well.  Like we do not 
have any, well we might have a bit of bread in the freezer, but 
we do not have any milk – things like that…For a start, we 
cannot afford to buy it.  We rely on donations, and so it is just 
whatever comes in.  And the problem with donations is that 
you cannot keep them for that long because they spoil so we 
end up giving it out to our community women. 
(Rangi-Smith, 2008) 
 
Whanau Awhina Women’s Refuge in Whakatane also did not have enough food 
to meet the demands of its clients.  They initially tried to access food from the 
Civil Defence foodbank but fulfilling the criteria for this was difficult as the 
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women needed proof they resided in a flooded area, proof that was not always 
readily available when women fled their homes at short notice.  However, in this 
case, the intervention of the national body was vital and another Women’s 
Refuge, from outside the area, undertook a food drive for them: 
Wini: …We didn’t have enough food to cover the families we were 
working with – the families in our homes, the families in our 
community.  So we contacted our sister refuges in Hamilton, 
and what they did for us was a food drive in which we were 
able to feed up to 120 families over a four week period and 
every week they would come down with that.  And that took a 
huge relief off us.  Because the criteria for accessing the 
emergency food bank was really difficult. 
(Te Are, 2005) 
 
Aside from the scarcity of physical resources during emergencies, human 
resources were also affected.  Enarson observed in her work with 77 women’s 
shelters in the United States and Canada that the shelters not only experienced 
an increase in demand for service, but also a significant drop in the number of 
workers available to meet the demand (1999: 758).  This was also the case for 
three of the New Zealand Refuges in the five case studies.  Women’s Refuge’s 
staff are reliant on volunteers with 72% of their workforce being non-paid staff 
(National Collective of Independent Women’s Refuges, 2005).  This has 
significant implications for the staffing of the Refuges in events that impact 
directly on the volunteers’ homes and families, such as Civil Defence 
emergencies. 
 
Two issues with regard to staffing arose from the case studies.  The first is that 
staffing was significantly reduced during the events, as staff were cut off from 
the Timaru township and because volunteers were unable to continue whilst 
dealing with the response to the event.  The second is that the workload for the 
remaining staff was increased two-fold; first by the lack of other staff and 
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second by the increased numbers of women reporting.  This took a toll on staff 
and added to already stressed Refuge workers’ worries. 
 
South Canterbury Women’s Refuge in Timaru reported that some staff members 
were unable to get in to the Refuge to work because the roads were blocked.  
The attitude of all Refuges was also that they could not expect volunteers to 
work in disaster situations given that they had families to take care of and were 
not being paid: 
Dawn: We couldn’t get volunteers into there.  It was basically just 
about three of us who were paid workers, only because we 
were the only who were directly responsible.  You know, you 
can’t expect a volunteer to come in from out of town, and she 
couldn’t get there at any rate.   
 
This is a significant difference between Women’s Refuge and government 
agencies and it is an issue that has been overlooked in much of the Civil 
Defence planning and policy to date.  Organisations such as the New Zealand 
Police and Work and Income can not only rely on staff to turn up for work 
during a disaster but also have a backup plan of secondary staff from other 
areas being made available.  Organisations such as Women’s Refuge do not 
have an extended pool of staff to draw from. 
 
Te Roopu Whakaruruhau Women’s Refuge in Palmerston North experienced a 
reduction in staff numbers available to work with the extra cases.  In this case, 
the Refuge did not seek outside help and worked with the other local Refuge 
(Palmerston North Women’s Refuge) to cope with the cases as best they could 
and as rapidly as they could using their remaining paid and non-paid staff and 
volunteers.  Much of the work being undertaken over this period was conducted 
over the telephone as the Refuge staff were restricted in their ability to travel 
outside of Palmerston North due to the flood.  This was normal procedure for 
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busy times so the increased workload was simply absorbed.  This is potentially 
why the increase was not seen as extraordinary by any of the workers: 
Julie: We always work longer hours when we’re busy 
(Tukariri, 2008) 
 
In Whakatane, Whanau Awhina Women’s Refuge’s staffing levels were 
maintained through cancelling staff leave: 
Wini: …this is what happened, it was my four weeks holiday – 
because my daughter lives in England and she comes in July.  
I’d gone up to Auckland to pick her up; I’d already booked out 
four weeks.  All staff had to come back in.   
(Te Are, 2005) 
 
 
This decision was based on a lack of funding for the increased cost of extra 
staff and the specialised training needed for working in a Women’s Refuge.  The 
Refuge did not have the ability to hire extra staff to deal with increased 
workloads, and did not have a plan in place to access experienced staff if and 
when this money became available.  This highlights the personal impacts that 
the lack of planning can have on staff. 
 
The impact on staff was not consistent across the Women’s Refuges 
interviewed.  Hutt City Women’s Refuge did not experience a change in staffing 
levels.  The Refuge was aware of increased reporting following the flooding in 
Lower Hutt but this was anticipated by their staff who incorporated the 
increased caseloads into their normal work.  The Refuge representative stated 
that they had experienced an increase in calls for help following major 
traumatic events both within New Zealand and globally, so was not surprised 
when they experienced the increase after the local flooding event.  Wairarapa 
Women’s Refuge in Masterton did not experience a change in staffing levels 
either.  The Refuge was not aware of the increased workload at the time of the 
event and the increase, more than a doubling of the number of clients, was 
absorbed into the everyday work of the staff.   
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Another impact on the workers was dealing with their own domestic flooding 
issues.  In Whakatane, two of the staff members who were working full-time 
during the flooding experienced flooding or near-flooding of their homes: 
 
Wini: My house was always on the verge of flooding because I’m on 
the creek, and we just built it up and built it up – only surface 
flooding but not absolute flooding.  One of workers who lives 
out in Purupuru was flooded.   
(Te Are, 2005) 
 
Working in the domestic violence field is often very stressful, and this fact, 
coupled with cleaning up flooding damage in their own homes, created an 
immensely stressful time for the staff of Whanau Awhina Women’s Refuge.  
Staff members at the Refuge were working unusually long hours and then going 
home to a clean-up with no support from other agencies: 
Wini: I think that that’s the only other recognition, that if you’re a 
helping agency and you require help yourself, then there is 
very little advocacy for that.  That you either have to agree to 
do it or not do it at all.   
(Te Are, 2005) 
 
Clearly, being able to take the time to clean up their houses before responding 
to the increased Refuge workload would have been ideal.  However, this was not 
the case in Whakatane and may not be a realistic option in future hazard events, 
but it shows an extra area in which there is room for improvement via planning 
and policy shifts. 
 
Added to the increased workloads that the Women’s Refuges faced, two 
Women’s Refuges reported they were working with more children than usual.  
Both South Canterbury Women’s Refuge in Timaru and Whanau Awhina 
Women’s Refuge in Whakatane reported they were working with more children 
than expected. 
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Dawn: Yes we did, we did have a lot of children.  Probably a little bit, 
probably more children than what we’d normally have had… 
(Rangi-Smith, 2008) 
 
As all childcare facilities and schools are closed during Civil Defence 
emergencies, children in the Refuges did not have an alternative location to go 
to during the day and this created the additional concern of childcare during 
the cleanup phase.  This not only caused stress for Refuge workers but was also 
mentioned as an added stress felt by the women before contacting and whilst at 
the Refuges. 
Ros: Did any of the women say that that was a part of it (why they 
were seeking help) – having the children home while they were 
trying to deal with it, clean up? 
  
Jenny: My memory is yes it was, it was extra stress put on the families 
at that time, and it was having children at home  
(Thomas, 2005) 
 
What this pattern suggests for future events is that, without any intervention, 
an event that destroys or significantly damages a Refuge safehouse, or reduces 
the staff numbers available to Women’s Refuge will create an increased 
awareness of the problems.  Conversely, in those events that do not impact 
significantly on the Refuge resources, there may be increases in domestic 
violence that go unnoticed or unacknowledged. 
 
Women’s Refuge was the primary non-government agency experiencing issues.  
However, there were other non-government agencies that raised issues 
resulting from the Civil Defence emergencies in their areas. 
 
Victim Support 
Victim Support Whakatane was the only Victim Support agency to participate in 
this research.  At the time of interviewing in 2005, Victim Support Whakatane 
had no planning in place for increased domestic violence cases in the aftermath 
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of Civil Defence emergencies.  The increase referred to below came as a 
surprise to staff.  The increased workload was met in the short-term by the 
current staff working longer hours:  
Jenny: We got called in at 10 o’clock at night and I think I left the hall 
at 1.30-2 the next day and went to a family member in 
Whakatane because I couldn’t travel home and then went back 
to the hall the next day and everyday 
(Thomas, 2005) 
 
In the weeks following the event, Victim Support gained some funding through 
Child, Youth and Family, for three social workers to work in the community: 
Jenny: And we had field workers who were also employed at that time, 
we had 3 field workers to go and do the personal contact with 
the families affected by the flood, to help support them.  So we 
had one in Edgecumbe-Rangitikei region, one in Whakatane 
and one in Opotiki. 
(Thomas, 2005) 
 
Presbyterian Support Services 
Presbyterian Support Services and the James Family Trust (in Whakatane) are 
both faith-based social service agencies.  In some cases, such as Whakatane, 
they run Women’s Education programmes for women who have been victim to 
abuse and, in other cases, they provide one-to-one counselling for domestic 
violence victims.  Presbyterian Support Services do not have any planning in 
place for increased domestic violence during and after Civil Defence 
emergencies. 
 
Due to the nature of the work Presbyterian Support Services undertakes with 
victims of domestic violence, it is likely that any increase in domestic violence 
cases will occur much later than with other agencies.  The James Family Trust 
responded to an increased demand for their women’s education programme by 
creating a waiting list.  This occurred two months after the physical event 
ended: 
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Ros: From your perspective, did you notice an increase in domestic 
violence? 
 
 Diana: Definitely.  I don’t know that our family workers who went out 
and did work with the families came back and reported an 
increase but I do know that after the floods we had a waiting 
list, which we don’t normally have.  However, because of the 
size of our rooms and the number of people wanting to attend, 
we created it and we’ve never had that before and that is a 
direct result of the floods.  
 
 Ros: When did that occur? 
  
Diana: Probably a couple of months, about two months.  That’s when 
we had our influx, then they stay on the programme and 
complete it.  But it was around about two months that I noticed 
we had the increase. 
(Oomen, 2005) 
 
 
Common Issues across Agencies 
The most significant issue across all the agencies is a lack of incorporation of 
increased domestic violence reporting in disasters in their policies and plans.  
This occurs despite the prior experiences of domestic violence agencies during 
disasters in New Zealand and the growing international literature that has also 
established this.  The omission has had downstream effects that have varied 
across the agencies, but the base cause is the same for all, a lack of recognition 
that domestic violence reporting increases during disasters.  Even after it was 
experienced by agencies, no changes were made at a local or national level to 
address this issue.  This needs to change to ensure that all women and children 
who seek help because of domestic violence receive the best service possible 
from these agencies.  
 
A second issue observed was the lack of communication and co-ordination 
between agencies who respond to disasters and domestic violence.  Women’s 
Refuges did not communicate their increased work to any other agencies at the 
time of the event except in one case study.  However, other agencies that work 
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closely with Women’s Refuge on a daily basis also made no contact with the 
Refuge (or other agencies involved in domestic violence response) to ascertain 
if the agency was coping – regardless of the increased workload.  Even if 
reporting levels had maintained a steady level, I would suggest that agencies 
that work so closely together would benefit from such an interaction.  The act 
of showing concern for staff at other agencies builds rapport and strengthens 
the relationship.  In the future, given that increased domestic violence reporting 
has been substantiated by this study, agencies should communicate with each 
other as part of their response to disasters. 
 
Despite a move by many agencies both within New Zealand and internationally 
to work in a co-ordinated manner to address domestic violence (Kelly, 2004; 
Robinson, 2006; Hague & Bridge, 2008), Whanau Awhina Women’s Refuge in 
Whakatane was the only Refuge that discussed its increased workload with 
other agencies at the time it was happening.  Its staff raised the issue of 
increased caseloads with the local Family Violence co-ordinator at the 
Whakatane Police and with the Victim Support co-ordinator.  This in turn led to 
the local Work and Income management becoming involved directly and all the 
agencies then began to discuss increases they were experiencing and, in this 
manner, the issue of increased levels of domestic violence was recognised 
across the social service sector.  The Police co-ordinator advocated on behalf of 
the Women’s Refuge for a seat on the Welfare Advisory Committee put in place 
by Civil Defence.  Once in place, the Refuge was able to inform the local Civil 
Defence and other organisations of what was occurring.  This was not a formal 
process and has not been written subsequently into any policy or plan.  
Therefore, there is no guarantee that, in future events, agencies like Women’s 
Refuge will gain a priori representation on such a committee. 
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In Lower Hutt, no comment was made to other agencies about the increase and, 
therefore, there was little awareness among other agencies that the Refuges 
(both Hutt City and Kokiri Marae Maori Women’s Refuge) were experiencing 
reporting and enhanced workloads.  At Hutt City Women’s Refuge, the flooding 
did not significantly affect the safehouse.  Therefore, aside from the increased 
caseload, there was little other impact on the Refuge.  This was also the 
situation in the case of Wairarapa Women’s Refuge in Masterton and Te Roopu 
Whakaruruhau Women’s Refuge in Palmerston North.  Neither of their 
safehouses or offices were damaged during the flooding event and, therefore, 
the increased workload did not create such immediate issues as observed in the 
cases of South Canterbury Refuge and Whanau Awhina Refuge.  This perhaps 
explains why these Refuges did not mention the increase to other agencies. 
 
Many of the government agencies interviewed stated that they felt their 
relationships with the local Women’s Refuges were such that the staff at the 
Refuges would tell them if an increase was occurring for them, and they rely on 
this implicitly (Harrison, 2008; Rounthwaite, 2008; A Wills, 2008; S Wills, 2008).  
In four of the five case studies (all but Whakatane), the Refuges did not 
communicate their increased workload to other agencies.  This may have been 
due to a lack of awareness themselves that the increase was happening.  
However, in some instances, the Refuges were aware of an increased workload 
but did not attribute it to the Civil Defence emergency.  In this case, the 
increase was noticed but it was not expressed to other agencies.   
 
This may be highlighting a part of Women’s Refuges organisational culture of a 
siege mentality.  A siege mentality is a belief that a group are “standing alone in 
a hostile world” (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992: 251).  The group believes that those 
outside the group want to do harm or wrong to the group and, therefore, they 
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are in a constant state of defensiveness (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992).  A second 
aspect to this is the belief that those outside the group do not care about the 
welfare of the group, and would not help them in the situation of a disaster 
(Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992: 253).  This leads the group to turn inwards in times of 
struggle, rather than out, and may explain why Women’s Refuge does not 
discuss increased workloads with other agencies. 
 
If this is the case, this mentality will need to be overcome within Women’s 
Refuge to ensure that domestic violence reporting increases during disasters do 
not continue unnoticed: 
Ros: So you just had to cope? 
 
Dawn: Yeah.  We had to cope with what we had.  Well I think too Ros, it 
was a matter of I didn’t ask.  I think I could have gone to the 
Mayor or could have asked but I didn’t.  So we made do with what 
we had.   
(Rangi-Smith, 2008) 
 
The dissemination of the results of this research to all agencies involved will 
begin the steps to change this lack of communication between agencies.  
However, if this mentality is institutionalised and not overcome, Women’s 
Refuge will continue to deal with the increased demands on their services in 
isolation.  This is not a good situation for both the workers at the Women’s 
Refuges, and the women and children accessing these services. 
 
Potential Future Issues 
The events examined in this study varied in effect from causing little physical 
disruption in a community to causing a moderate impact.  However, this study 
has not examined a large-scale event such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005 or the 
2004 Boxing Day tsunami around the Indian Ocean.  Events of this scale and 
magnitude of impact are likely to have more severe outcomes on victims of 
domestic violence and the agencies that help them.  When considering the 
 Chapter 7 
 
 224   
issues presented by increased domestic violence reporting in Civil Defence 
emergencies with little or no policy in place to meet the needs, it would be 
remiss not to discuss the other feasible issues that could arise from a large-
scale event.  Planning needs to cover not only what has been proven to happen 
in the past, but also what would happen in the future if an event occurred that 
lead to wide evacuations and massive destruction of infrastructure and homes 
in New Zealand.   
 
Conclusions 
Overall, an understanding of domestic violence is needed within Civil Defence 
and an understanding of disasters’ potential impacts on workloads and agency 
operation is needed by domestic violence agencies.  This can only happen if all 
groups involved convene to discuss their perspectives and contribute their 
areas of expertise to each others’ policies related to disaster response.  This 
may be the necessary first step in addressing a current lacuna in all parties’ 
policies.   
 
Factors listed included the increased stress from dealing with household 
cleanup, the loss of some or all of a family’s possessions, and the uncertainty 
that accompanies displacement.  However, all of this is just an excuse or 
justification that masks what is actually occurring.  Consistently, interviewees 
reported that the domestic violence women were reporting had been present in 
the relationship long before the event itself.  The event did not create the 
domestic violence.  However, it did change the dynamics within the relationship 
and led to an increase in reporting. 
 
A significant paradox that became evident during the research is that agencies 
that experience less of an increase in reported domestic violence are best 
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placed for dealing with an increase, and agencies that experienced the greatest 
levels of increased reporting have little or no planning in place to meet this 
need.  Work and Income and the New Zealand Police have structures in place 
already to gain access to more human resourcing during any event through 
other agencies/stations in the country.  Women’s Refuge, who consistently 
experienced the greatest increases in each community, currently do not have 
any plan in place to access any resources, let alone increased human resources, 
during and after a disaster. 
 
There was clearly no formalised response to any of the increased reporting in 
any of the five case studies.  Even if an increase was acknowledged during the 
event, an ad hoc arrangement was made to try to meet the needs of clients and 
lessons learned from this situation have not led to a change in policy or 
planning to date.  Policy is a vital tool in addressing increased domestic 
violence reporting during disasters.  The next chapter will discuss potential 
policy changes that will lead to an improved response and, hopefully, better 
outcomes for the women and children affected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Eight:  Policy Implications 
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An element of feminist research is that it aims to use the findings to bring 
about social change (Ramazanoglu, 1992; Thompson, 1992; Eichler, 1997; 
Renzetti, 1997: 133; Fonow & Cook, 2005; Skinner, Hester & Malos, 2005: 14; 
Landman, 2006: 431).  Thus, though the previous chapters of this thesis have 
demonstrated the increase in domestic violence reporting observed during 
three natural disasters and the lacuna that currently exists in the planning for 
and response to this increase, this thesis does not stop there.  The current 
chapter will discuss the possible implications for policy arising out of the 
response issues raised in the previous chapter.  The chapter commences with 
the proposition that a shift in policy is needed in order to accommodate the 
increased domestic violence reporting during disasters.  Then, potential policy 
responses to this issue are examined both in the abstract and in the context of 
New Zealand policy.  Recommendations for changes in policies relating to Civil 
Defence emergencies in New Zealand, and the internal policies of domestic 
violence agencies related to preparedness for a natural disaster are presented.  
Finally, because domestic violence is one of a number of gendered issues 
during disasters, this chapter will address these further issues and consider the 
need for greater gendered policy in Civil Defence and Emergency Management.   
 
Why Policy Change? 
Many of the representatives of agencies interviewed referred to personal 
lessons learned from each event (Anderson, 2005; Te Are, 2005; Bang, 2008; 
Rangi-Smith, 2008; Rodgers, 2008; Tukariri, 2008).  Each event provided the 
agencies involved with the opportunity to test their current policies and 
procedures and to isolate and address any lapses or gaps.  However, these 
lessons were not applied during any policy reviews in the aftermath of the 
events and, therefore, appear destined to be lost as key individuals move on 
from the agency or on to the next ‘crisis’ situation.  Natural hazard events differ 
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in their frequency.  By way of example, whilst major floods can occur annually 
or every one hundred years, the return interval for major volcanic eruptions can 
be thousands of years.  The loss of corporate memory of key response issues 
and best-practice measures is a common feature under these circumstances.  
Responsive written policies are one of the most effective means of avoiding this 
problem. 
 
The process of policy development is useful in itself as it provides an 
opportunity for policy makers to evaluate the variety of scenarios that could 
occur in the future.  New Zealand has not experienced an event on the scale of 
the 2004 Hurricane Katrina in the United States or the 2004 Boxing Day 
tsunami across Southeast Asia, since the 1886 AD eruption of Tarawera 
volcano.  The largest event in relatively recent times was the Hawke’s Bay 
earthquake in 1931.  However, it is prudent to apply the lessons learned in 
these significant overseas events in the New Zealand context in order to 
develop our own best practice for large-scale events.  A total reliance on the 
past experience of individuals working in the field to use their past specific 
experiences in deciding the form of the response to the next event leaves room 
for the same mistakes experienced in the United States’ response to Hurricane 
Katrina to be repeated in New Zealand (Batlan, 2008; Jenkins & Phillips, 2008). 
 
This chapter will cover the existing domestic and international policies that New 
Zealand is subject to with regard to both domestic violence and Civil Defence 
emergencies, prior to concluding with suggestions for policy amendments. 
 
Current Policies of Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
The national level policy that New Zealand Civil Defence planners and policy 
makers currently utilise in addressing disaster risk reduction is the Ministry of 
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Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) National Strategy (2007).  
This strategy is supported by several other policy documents in the form of a 
national plan, the CDEM Act (2002), Director’s guidelines and information 
pamphlets.  However, the strategy is the significant underpinning document on 
which current practice is based. 
 
The strategy is based on five principles, which are: 
1. Individual and community responsibility and self-reliance. 
2. A transparent and systematic approach to managing the risk from 
hazards. 
3. Comprehensive and integrated hazard and risk management. 
4. Addressing the consequences of hazards. 
5. Making best use of information, expertise and structures. 
(MCDEM, 2007) 
 
These principles provide the basis for the four goals of the strategy.  Each goal 
is broken down into objectives that aid in achieving each goal.  The four goals 
and their objectives are: 
1. Increasing community awareness, understanding, preparedness and 
participation in civil defence emergency management. 
a. Increasing the level of community awareness and understanding 
of the risks from hazards. 
b. Improving individual, community and business preparedness. 
c. Improving community participation in CDEM. 
d. Encouraging and enabling wider community participation in 
hazard risk management decisions. 
 
2. Reducing the risk from hazards in New Zealand. 
a. Improving the co-ordination, promotion and accessibility of CDEM 
research. 
b. Developing a comprehensive understanding of New Zealand’s 
hazardscape. 
c. Encouraging all CDEM stakeholders to reduce the risks from 
hazards to acceptable levels. 
d. Improving the co-ordination of government policy relevant to 
CDEM. 
 
3. Enhancing New Zealand’s capability to manage civil defence 
emergencies. 
a. Promoting continuing and co-ordinated professional development 
in CDEM. 
b. Enhancing the ability of CDEM groups to prepare for and manage 
civil defence emergencies. 
c. Enhancing the ability of emergency services to prepare for and 
manage civil defence emergencies. 
Chapter 8 
 
232 
 
d. Enhancing the ability of lifeline utilities to prepare for and 
manage civil defence emergencies. 
e. Enhancing the ability of government agencies to prepare for and 
manage civil defence emergencies. 
f. Improving the ability of government to manage and event of 
national significance. 
 
4. Enhancing New Zealand’s capability to recover from civil defence 
emergencies. 
a. Implementing effective recovery planning and activities in 
communities and across the social, economic, natural and built 
environments. 
b. Enhancing the ability of agencies to manage the recovery process. 
(MCDEM, 2007: 10-14) 
 
Across the four goals, there are areas in which policy can be developed to 
incorporate the response to increased reporting of domestic violence and 
integrated with disaster planning in domestic violence agencies.   
 
An aspect that became clear during this research is that agencies dealing with 
domestic violence have little awareness of the potential risks from hazards in 
their community.  The nature of the work of many of these agencies means that 
they have little time to consider those issues that do not create an immediate 
problem for them.  Therefore, they are an obvious target for Civil Defence 
education programmes under Objective 1A above.  
 
Increased awareness within domestic violence agencies of the potential impacts 
a significant disaster could have on their work, may trigger increased 
preparedness (Objective 1B).  This research has already highlighted that 
participation in flooding responses alone generated attention at a national level 
for Women’s Refuge with regard to including disaster preparedness in policy 
formulation.  The Chief Executive, Heather Henare, stated emphatically that, but 
for the research, there would have been no awareness and, therefore, no 
preparation at a national level (Henare, 2009).  Currently, non-governmental 
domestic violence agencies are not participating in any Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management at a national level (Objective 1C), and local level 
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participation was not observed in any of the five case studies in this research.  
However, once the process of engagement between Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management and these agencies begins, this may lead to key actors 
in the community continuing to engage more actively with Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management, at both local and national levels, and participate in 
decisions with respect to risk management (Objective 1D). 
 
The engagement will benefit both domestic violence agencies and Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management.  For domestic violence agencies, the opportunity 
to have a voice in decisions that affect them (where they have previously been 
silent) is vastly positive.  What is clear from the five case studies, is that Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management, at both local and national level, do not 
have a clear understanding of the needs of a Women’s Refuge safehouse or a 
women’s education programme during a disaster.  This lack of clarity means 
that actions taken in the official response and recovery could put these facilities 
at risk or create unnecessary barriers to effective operation.  Understanding the 
needs of domestic violence victims and their children, and the agencies that 
support them, during disasters will likely lead to a higher level of goodwill in 
the community. 
 
The current planning shortfall may, in the future, lead to agencies being unable 
to provide vital services to victims of domestic violence in disasters.  By 
encouraging agencies to prepare, and setting an example through preparing 
themselves, Civil Defence and Emergency Management staff will be able to 
reduce the level of risk to this already vulnerable group (Objective 2C). 
 
Domestic violence policy is not currently seen as relevant to Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management.  However, domestic violence policy will have a 
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significant impact on how well domestic violence agencies respond and recover 
from disasters.  Incorporating domestic violence considerations into planning 
and policy development within Civil Defence and Emergency Management, and 
giving input into how domestic violence policies are faring with regard to 
disasters, will improve the co-ordination of the government policies regarding 
domestic violence and current Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
policies (Objective 2D). 
 
At the present time, CDEM groups are unprepared for the consequences of 
increased domestic violence reporting during disasters/Civil Defence 
Emergencies.  Policy change can be implemented to enhance local CDEM 
groups’ ability to both prepare for and manage this aspect of emergencies 
(Objective 3B). 
 
Emergency services, such as the New Zealand Police and paramedic 
organisations, can be called to the scene of a domestic violence incident.  
However, there is no planning in place for how this will be achieved during a 
disaster, in circumstances where limited access and resources are likely to be 
issues (Objective 3C).   
 
Much like emergency services, government agencies, such as Work and Income 
New Zealand and Child, Youth and Family, have responsibilities relating to 
domestic violence.  Policy changes within Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management will benefit other government agencies to prepare for and manage 
this aspect of disaster response and recovery (Objective 3E) and improve the 
ability of government to manage large-scale emergencies (Objective 3F). 
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Domestic violence is a social issue that creates significant risk for the women 
and children affected by it.  In order to assist these women and children to 
recover from a disaster (Objective 4A), it is vital that domestic violence agencies 
are in a position to offer the requisite services needed.  Enarson (1999: 748) 
pointed out that the disaster could be an opportunity for women to leave an 
abusive relationship, in that the act of surviving of the disaster created enough 
self-esteem and self-efficacy within the woman that she felt she could leave the 
relationship for good.  If this is so, then agencies need to be at their best in 
terms of service quality and breadth to ensure that the women receive the 
support necessary to make this time the final time they need to leave an 
abusive relationship. 
 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management have the potential to equip domestic 
violence agencies with the skills necessary for recovery from a disaster as an 
agency and to help their clients recover (Objective 4B).  However, this will only 
happen if Civil Defence and Emergency Management acknowledge the need for 
these agencies to learn these skills, and recognise the current problem of 
increased domestic violence reporting and the lack of planning and policy to 
address this. 
 
From the discussion above, it is clear that the incorporation of domestic 
violence increases into Civil Defence and Emergency Management policy, and 
the inclusion of policies that cover disasters into domestic violence agencies’ 
policies, fit with the National Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
strategy.  All parties will benefit from developing policy to ensure that domestic 
violence victims are able to gain high quality help during disasters in New 
Zealand.  Maintaining a high quality of assistance during disasters is essential, 
as this plays a role in whether a woman successfully leaves an abusive 
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relationship (Berk & Newton, 1985; Berk, Newton, & Berk, 1986; Holiman & 
Schilit, 1991; Sullivan, 1991; Davis et al., 1994; Barnett et al., 1996; Sullivan & 
Bybee, 1999; Allen et al., 2004; McDermott & Garofalo, 2004).  Formal 
discussions are the first step in the creation of policies and procedures that will 
execute the necessary steps to achieve this. 
 
Gender and NZ Civil Defence and Emergency Management Policy 
One of the main considerations that must be included when formulating policy 
to deal with increased reporting of domestic violence during disasters is the 
gender dynamics underlying social interactions.  Since the 1970’s, feminists 
have been raising the issue of gender inequalities and the lack of recognition of 
this in policy and law (Alston, 2006: 125).  If organisations, such as the Ministry 
of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, are open to changing policy to 
meet the needs of domestic violence victims, then this could also be the time to 
consider wider gender issues in parallel. 
 
Within New Zealand, recommendations for government departments to 
mainstream gender in practice and policies already exist.  The Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs in New Zealand is charged with providing the government with 
advice on “issues relevant to advancing the well-being of women and ensuring 
they are able to make their full contribution to New Zealand” (Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs, 2006).  In 1996, the Ministry released a report titled “The full 
picture: A framework for gender analysis” (Ministry of Women’s Affairs, 1996).  
This framework was designed for government department to integrate 
systematic gender analysis into their policy process (Teghtsoonian, 2004: 267).  
Although this was published more than a decade ago, there is little evidence 
that the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management has implemented 
its recommendations.  At the present time, the Civil Defence and Emergency 
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Management Strategy, the CDEM Act (2002) and the National Plan do not 
address gender or gender dynamics (MCDEM, 2007; MCDEM, 2008).  This lack 
of gender awareness is also seen in the practice of those agencies operating at 
the local level (as seen in Bang, 2008; Harrison, 2008; Rodgers, 2008). 
 
New Zealand also has international obligations with regard to disaster risk 
reduction.  In 2005, the United Nations launched the international decade for 
disaster risk reduction.  The campaign introduced a policy aimed at specifically 
addressing the need for each nation to employ policies at a national level to 
address disaster risk reduction.  It raised five action areas: 
1. Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a 
strong institutional basis for implementation. 
2. Identify, assess, and monitor disaster risk and enhance early warning. 
3. Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and 
resilience at all levels. 
4. Reduce the underlying risk factors. 
5. Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels. 
(UNISDR, 2005) 
 
Gender is mentioned as one of the five key considerations for the priorities for 
action.  The policy states that: 
A gender perspective should be integrated into all disaster risk 
management policies, plans and decision-making processes, 
including those related to risk assessment, early warning, 
information management, and education and training. 
(UNISDR, 2005) 
 
There is no evidence that this consideration has been included in the Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management policies in New Zealand.  New Zealand is 
not currently meeting of its local and international obligations and, in this 
regard, falling behind other countries in the world who do include a gender 
perspective in their disaster management policies, such as Pakistan and the 
Philippines (Gomez, 2008; Ummar, 2008). 
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Domestic violence is a form of prohibited discrimination under 
international law and states are obligated to act with due 
diligence to prevent, investigate or punish such acts and to 
provide effective remedies to the victims of domestic violence. 
(Fenrich & Contesse, 2009) 
 
New Zealand also has obligations under the Convention for the Elimination of 
all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).  CEDAW requires “a state 
to act with the existing means at its disposal to address both individual acts of 
violence against women and the structural causes so as to prevent future 
violence” (UN, 2006).  The lack of planning and policy in place for increased 
domestic violence reporting during disasters or wider gender issues means New 
Zealand is not fulfilling its obligations under international law to the 
international community and perhaps more worryingly, to the women and 
children who are subject to domestic violence. 
 
Gendering Policy 
The process of gender mainstreaming is not a simple or quick exercise.  Prior to 
the introduction of gender mainstreaming, many policy practitioners opted for a 
gender-blind approach to policy.  This approach involved the removal of any 
notion of gender in policy (Kenway, 1990: 7; Little, 1994).  The rationale for this 
approach was the belief that it was gender “neutral” and, therefore, a level of 
equality would be achieved in the policy process.  However, gender-blind and 
gender-neutral are not synonymous.  The gender-blind practice introduced to 
redress some of the inequalities caused by gender, in fact led to further 
inequality (Alston, 2009: 140 & 150). 
 
Gendering policy is not a straight-forward concept and, much like the feminist 
scholarship it was born out of, it faces issues of definition and method of 
application (Kenway, 1990: 12; Little, 1994: 41; Daly, 2005; Walby, 2005).  In 
some early situations, gendering policy was interpreted as requiring the 
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inclusion of a reference that men and women have different needs and a strictly 
sex-based approach was taken.  This early approach meant that a focus was put 
on women’s issues.  As a result, women’s programmes or units in policy teams 
were created to ensure that women’s needs were met (UN, 2001; Alston, 2006: 
126; Alston, 2009: 141).  Rather than changing the institution to suit those 
affected by it, policies aimed to change the way individuals fitted within the 
same institution (Alston, 2009: 141).  This approach kept women in the role of 
the “other” and reinforced the inherently male-privileging systems that were 
known to disadvantage women (Alston, 2009: 141).  At the 1995 Fourth World 
Conference on Women in Beijing, the idea of gender mainstreaming was 
recognised as a preferable method of achieving gender equality than the 
previous women-focussed policies, as gender mainstreaming challenged 
policies and institutions at their very core (Donaghy, 2004: 393; Moser, 2005: 
576; Alston, 2009: 141).  The most frequently cited definition of gender 
mainstreaming is: 
Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing 
the implications for women and men of any planned action, 
including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at 
all levels.  It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s 
concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and 
programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that 
women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated.  
The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality. 
(UN, 1997: 28) 
 
Gender mainstreaming in Civil Defence and Emergency Management is not 
exclusively related to the inclusion of women in disaster policies.  Whilst this 
may form a part of a gendered response, it does not include consideration of 
the gendered power dynamics that will affect individuals during a disaster.  
Gender mainstreaming seeks to address the interests of women and girls but 
also men and boys.  In order to fully mainstream gender into any policy, the 
structures that enforce the policy will be challenged and transformed (Alston, 
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2009: 141).  Rather than isolating a separate unit for the consideration of 
women, the entire team will need to have knowledge of gender and its 
implications for policy needs and outcomes (Daly, 2005: 442).   
 
A question asked by advocates of gender mainstreaming is, “Is it better to make 
gender mainstreaming the responsibility of everyone, or to have a person 
specifically responsible for the gendering role in policy evaluation and 
creation?”  (Donaghy, 2004: 396)  The argument for making each individual 
responsible for gender mainstreaming is that it will ensure that all members of 
a policy team are aware of the social environment they are working in.  
However, the argument for a specific role in gendering policy, is that when an 
issue becomes everyone’s responsibility, it can become no one’s responsibility.   
 
In order to ensure that Civil Defence and Emergency Management does 
undertake an effective move towards equity for women and men, a position 
with gender expertise must be created within Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management that will support and assist in this change.  Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management policy states that it is everyone’s responsibility to be 
prepared for a disaster (Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, 
2007: 7).  However, there is an entire field of planners and policy-makers that 
must take a lead in increasing the level of preparedness in communities.  This 
is because it has been shown that little will change without some form of 
leadership and enforcement (Teghtsoonian, 2004; Donaghy, 2005: 405).  The 
role created within Civil Defence and Emergency Management must hold the 
power to enforce change if policy does not comply with gender mainstreaming 
as without the support of those in power, those resistant to such change will 
continue to slow progress (Donaghy, 2005: 400; Veitch, 2005: 605). 
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For over a quarter of a century, researchers have examined the relationship 
between gender and disasters (Rivers, 1982; Melick & Logue, 1985; Jiggins, 
1986; Shroeder, 1987; Vaughan, 1987; Fenton, 1989; Begum, 1993; Enarson & 
Morrow, 1997; Alway & Smith, 1998; Enarson, 2000a; Bradshaw, 2002; 
Ariyabandu & Wickramasinghe, 2004; Enarson, Fothergill & Peek, 2006).  The 
literature is broad and covers both gendered vulnerability (Cutter, 1995; Bolin, 
Jackson & Crist, 1998; Ahmed, 2004) and gendered resiliency (Neal & Phillips, 
1990; Akhter, 1992; Delica, 1998; Akcar, 2001; Ariyabandu, 2003) in disasters.  
The main issues highlighted in the literature that affect women during disasters 
are: violence; housing and evacuation; transportation; income and employment; 
dependent care; physical and mental health; access to relief resources; and full 
participation in disaster decision-making.  (Pan American Health Organisation, 
1991; Agarwal, 1992; Anderson & Manuel, 1994; Turner, 1997; Wraith, 1997; 
Wilson, Phillips, & Neal, 1998; Ollenburger & Tobin, 1998; Childers, 1999; 
Clemens et al., 1999; Enarson, 1999; Enarson, 1999b; Ollenburger & Tobin, 
1999; Delica, 2000; Enarson, 2000b; Rashid & Michaud, 2000; Khogali & 
Takhar, 2001; Van Willigen, 2001; Bateman & Edwards, 2002; Mankuta, 2004; 
Fisher, 2006; Jenkins & Phillips, 2008) 
 
These issues have varying degrees of relevance in the New Zealand context.  
For example, access to relief resources may not be as restricted in New Zealand 
as it has been seen to be in countries with a strong Muslim influence, where a 
woman is expected to spend four months isolated from society in mourning if 
her husband dies.  This cultural practice clearly limits women’s access to 
needed resources (Emmanuel, 2005).  However, there are other issues, such as 
violence against women, where this thesis has demonstrated that New Zealand 
is clearly not up to standard in terms of the level of planning and policy, both 
within Civil Defence and Emergency Management and across the domestic 
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violence sector.  Whilst this chapter focuses on recommendations to meet the 
needs of domestic violence victims, who are predominantly women, there is a 
wealth of literature (mentioned in the previous paragraph) that Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management can consult to incorporate wider gender issues 
into policy and practice.  This incorporation should mean that New Zealand Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management are able to comply with their national and 
international legal obligations, and ensure that the policy is meeting the needs 
of those affected by it. 
 
Power Dynamics 
It would be remiss to discuss any policy suggestions without addressing the 
power dynamics that occur between government agencies and non-government 
agencies.  Whilst New Zealand’s central government suggests that it wants to 
take part in an equal relationship with non-government agencies and work in 
partnership or collaboration with these agencies, this is perhaps idealistic and  
does not recognise the power imbalance that exists between government and 
non-government organisations.  Government agencies necessarily have greater 
access to resources, knowledge, capacities, and capabilities through their legal 
status, size and scope.  As a consequence, any relationship with a community 
agency or a national non-government agency cannot be equal (Johnson & 
Wilson, 2006).  
 
In democratic societies, governments are seen as the legitimate site of legal and 
statutory power, which comes with the obligation of not misusing this power 
(Borowiak, 2007: 998).  This power gives agencies of the government a greater 
level of legitimated power than non-government agencies wield and so the 
groups are not on an equal footing from the outset of any relationship between 
the two.  The government agencies and structures also possess a greater access 
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to resources, particularly financial assets than their non-governmental 
equivalents.  It is also likely that there will be a transfer of money from the 
government to the non-government agencies during disasters to help with the 
response and recovery from the disaster.  This relationship is inherently an 
unequal one, in which fiscal and legal power is vested in the central government 
agencies.  This was seen, perhaps most dramatically, in the widely criticized 
role of the American FEMA in the Hurricane Katrina disaster (Jenkins & Phillips, 
2008).  Emergency Management texts refer to power dynamics when discussing 
key stakeholders, such as community agencies (Lindell, Prater & Perry, 2007).  
Lindell, Prater & Perry (2007) discuss the importance for Emergency Managers 
to understand that there are a variety of power dynamics occurring between 
national, regional and local governments; government agencies and non-
government agencies; and agencies and the community.  Therefore, future 
policy amendments must be cognisant of this differential power in the relations 
between government organisations, such as Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management, and non-government organisations, such as Women’s Refuge and 
Victim Support. 
 
Suggestions 
Each agency involved in this research plays a different role during disasters.  
Civil Defence and Emergency Management, the New Zealand Police, and Work 
and Income New Zealand are central government agencies that have statutory 
responsibilities during disasters.  Their position is different to the roles of non-
governmental agencies, such as Victim Support, Women’s Refuge and the faith-
based or indigenous-focussed agencies.  However, across all agencies there are 
some general considerations that all should include when evaluating potential 
policy changes relating to the increase in domestic violence reporting observed 
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in this research.  These general needs are discussed before moving to more 
specific cases. 
 
A major issue reported or observed across all case studies was a lack of 
communication between agencies.  During the events, agencies appeared to 
turn inwards and focus on their own roles, which for some was clearly a coping 
mechanism for the vastly increased workloads.  The lack of communication was 
evident when the New Zealand Police or Work and Income all reported a good 
working relationship with Women’s Refuges, yet showed no awareness of the 
increased workloads or issues of lack of access to safehouses that local Refuges 
were dealing with in the months after the events.   
 
A second measure that agencies can take before the event to ensure current 
relationships either remain as communicative or increase in the level of 
communication during events is proactive relationship management and 
building during the months that events are not present.  In doing this, actions 
to meet the needs of agencies during disasters will be undertaken more 
smoothly as a relationship is in place and trust between parties will exist.  This 
need for relationships was recognised by a number of participants in this 
research (Peterson, 2005; Bang, 2008; Harrison, 2008; Wills, 2008; Mamula-
Seadon, 2009).  Due to issues such as staff turnover, this relationship building 
may need to be a formalised part of a role within each organisation to ensure 
that these relationships do not diminish over time. 
 
Government agencies must be aware of the constraints on non-government 
agencies from a lack of resources, both financial and human, during a disaster.  
It was clear during the interviewing that some government agency 
representatives did not have an understanding of a non-government agency’s 
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inability to respond to a disaster and increased work without external support.  
Non-government agencies have a wealth of resource in terms of networks and 
the ability to mobilise staff (Henare, 2009).  However, at times, they will require 
external support, in the form of access to resources that may be held by 
government agencies.  Government agencies may need to provide this support 
and, therefore, should prepare for this potential actuality. 
 
Finally, in this planning, all organisations must plan for the varying scales of 
events.  Civil Defence and Emergency Management have the background 
necessary to educate other organisations on the differing impacts of disaster 
scenarios.  The case studies in this research did not involve events in any way 
comparable to recent international events.  In the New Zealand case studies, 
whilst safehouses may have been cut off or overflowing, they were not 
destroyed (and neither were the office premises of the agencies).  An escalation 
of scale of the causal event would significantly alter the requisite response and 
agencies need to be prepared for such an event. 
 
All domestic violence agencies need to be prepared to maintain their services to 
current clients, as well as meeting any increase in caseload.  Whilst these will be 
discussed in specific detail in the sections reviewing each agency, an example is 
how a women’s education programme or men’s stopping violence programme 
should continue during a disaster.  This may not be a high priority for those 
most directly affected by the disaster.  However, the agencies have a duty to all 
clients not to cut services without offering an alternative or communicating 
when these services will resume.  A second example is the role of the New 
Zealand Police in enforcing existing protection orders when officers are pre-
occupied with disaster response and other law enforcement.  It is vital that this 
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type of enforcement does not halt as the risk to the protection order holder has 
not decreased and may, in fact, have increased.  
 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
New Zealand’s Civil Defence and Emergency Management staff at national, 
regional and local levels now have evidence that they need to be aware of 
increases in domestic violence reporting and the needs of domestic violence 
agencies during disasters.   
 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management is based on the principles of the four 
R’s: Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery (Ministry of Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management, 2007).  Of all the organisations interviewed, Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management holds the greatest level of responsibility 
to ensure that agencies and communities are prepared for disasters and have 
the capacity to respond and recover from them.  It is also considered best 
practice to involve non-government agencies in the Civil Defence practice, both 
in planning and policy-making, and in the response and recovery phases 
(Lindell, Prater, & Perry, 2007: 29). 
 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management is a de-centralised organisation 
(Mamula-Seadon, 2009).  Aside from the CDEM Act (2002), the Ministry of Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management’s main avenue for communication with 
the local Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) groups is through 
optional guidelines and information (Mamula-Seadon, 2009).  The local CDEM 
groups are relatively autonomous.  This has implications for the way in which 
policy and practice is implemented.  The manner in which the following 
suggestions are incorporated in practice will need to reflect this de-
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centralisation, whilst ensuring that the changes are as consistent as possible 
across New Zealand. 
 
Within Civil Defence and Emergency Management’s readiness principle, there is 
a role for staff involved in Civil Defence and Emergency Management to provide 
training for organisations and groups to prepare for disasters.  Prior to any 
event, domestic violence agencies are in need of training as to the ways a 
significant disaster could affect them.  At the present time, the Women’s 
Refuges in this research have only basic evacuation plans in place and lack any 
sort of business continuity planning or provision for what will happen with the 
women and children once they are evacuated from the safehouse or office.  
Addressing these inadequacies is an aspect of the readiness principle on which 
the Civil Defence and Emergency Management work is based.   
 
Planning by Civil Defence and Emergency Management also needs to include 
consideration of where to evacuate a vulnerable Women’s Refuge safehouse to 
in the event of a disaster.  In the Wellington region, there are six Refuges with 
six separate safehouses, and there are considerably more in the Auckland 
region.  When a disaster affects these areas to the extent that evacuation is 
necessary, the number of women and children evacuated from safehouses 
could be in the hundreds.  There is currently a director’s guideline relating to 
mass evacuations (MCDEM, 2008), however, this does not mention Women’s 
Refuge safehouses specifically.  There are sections that cover vulnerable 
populations during evacuations, yet, domestic violence victims are not specified 
in this.  The inclusion of safehouses and domestic violence victims into the 
evacuation planning undertaken by local Civil Defence will prepare Civil Defence 
for the special needs of domestic violence victims, and ensure that appropriate 
accommodation is found quickly. 
Chapter 8 
 
248 
 
 
Finally, Civil Defence and Emergency Management needs to discuss which 
agency, if any, will be responsible for the additional financial costs incurred by 
non-government agencies in responding to increased reporting of domestic 
violence during disasters with other government departments, including, but 
not limited to, the Ministry of Social Development.  Costs would include the re-
housing of women and children if a Women’s Refuge safehouse is evacuated; 
the cost of extra staff with the experience necessary to respond to increased 
demand whilst maintaining a high standard of service; and the use of vehicles 
needed to gain access to a Women’s Refuge safehouse isolated by a disaster.  
Non-government organisations, such as Women’s Refuge, currently lack the 
capacity to meet these financial demands and this is an issue that will need to 
be addressed.  
 
New Zealand Police 
The New Zealand Police, also have a statutory responsibility during disasters.  
This responsibility was observed to increase their workloads more generally, as 
noted in Chapter Five, and required the cancellation of staff leave and longer 
work hours for officers.  Women’s Refuge view the role of the New Zealand 
Police as key in interfacing between Women’s Refuge and Civil Defence.  The 
reason expressed was the fact that the relationships are currently in place: 
Heather : Well the confidentiality of the women in the house is an 
issue.  You know, where your local Civil Defence plan 
might jump in, it might be problematic within a Refuge, 
because it might be his partner in there.  So you’ve got to 
consider those, and we can’t possibly go around and train 
every Civil Defence person in the country so you’ve got to 
be realistic with what you can work with.  Obviously the 
Police are involved with Civil Defence so they would be 
your best port of call… 
(Henare, 2009) 
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The New Zealand Police may need to play a role in passing information between 
Women’s Refuge and Civil Defence.  The nature of the work of Women’s Refuge 
means that its work requires a high degree of confidentiality.  The need for 
confidentiality can lead to issues with regard to safehouse evacuation or access 
during the emergency, or the need for the concealment of the names of 
residents within the safehouse. 
 
The New Zealand Police and Women’s Refuges in all five case studies stated that 
they had good working relationships with each other.  However, practical 
evidence of this during the disasters was scarce in all but Whakatane.  In the 
case of Timaru, the safehouse was isolated from workers for a one-week period 
after the initial snowfall and the New Zealand Police were not aware of this.  In 
hindsight, the Police could have provided access to all-terrain vehicles, which 
would have allowed Women’s Refuge workers to take food and supplies into the 
safehouse and evaluate the need to evacuate victims, depending on the level of 
damage to the house.  This co-operation did not happen and women and 
children were forced to fend for themselves in an under-stocked safehouse 
during the snowstorm.  In the future, it would be beneficial for both Women’s 
Refuge and the New Zealand Police, if policy changes involved formal measures 
to ascertain whether Women’s Refuge needed the assistance of the Police 
vehicles to access their safehouse during a disaster. 
 
Aside from vehicular access, I submit that it is best practice for the Police force 
in each community affected by a disaster to check on the non-government 
agencies they work closely with as soon as practicable.  This benefits the non-
government agencies as any issues raised with the New Zealand Police may 
obtain an expedited solution through the Police role in the official Civil Defence 
response.  However, it also benefits the Police and the official Civil Defence 
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structure as community agencies are often involved with the most vulnerable of 
community members and will be able to inform the responding agencies of 
gaps in the response.  Learning of gaps at a time when these can be addressed 
rather than retrospectively after the Civil Defence operation is complete will 
build better relations with those community members and, more importantly, 
will ensure the Civil Defence response is more effective. 
 
A consideration for the New Zealand Police, with regard to their own work with 
victims of domestic violence, is how they will continue to enforce protection 
orders during disasters.  It is not unreasonable to consider that in the face of 
large-scale evacuations, some of the everyday work of the New Zealand Police 
must be given a lower priority than it would normally receive.  However, 
knowing this, a perpetrator of domestic violence with a protection order against 
them may choose this time to breach it, assuming enforcement will be given a 
lower priority.   
 
In addition to the enforcement of existing protection orders, the increased 
reporting of domestic violence that has been presented in this thesis means 
that officers and procedures will need to be prepared to meet the needs of new 
victims of domestic violence in larger numbers than at other times.   
 
Another consideration that should be taken into account when addressing the 
issue of increased reporting during disasters is the means of contact for the 
public.  In the case of Timaru, it was observed that phone lines were down for 
varying time periods.  This meant that the public were not able to contact the 
Police (and other agencies) by phone in the aftermath of the event.  Being 
unable to solicit help from the Police in the event of a violent domestic violence 
incident is a major concern. 
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Ministry of Social Development 
The Ministry of Social Development is a government body with, among others, 
two key social service agencies in New Zealand communities, Work and Income 
New Zealand (the agency responsible for financial welfare provision), and Child, 
Youth and Family (the agency responsible for the welfare of children and youth 
under the age of 18).  Both agencies have statutory obligations to respond 
during disasters.  Child, Youth and Family, at a national level, also provide 
government contracts to non-government agencies, including Women’s Refuge.  
Women’s Refuges receive quarterly funding based on the fulfilment of formal 
contractual obligations.  Consequently, both Work and Income New Zealand, 
and Child, Youth and Family need to be aware of increased domestic violence 
reporting during disasters. 
 
Work and Income New Zealand provides financial assistance to domestic 
violence victims upon leaving an abusive relationship.  In some of the agencies 
interviewed, there had been specific liaison with a Work and Income staff 
member who dealt with all domestic violence victims that request Work and 
Income support at the time of the disaster.  In other communities, the role had 
been created after the disaster.  In future disasters in New Zealand, this role will 
need to be strengthened to cope with the increased work which is specific to 
domestic violence and in addition to the increased numbers of people accessing 
Work and Income for general disaster assistance. 
 
The nature of the work with Women’s Refuge clients is likely to change in the 
aftermath of a disaster.  Prior to an event, Women’s Refuge may have been able 
to take the women to Work and Income for their appointments and then return 
to the safehouse.  However, during a disaster, this may not be physically 
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possible or logistically feasible.  This change in the way Women’s Refuge and 
Work and Income will be working together needs to be recognised in Work and 
Income’s emergency response policy.  This is to ensure that Work and Income 
staff are prepared to mobilise during disasters to provide the right level and 
type of support needed by the local Women’s Refuge (and other non-
government agencies) and their clients. 
 
Documenting increases in domestic violence reporting is also vital to the future 
understanding and monitoring of this social issue.  If Work and Income are 
willing to include a section in their documentation that allows for the 
assignment of an external event, such as natural disasters, or a wider category 
including other “disasters” such as major plant closures, this will allow for the 
tracking of domestic violence reporting in relation to specific events.  Future 
research will be greatly improved through this measure as it not only collects 
figures of related cases but also raises awareness within the individuals working 
at Work and Income about the potential link between the event and their 
caseloads. 
 
Child, Youth and Family will need to be aware, at a national level, of the impact 
that a disaster can have on the domestic violence agencies that it funds in areas 
affected by disasters.  The increased workload during disasters may influence 
an agency’s ability to report back to Child, Youth and Family in order to fulfil 
their contractual obligations.  Whilst this reporting is an important part of the 
contractual process, Child, Youth and Family may need to be more flexible in 
terms of when these reports need to be submitted. 
 
The question of funding also needs to be discussed when Child, Youth and 
Family are examining their Civil Defence and Emergency Management policies.  
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It is unclear who the key funder should be if agencies, such as Women’s Refuge 
require additional funding during a disaster.  In the case of Whakatane, an 
attempt was made to gain funding for a second safehouse in the community to 
deal with the excess number of women and children staying in the primary 
safehouse and the houses of the workers (Ripaki, 2005).  However, without the 
authority at local level to do this, delays in getting approval from the national 
office in Wellington, coupled with the specific needs of a Women’s Refuge 
safehouse, meant that a second house was never found and workers continued 
to house women and children in their homes throughout the disaster (Te Are, 
2005). 
 
At a local level, Child, Youth and Family will also need to consider the 
downstream effects of increased reporting of domestic violence.  Currently, 
when the New Zealand Police visit a residence for a domestic violence incident, 
they complete a form called a POL400 (Peterson, 2005).  If a family receives 
three POL400’s when children are present, their case is referred to Child, Youth 
and Family.  This means that whilst Child, Youth and Family may not experience 
an increase in caseloads relating to the floods in the immediate aftermath of an 
event, it may experience an increase later on, which may be so temporally 
removed that it is not immediately linked with the disaster.  However, the 
increased reporting may have been related to the event through the necessary 
extended period of reporting to the Police. 
 
Women’s Refuge 
Women’s Refuge has different needs from those of other domestic violence 
response agencies.  The provision of Women’s Refuge safehouses, which 
provide accommodation to both women and children, mean that its needs 
during a disaster are of a different nature to agencies that do not have a 
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residence.  On this basis, they will be treated separately to other domestic 
violence non-government agencies in this chapter.  In addition to the safehouse 
accommodation, Women’s Refuge advocates provide education programmes, 
support for women who do not want to come into a safehouse, advocacy with 
other agencies such as medical, legal and government agencies, assistance with 
formulating safety plans for women who want to stay in their relationships, and 
work with children who have witnessed the abuse (Te Are, 2005; Buckley, 2008; 
Rangi-Smith, 2008; Tukariri, 2008; Williams, 2008; Henare, 2009).  Women’s 
Refuge services are wide-ranging and complex, which means that a disaster can 
impact on a local Refuge in a myriad of ways.  Policy will need to reflect this 
complexity. 
 
At a very basic level, Women’s Refuge will need to update its policies to 
incorporate a Civil Defence plan.  This plan is not the simple evacuation plan in 
case of an emergency that can be found in many buildings.  It must be a 
comprehensive and adaptable policy that will meet the needs of the Refuges, 
and the women and children in the immediate aftermath of a disaster and in the 
months or years following that are needed to recover.  Here, Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management can provide support and information on potential 
issues, such as road closure or power outage durations, to ensure the policy is 
based on the highest level of current knowledge on infrastructure impacts of 
disasters. 
 
Women’s Refuge will also need to address the issue of funding to meet the 
increased service demands coinciding with potential costs of relocation, 
cleanup, or replacement of destroyed items.  In discussing this issue at a 
national level, it was clear that Women’s Refuge funding is based on grants and 
contracts that are for specific projects (Henare, 2009).  This means that, at 
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present, there is no reserve left to be pooled for unexpected financial needs, 
such as disasters.  It was also clear that some of the Refuges in the national 
body do not have the funds to meet daily needs, let alone to insure for disasters 
or stock up on food and emergency supplies (Henare, 2009).  This issue of little 
financial resourcing is one that will need to be examined by Women’s Refuge 
and a solution agreed upon across the national organisation.   
 
At the present time, the safehouses are particularly vulnerable during disasters, 
placing the women and children who may be in them at the time of a disaster at 
great risk.  With no pre-existing plans for evacuation of the safehouse or a way 
to gain access to women in a safehouse who are unable to leave, the 
safehouses are exposed to dangerous situations.  The safehouses are one 
aspect of planning that are of equal concern for both Women’s Refuge and Civil 
Defence planners.  A safehouse can be viewed as a ‘special residence’.  
Therefore, as in the case of retirement homes and hospitals, special plans must 
be made to ensure that safehouses are able to continue services during a 
disaster and, if evacuation becomes necessary, that the workers have the 
resources available to evacuate safely. 
 
Evacuation of a safehouse is not as simple as evacuating to the general site.  
Domestic violence victims cannot be relocated to where other members of the 
community are housed for safety reasons (Henare, 2009).  It is possible that 
their abuser, or family and friends of the abuser, will be located at the 
evacuation site, which puts the victims and their children at a high risk.  The 
point at which a woman leaves an abusive relationship and the weeks following 
are the most dangerous periods for her (Choice & Lamke, 1997; Rhatigan, 
2006).  In addition to the risk to the victims, the staff and other residents at the 
evacuation centre may be placed at risk because they could be caught in the 
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incident.  A separate evacuation site is the safest option for domestic violence 
victims and, where possible, it may prove safest to move the victims out of the 
area entirely.  However, if this is not possible, as was the case in Palmerston 
North and Whakatane, where roads were closed for up to a week after the event, 
then the bare minimum is a secure, confidential local site.  It is in the nature of 
Women’s Refuge’s work that confidentiality is required to maintain a secure 
safehouse.   
 
In the cases where evacuation is not required, but the safehouse is 
geographically cut off from the workers (as was the case in Timaru).  Women’s 
Refuge needs to consider how they will gain access to the premises.  Using 
resources available to other organisations, such as the New Zealand Police, 
necessitates pre-planning and a specific policy that requires the New Zealand 
Police to make the vehicles available for such a use as soon as practicable. 
 
Secondly, the issue of food, water and other supplies in the safehouse is one 
that requires consideration.  All five of the Refuges studied reported that there 
would not be enough food in the house at any one point in time to feed and 
take care of a full safehouse for an extended period of time.  In Timaru, the 
safehouse was isolated for one week after the initial snowfall and there were 
insufficient supplies to sustain the families in the safehouse comfortably at the 
time (Rangi-Smith, 2008).  This situation demonstrates to other Women’s 
Refuges the need to stock up on supplies as much as possible.  However, it 
should also indicate to Civil Defence and Emergency Management, that the 
nature of Women’s Refuge’s funding structure means that it cannot be assumed 
that there will be enough food and supplies to meet the needs of those in the 
residence. 
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Finally, the health and safety considerations of those inside the safehouse will 
need to be included in Women’s Refuge disaster policies.  The safehouse can 
accommodate a large number of women and children.  Therefore, the use of 
toilets, showers, and tap water during disasters will need to be examined and 
addressed in the planning and policy. 
 
A second area of consideration for Women’s Refuge is staffing levels.  With such 
a large proportion of its staff being volunteers, it was observed that in the 
aftermath of events, staffing numbers were reduced not increased (Te Are, 
2005; Rangi-Smith, 2008).  Women’s Refuge needs to consider what it will do in 
the event that staffing levels are significantly reduced during a disaster.  Unlike 
the government agencies that are under a statutory responsibility and a 
majority of paid staff, Women’s Refuge has no mandate for seconding extra 
staff outside of the disaster area.  This is also, in part, caused by the fact that 
the Refuges in the National Collective are independently run.  However, 
Women’s Refuge can learn from the government agencies in this research.  
Separately, the New Zealand Police and Work and Income New Zealand 
representatives discussed a requirement in their organisations to be able to 
respond to requests from other areas to send staff from their agency to support 
disaster-affected agencies.  This means that if a disaster strikes in one area of 
New Zealand, such as the Lower North Island flooding, then staff from agencies 
in other areas, for example the South Island agencies, must be available should 
a request be made to go to the area and help with the overload of work.   
 
Women’s Refuge’s work is such that, in a disaster, experienced staff are needed 
and the people brought in must have domestic violence education and Women’s 
Refuge training.  Unfortunately, for this reason, it cannot be volunteers from the 
community with no experience in domestic violence response.  This type of 
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policy would need to be agreed upon long before an event occurs, as all 
Refuges are already under-resourced (Henare, 2009) and, therefore, it may not 
be feasible to send staff to other areas.   
 
The cost of doing this will also need to be discussed by Women’s Refuge, and 
the decision as to who will pay for the relocation, housing, replacement or 
restoration of computers and other technology and expenses of the staff 
coming into the area must be made before an event.  There are a number of 
options for the financing of this type of initiative and it is important to have 
clarity as to who will meet the costs before an event so that this is not an added 
stress for the Women’s Refuge staff during a disaster. 
 
Women’s Refuge needs to plan for the contingency of power and phone 
outages, as observed in Timaru in the Canterbury snowstorm.  During the first 
week, when snow was still blocking roads and phones and power were out, 
women were not able to reach the services of Women’s Refuge.  This was 
reflected in the Timaru figures, which showed only four new women requesting 
Women’s Refuge services during the month of June and then 25 in July.  Other 
parts of South Canterbury were without power and phone access for up to six 
weeks in this event.  It is less clear whether there were women from outer areas 
unable to get help during this period as nothing was recorded in the case file 
summaries.  However, it is plausible to consider this was present in other areas 
also.  In the case of a larger-scale disaster, Women’s Refuge needs to consider 
how they will ensure their services are still accessible in some form when 
phones are not working for extended periods.  This is perhaps one of the most 
difficult situations to deal with and will require some specific technical advice 
given to Women’s Refuge policy-makers to help with effective decision-making. 
 
Chapter 8 
 
259 
 
Another technical consideration that Women’s Refuges will need to incorporate 
into their planning is how they will continue to record details of cases they are 
working with during a disaster.  If their computers and database are destroyed 
during the disaster, a backup exists at the national office.  However, this file 
does not have the names of the women and children the staff are working with, 
as these are deleted in the process of sending them to the national office for 
security and confidentiality processes.  It is important to continue to keep a 
record of the women and children the staff are working with and the specifics 
of each case. 
 
Finally, clients can require years of counselling with Women’s Refuge and, it is 
likely that during a disaster, the Refuge will have existing clients as well as the 
new ones that are increased in number.  A plan to maintain the relationships 
and work with their current clients needs to be in place before the disaster.  
This needs to be communicated to the current clients at the time of the disaster 
so that they are not left unaware of what to do and when the work can continue 
if stopped.  Similarly with current clients accessing the women’s and children’s 
education programmes that are run by the Refuges.  A disaster could strike at 
any point in the programme and the consequences of a cancelled or interrupted 
programme could create an unsafe situation for the women or children 
involved.  It will be integral for the Refuge to communicate clearly what is 
happening to the programmes during the disaster and what services women 
can access. 
 
Other domestic violence non-governmental agencies 
These other non-governmental agencies do not have the same safehouse 
considerations.  However, demand for their services may also increase, and they 
will have the task of supporting existing clients during a time when offices may 
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be destroyed or unusable.  As with Women’s Refuge, some of the other non-
governmental agencies offer education programmes for women and children, 
and stopping violence programmes for men.  If a disaster occurs in the middle 
of a programme, plans will need to be made to convey this to participants and 
an alternative set up for those participants who need it. 
 
An increased workload during a disaster will mean that an agency, particularly a 
non-governmental agency, will need to be doing more with less.  Scarce 
financial resources in non-governmental agencies means a strong dependence 
on human resources becomes part of the organisation’s culture (Henare, 2009).  
If a disaster causes a reduction in the number of staff available to help or 
offices are destroyed, non-governmental agencies may lack the resources to 
address the replacement of such resources whilst managing an increased 
workload.  Civil Defence should also include other domestic violence, non-
government agencies in business continuity training that will aid each 
organisation in making decisions about policies addressing disaster events.  
The policies will also need to consider where extra funding can be found during 
a disaster should they require more resources – physical, financial or human. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has discussed the current policies, both local and international, in 
place that provide the basis for New Zealand’s current Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management approach.  It has also covered the policy for gender 
mainstreaming analysis in New Zealand that all government departments are 
expected to apply to their policy analysis.  I then presented the process of 
gendering policy as one of the considerations necessary for the creation of 
effective policy to address increased domestic violence reporting during 
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disasters.  Finally, I have offered suggestions for the key agencies involved in 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management and domestic violence response. 
 
The process of changing or creating policy to address increased domestic 
violence will only be successful if the agencies join together to share their 
knowledge and come to an understanding on each agency’s role.  The policy 
changes will not be immediate as there are a large number of considerations.  
Initiation of the process would benefit from a meeting between the key agencies 
at a national level and a clear agreement on the steps to follow. 
 
The policy suggestions set out above have been formulated through 
discussions with agency representatives, at the local and national levels, and an 
examination of practices suggested by the international literature.  Specific 
planning for increased reporting of domestic violence in disasters is a women-
specific initiative, which is the first step towards gender mainstreaming.  
However, domestic violence is a manifestation of the gendered nature of social 
life.  It is one way in which an underlying patriarchy in New Zealand society 
creates an unsafe condition for a specific group of diverse women.  In 
addressing this issue, policy makers are taking a step towards dealing with 
gender inequality, which is a goal of gender mainstreaming.  This step is a 
good start to the overall gender mainstreaming process as the agency 
representatives that will be involved in making policy changes are currently 
open to making these changes (Byers, 2009; Henare, 2009; Mamula-Seadon, 
2009). 
 
Women-focussed initiatives are used in the early stages of gender 
mainstreaming.  However, the approach has yet to be widely applied to policy 
(UN, 2004).  Civil Defence and Emergency Management policy makers and 
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planners will need to consider other gender-based inequalities, such as those 
discussed above, that create differing levels of risk for men and women in the 
future to ensure that the policies used are not gender-blind, and enforce rather 
than mitigate gender inequality.  However, a top priority for both Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management and domestic violence agencies is to put in place 
policies and plans that address increased domestic violence reporting during 
Civil Defence emergencies, as the current lack of either heightens the risk 
already vulnerable women and children during disasters.   
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Violence against women is perhaps the most shameful 
human rights violation, and it is perhaps the most 
pervasive.  It knows no boundaries of geography, culture or 
wealth.  As long as it continues, we cannot claim to be 
making real progress towards equality, development and 
peace. 
(Kofi Annan, 1999) 
 
 
A decade after Kofi Annan’s statement, it still holds true.  Domestic violence 
continues to be a pervasive issue that affects women across the demographic 
spectra.  This thesis has addressed one aspect of domestic violence in one 
country, New Zealand, that of increased domestic violence reporting during 
disasters.  Overall, the research has presented evidence for increased domestic 
violence reporting in 11 of the 17 events that were part of the survey and, in all 
five detailed case studies.  Moreover, it has examined the multifaceted nature of 
the relationship between domestic violence and disasters. 
 
Understanding Domestic Violence and Disasters 
The relationship between domestic violence, domestic violence reporting and 
disasters is complex and reciprocal.  Both disasters and domestic violence are 
social phenomena.  Where these two phenomena intersect, outcomes of each 
are intensified by the other.  Disasters have been reported to influence the 
incidence of both domestic violence and domestic violence reporting.  
Conversely, domestic violence creates a higher level of risk to those subjected 
to it prior to, and during disasters, which impacts upon the magnitude of the 
disasters.   
 
As this thesis studies an intersection between two social issues, the sociology 
of disasters was the most appropriate discipline to use within this project.  Out 
of the sociology of disasters came the Pressure and Release model, which 
provides a framework to explain why domestic violence reporting may increase 
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during disasters.  Disasters expose social structures within a society that 
remain somewhat obscured during times of environmental normalcy.  The 
Pressure and Release model uses three levels to explain the risk created by 
social, cultural, political and economic structures (Wisner et al., 2004).  These 
are “root causes,” “dynamic pressures,” and “unsafe conditions” (Wisner et al., 
2004).  Domestic violence is one of the dynamic pressures that the root cause 
patriarchy creates.  During disasters, domestic violence becomes more visible 
placing violence in the view of those it is normally hidden from. 
 
The model also explains the way in which domestic violence places its victims 
at a level of higher risk from natural disasters than those who are not subjected 
to it.  Domestic violence is a dynamic pressure that creates a number of unsafe 
conditions.  These conditions include isolation, a heightened level of fatalism in 
both victims and perpetrators, and lack of access to resources, to social support 
networks and to communication media.  All of these conditions are very 
common in cases of domestic violence, and all put the women (and children) 
that are subjected to domestic violence at a greater level of risk during 
disasters. 
 
However, both the pre-existing body of work on domestic violence and 
disasters, and this research have demonstrated that it is not just domestic 
violence that may increase, it is also reporting of domestic violence (Enarson, 
1999; Fothergill, 1999; Jenkins & Phillips, 2008).  Literature regarding women’s 
stay/leave decision-making in violent relationships aids in understanding why 
domestic violence reporting increases during disasters.  Six models have been 
proposed to explain a women’s decision to stay or leave an abusive 
relationship: Learned Helplessness, Traumatic Bonding, Psychological 
Entrapment, Investment, Rational Action/Planned Behaviour and Two-Part 
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Question model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Walker, 1979; Dutton & Painter, 1981; 
Brockner & Rubin, 1985; Launius & Lindquist, 1988; Strube, 1988; Rusbult & 
Martz, 1995; Choice & Lamke, 1997; Rhatigan et al., 2006).   
 
The model favoured in this work is the two-part question model.  This model 
proposes that women base a decision on whether to stay or leave on their 
answers to two self-imposed questions.  These questions are “Will I be better 
off?” and “Can I do it?” (Choice & Lamke, 1997: 297).  A disaster can be seen to 
affect the responses to both questions.  For the first question, a woman will 
look at her previous investment in the relationship, the level of satisfaction she 
feels in the relationship and the quality of alternatives (Choice & Lamke, 1997: 
297).  The disaster can reduce the previous investments in the relationship (by 
destroying houses and possessions and/or incapacitating social networks 
through evacuations) and the level of satisfaction with the existing relationship 
(through stress-induced, more frequent or more intense violence), whilst also 
increasing the quality of alternatives, via disaster-relief.   
 
Choice and Lamke propose that if a woman decides she would be better off by 
leaving the relationship, the subsequent question she asks herself is, “Can I do 
it?”  (Choice & Lamke, 1997: 297).  During Civil Defence emergencies, a wealth 
of social service agency support is made available to the community (Te Are, 
2005; Bang, 2008; Rodgers, 2008).  Evacuation, or a home-visit from a social 
worker or Civil Defence worker, may be the prompt necessary for a woman to 
feel she is able to leave.  If this is coupled with increased availability of 
alternative housing or more social support within the community, then 
increased reporting of domestic violence in disasters may be a by-product of 
improved self-efficacy as a result of these changes.   
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The existing literature provides background regarding why domestic violence 
and domestic violence reporting may increase during disasters.  To establish 
support for these hypotheses, interviewees in this research were asked their 
impressions of factors influencing women’s decisions to report during that 
period.  In speaking to agency representatives, a number of factors were 
reported as significant.  Financial stress was one of the most frequently cited 
factors involved in the increased domestic violence reporting (Peterson, 2005; 
Te Are, 2005).  This occurred due to a loss of house and/or possessions, and 
reduced work hours due to businesses closing for cleanup.  Structural factors 
were also raised (Anderson, 2005; Hetet, 2005; Ripaki, 2005; Te Are, 2005).  
These include a lack of communication, between agencies, and between 
agencies and the community (Anderson, 2005; Hetet, 2005; Ripaki, 2005; Te 
Are, 2005).  This created increased stress for victims of the emergency as they 
were sometimes unclear how to fulfil the requirements to qualify for support 
(Te Are, 2005). 
 
However, these factors are not causes.  Domestic violence is not created by a 
lack of money, disasters or stress.  What is not explained by these factors is 
why the perpetrators of domestic violence are abusive with their partners and 
not with colleagues, friends, or other members of the community.  Domestic 
violence is fundamentally about control and, in particular, the control of women 
by their intimate partners (Umberson et al., 2004).  It is a clear indicator of how 
fundamentally gendered society is.   
 
Although reporting of domestic violence increases during disasters, there is, 
currently, a lack of any significant planning or policy in place that addresses 
this phenomenon during Civil Defence emergencies in New Zealand.  This 
research has created a greater awareness among the agency representatives 
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involved but has, as yet, not led to changes in policy or practice.  This lacuna 
means that women and children who are subjected to domestic violence will 
still be placed at heightened risk during disasters.  For example, domestic 
violence victims may not have access to traditional communications media, 
such as television or radio and, therefore, may not be aware of evacuation 
orders or other emergency information.  Policy and practice for Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management must adapt to fill this short-coming which is 
currently creating unequal outcomes for victims of natural disasters in New 
Zealand. 
 
Just as Civil Defence and Emergency Management is unprepared for increases in 
domestic violence reporting, domestic violence organisations are also under-
prepared and, in some instances, ill-equipped to deal with a significant Civil 
Defence emergency and the subsequent increase in domestic violence 
reporting.  At the present time, there are no specific policies in place, in 
domestic violence agencies including the New Zealand Police, Women’s Refuge 
and secondary agencies such as Victim Support, to respond to increased 
domestic violence reporting during a disaster.  Organisations such as Women’s 
Refuge and other non-government organisations also lack any continuity 
planning to maintain, let alone increase, levels of their services during a Civil 
Defence emergency.  In the past, this lack of planning has led to the 
overflowing of a safehouse in Whakatane, to the degree that workers housed 
families in their own homes, a safehouse being physically cut off for a week 
from workers and food or water in Timaru, and women being unable to access 
services of Women’s Refuge due to road closures in Palmerston North. 
 
At the present time, both domestic violence organisations and Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management are not providing best practice for women and children 
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who are subjected to domestic violence.  Given that the quality of service a 
woman receives when seeking help significantly influences her decision as to 
whether she will leave an abusive relationship (Berk & Newton, 1985; Berk, 
Newton, & Berk, 1986; Holiman & Schilit, 1991; Sullivan, 1991; Davis et al., 
1994; Barnett et al., 1996; Sullivan & Bybee, 1999; Allen et al., 2004; 
McDermott & Garofalo, 2004), this is unacceptable. 
 
Domestic violence and disasters do not have a causal relationship.  Domestic 
violence was reportedly already present in the relationships of the women 
seeking assistance in the months following significant Civil Defence 
emergencies in New Zealand, before the events.  However, a link does exist and 
has been demonstrated, in this research, to lead to increased domestic violence 
reporting in New Zealand. 
  
Where to from Here? 
I hope that the next step arising from this research is for domestic violence 
organisations and Civil Defence and Emergency Management to apply the 
findings of this thesis to address shortfalls in policy and practice.  The policy 
suggestions offered are agency-specific and are realistic given the constraints 
each organisation faces.  The process may involve a significant undertaking 
from organisations, and require time to fully address the needs of each 
institution and their clients.  However, the outcomes for domestic violence 
victims (both women and children) will be significantly improved if policy and 
planning changes are implemented effectively. 
 
Further research into the topic of domestic violence and disasters should 
include the interviewing of women who experienced a change in their abusive 
relationship following a significant Civil Defence emergency in New Zealand.  
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This change could consist of either a change in the nature of the abuse, or a 
change in the woman’s acceptance of the abuse leading her to leave the 
relationship, with or without the assistance of a domestic violence agency.  It is 
only through speaking to the victims and assessing any changes in their 
attitude towards the violence that the theories presented in this thesis can be 
confirmed or amended. 
 
This research provides baseline data on domestic violence reporting and 
disasters in New Zealand.  Research participants noted that in contributing to 
this research, their awareness of the issues had been raised (Rangi-Smith, 2008; 
Rounthwaite, 2008; Tukariri, 2008; Byers, 2009; Henare, 2009).  Future 
research that compares the level of increased reporting, and the agencies’ 
abilities to respond to this, will be useful in gauging if this research has created 
positive change.  Conversely, if no changes are made to policy or practice, 
future research can examine the impact a lack of change has had on domestic 
violence and the reporting of it.  
 
Conclusions 
An excuse that there is no evidence of increased domestic violence reporting 
during disasters in New Zealand is no longer plausible.  As a result, agencies in 
the field of domestic violence response and agencies in the field of Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management now need to address the effects on their 
work during disasters.  Policy and planning present the most durable methods 
for improvements, as they withstand changes in staff over time.  Policy-making 
and planning are iterative processes that allow for the re-evaluation and 
amendment of practice. 
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The policy changes should be the first step towards gender mainstreaming 
within New Zealand Civil Defence and Emergency Management.  New Zealand 
has formal obligations to ensure that policy does not create inequitable results 
between different groups.  These policy suggestions are women-focussed 
initiatives that fit into the early stages of gender mainstreaming.  As gender 
mainstreaming progresses, policy will need to incorporate wider considerations 
of the role gender plays in the lives of victims of a disaster, and how gender 
impacts on their experiences.  If this is not undertaken, Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management will fail in its legal and social obligations to those 
affected by disasters in New Zealand.  However, if New Zealand can successfully 
introduce gender into its Civil Defence and Emergency Management practice, it 
will lead the developed world in this area and create policy and practice that is 
truly reflective of the reality of disasters.  This is surely something to be strived 
for. 
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Reported Domestic Violence following Disasters 
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A survey of social service agencies following disasters in their 
communities 
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1. What does your agency do in relation to domestic violence? 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 
2. Do you deal with: (Tick all that apply) 
 Victims/Survivors 1 
 Perpetrators 2 
 Family and Whanau 3 
 Other  4 (Please Specify) ____________________ 
 
 
3. Following the event, did your agency experience a change in the 
number of clients reporting or referred to you for domestic 
violence-related help?  
(Please provide your best estimate of the % increase/decrease that followed the event) 
 
 Immediately after the event (first 2 weeks): 
 Yes, an increase 1 _____________% 
 Yes, a decrease  2 _____________% 
 No, numbers remained static 3 
 
Between 2 weeks and 6 months following the event: 
 Yes, an increase 1 ________% 
 Yes, a decrease  2 ________% 
 No, numbers remained static 3 
 
Between 6 months and _____ months following the event: 
 Yes, an increase 1 ________% 
 Yes, a decrease  2 ________% 
 No, numbers remained static 3 
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4. If the number of clients you were dealing with changed following 
the event, was this expected or planned for?  (Tick one) 
 Both expected and planned for 1 
 Expected but not planned for 2 
 Not expected or planned for 3 
 
 
5.  Were your clients: (Tick all that apply) 
 
 Male  1 
 Female  2 
 
 
6. What gender were the majority of your clients? (Tick one) 
  
 Male  1 
 Female  2 
 
 
7. What age groups did you work with?  (Tick all that apply) 
 
 Children:  0-17 years 1 
 Youths:  18-24 years 2 
 Adults:  25-34 years 3 
   35-44 years 4 
   45-54 years 5 
   55-64 years 6 
  65+ years 7 
 
 
8. What age group were the majority of your clients? (Tick one) 
 
 Children:  0-17 years 1 
 Youths:  18-24 years 2 
 Adults:  25-34 years 3 
   35-44 years 4 
   45-54 years 5 
   55-64 years 6 
  65+ years 7 
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9. Which ethnic groups did you work with?  (Tick all that apply) 
 
 NZ European 1 
 Maori 2 
 Pacific Peoples 3 
 Asian 4 
 Other   5  (Please specify)_____________________ 
 
 
10. What ethnic group were the majority of your clients? (Tick one) 
 
 NZ European 1 
 Maori 2 
 Pacific Peoples 3 
 Asian 4 
 Other   5  (Please specify)_____________________ 
 
 
11. What suburb/town were the majority of your clients from? 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 
12. Was this the area most affected by the event? 
 
 Yes 1 
 No 2 
 
 
13. What types of violence did you deal with?  
 (Please rank them with 1 being the most common and 5 being the least common) 
 
 Physical  
 Psychological/Emotional  
 Sexual  
 Economic  
 Other  (Please Specify) ___________________ 
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14. What was the most common relationship between perpetrator and 
victim/survivor? 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 
15. Were the majority of your clients: 
 
 New clients 1 
 Existing clients 2 
 
 
16. Why do you think the number of clients changed? 
 (Please rank them with 1 being the most likely reason and 5 being the least likely reason) 
 
 Increased/Decreased Violence  
 Increased/Decreased Reporting  
 Increased/Decreased Policing  
 
 ___________________________________  (Fill in if there is another reason for the change) 
 
 ___________________________________ (Fill in if there is another reason for the change) 
 
 
17. Please explain why you chose the ranking you did above: 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
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18. Following the event, did your agency experience a change in the 
number of paid staff able to work? 
 
 Yes, an increase 1 
 Yes, a decrease  2 
 No, numbers remained static 3 
 N/A  4 
 
 
19. Following the event, did your agency experience a change in the 
number of unpaid staff/volunteers able to work? 
 
 Yes, an increase 1 
 Yes, a decrease  2 
 No, numbers remained static 3 
 N/A  4 
 
 
20. Was your agency able to keep normal services running following 
the event?  
  
Yes 1 
 No 2 (If no, go to question 23) 
 
 
21. What services were you unable to provide? 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________
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22. What were the main reasons for this? 
 (E.g. funding shortage, staff shortage, premises unavailable) 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 
23. Did the event impact upon the operations of your agency in any 
other way? 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 
24. What other agencies did you work with following the event? 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
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25. Does your agency have an internal civil defence plan or set of 
procedures to follow in a civil defence emergency? (Tick one) 
  
 Yes 1 
 No 2 (Go to question 27) 
 
 
26. What does the plan or set of procedures cover? 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 
27. Is your agency involved with any national or regional civil defence 
planning?  E.g. A regional CDEM group member or a taskforce 
committee member (Tick one) 
 
 Yes 1 
 No 2 (Go to question 29) 
 
 
28. In what way are you involved? 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
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29. What role did your agency play in the response and recovery 
phases following the emergency? 
 
 Response 
 (The response phase is the period immediately after the event has occurred, 
it can vary in length, most commonly it can last from 2 days to 2 weeks.) 
 E.g. counselling, accommodation, financial support 
 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
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 Recovery 
(Recovery is focused on the long-term rehabilitation of the community.  It is 
the period after the response phase, and can last for many months following 
a specific event.) 
 
 E.g. financial advice, support, planning 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
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30. Please add any comments that you feel are relevant but have not 
been included: 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
 _________________________________________________________ 
  
 _________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________
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I consent to this information being used in a PhD, published articles and 
media interviews.  (Please note, your name will not be published in any 
of the reporting, only agency names will be used). 
 
 
Signed: ____________________________ Date: __________________________ 
 
 
Print name: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS SURVEY 
 
If you would like a summary of the findings please enter your contact details 
below: 
 
Name: _______________________________________________ 
 
Postal or   _______________________________________________ 
email address:  
 _______________________________________________ 
  
    _______________________________________________ 
 
Phone Number: _______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
FINALLY, would you be willing to be interviewed at a later stage on this 
topic? 
 
 Yes 1 
 No 2 
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Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
Researcher:  Rosalind Houghton: School of Social and Cultural Studies, Victoria 
University of Wellington 
 
I am a PhD student in Social Policy at Victoria University of Wellington.   As part of 
this degree I am undertaking a research project investigating social impacts of natural 
hazard events in New Zealand.   
 
To collect data on this topic, I am interviewing people working in agencies that deal 
with the women affected by domestic violence.  It is estimated the interview will take 
at most one hour and questions will be based around the incidence of domestic 
violence after the natural hazard event.  No specifics will be asked about individual 
cases but rather trends and commonalities over all the cases, such as demographics 
and the number of cases dealt with over the months following the floods. 
 
The interview will be recorded with your consent and I would like to quote you if 
necessary.  The transcript will be made available to you so that you are able to make 
any additions or factual corrections before publication and use.  A summary of the 
findings will also be made available to you at the conclusion of the research if you are 
interested. 
 
This research has been approved by the Victoria University of Wellington Human 
Ethics Committee.  The PhD will be submitted for marking to the School of Social 
and Cultural Studies and deposited in the Victoria University of Wellington library. It 
is intended that one or more articles will be submitted for publication in scholarly 
journals and also that media interviews may be done during and after research.  
Transcripts and tapes of the interviews will be destroyed 5 years after the end of the 
project so as to allow some time following the PhD for the writing and submission of 
articles. 
 
If you have any questions or would like to receive further information about the 
project, please contact me by email at Ros.Houghton@vuw.ac.nz, phone 027 4636 
415; or my supervisor, Dr Sandra Grey, at the School of Social and Cultural Studies at 
Victoria University, PO Box 600, Wellington, phone (04) 463 5361, email 
Sandra.Grey@vuw.ac.nz.  
 
 
 
 
 
Rosalind Houghton     
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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH 
 
Social Impacts of Natural Hazard Events in New Zealand 
 
 
I have been given and have understood an explanation of this research project.  I have 
had an opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction.  I 
understand that I may withdraw myself (or any information I have provided) from this 
project (before data collection and analysis is complete) without having to give 
reasons. (Please tick the following boxes once you have read and agreed to them). 
 
  I consent to information or opinions which I have given being attributed to me 
in publication of this research which will be available to the public, such as the 
PhD, journal articles, and conference papers. 
 
  I agree to the interview being recorded and then transcribed. 
 
  I consent to information or opinions which I have given being attributed to me 
in potential media interviews after I have checked the transcript for factual 
accuracy. 
 
  I understand that the data I provide will not be used for any other purpose or 
released to others without my written consent. 
 
  I would like to access a summary of the results of this research when it is 
completed. 
 
  I consent to the tapes and transcripts being kept for up to 5 years. 
 
  I agree to take part in this research  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name of participant …………….……………………………………………………… 
(Please print clearly)  
 
 
Signed………………………………………………… Date………………………….. 
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Article in the Whakatane Beacon, 28 October 2008 
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Phone  0-4-463 5676 
Fax  0-4-463 5209 
Email Allison.kirkman@vuw.ac.nz 
 
 
 
 
TO Rosalind Houghton 
COPY 
TO 
Dr Sandra Grey Janeen Batchelor 
FROM Associate Professor Jenny Neale, Acting Convener, Human 
Ethics Committee 
 
DATE 23 August 2006 
PAGES 1 
 
SUBJEC
T 
Ethics Approval: No 25/2006 SACS, Domestic Violence 
following natural hazard events in New Zealand 
 
 
Thank you for your application for ethical approval, and the amendments made 
which have now been considered by the Standing Committee of the Human 
Ethics Committee.  
 
Your application has been approved and this approval continues until March 2009 
If your data collection is not completed by this date you should apply to the 
Human Ethics Committee for an extension to this approval. 
 
 
 Best wishes with the research. 
 
 
Jenny Neale 
Acting Convenor 
pp  Allison Kirkman 
 Convener  
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